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AN HISTORICAL, THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
by
Steven Louis Widener 
University of New Hampshire, December, 1988
This thesis employs both aggregate data and a 
dissaggregated sample of 135 non-U.S. multinational 
enterprises to analyze the extent of direct foreign 
Investment (DFI) in United States manufacturing since 1900, 
its characteristics and causes. This research revealed 
that: (1) DFI originates primarily from other developed 
capitalist countries, (2) most DFI is relatively recent, 
accelerating markedly after 1970, (3) from the perspective 
of relative interpenetration of DFI, U.S. imperial power 
versus its major trading rivals has waned since 1970, (4)
there is a strong tendency for the parent firm to penetrate 
the market through acquisitions of existing U.S. firms, and
(5) that, normally, the investor acquires 100 % control of 
its investment.
Mainstream theories of DFI, which evolved from ideas 
advanced in the areas of marketing and industrial 
organization, argue that market imperfections create the
xi
firm's decision to undertake DPI. This view is seen as 
lacking due to its failure to account for the inherent 
advantages of investment over trade for servicing foreign 
markets. Additionally, this thesis rejects the view of many 
radicals in the U.S. concerning the nature of modern 
capitalist production and accumulation. Specifically, it is 
argued that monopoly capital theory is unable to explain the 
growing interpenetration of productive capital. Instead of 
solidified monopoly and perpetual stagnation, this thesis 
presents a dialectical view of competition and monopoly 
whereby the competitive interaction of capital continually 
undermines the old monopoly positions while creating new 
elements of monopoly (at a higher level) as the 
international concentration and centralization of capital 
proceeds.
This thesis also illustrates that the growth of direct 
foreign investment in the U.S. is tied to the transition 
from a long wave of expansion to a long wave of stagnation 
in the world capitalist economy. This transition to 
stagnation in the early 1970s produced a heightening of the 
forces of competition which Is increasingly expressed 
through the internationalization of the circuit of 
productive capital. Moreover, this movement of capital is 
seen as an important aspect in explaining the processes by 
which a foundation for a new social structure of 
accumulation is being erected.
xi 1
CHAPTER 1
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION
INTRODUCTION:__ THE NEED f 6r A FRAMEWORK
The goal of this thesis is to analyze the growth of 
direct foreign investment (DFI) in the United States, 
primarily in the 1970s and 1980s.1 I will attempt to show 
that this Increase of DFI Is an expression of growth in the 
forces of competition between units of capital on an 
international level in the post-World War II period. This 
development is significant since it represents a transition 
or evolution of world capitalism away from a system 
dominated by monopoly imperialist relations. A thorough
analysis of this hypothesis requires a number of 
simultaneous approaches. These can be summarized as follows:
1. An historical presentation of the aggregate magnitude 
and rate of growth of DFI in the U.S.
2. An historical investigation of the dominant agents 
(disaggregated) participating in the process of DFI. 
This includes a. specific identification of agents;
b. investigation of the concrete 
historical process undertaken.
3. Analysis of the factors causing the growth of DFI in 
the U.S.
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4. An interpretation of the significance of growing DFI 
in the U.S. for the future of capitalist 
accumulation.
The first two approaches are predominantly empirical 
questions that will be explored through a presentation of 
both aggregate and disaggregate data. The third and fourth 
approaches, however, require a framework (or an a priori 
system) through which DFI in the U.S. can be incorporated 
into the theory of capitalist production and accumulation. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to develop the 
methodological and theoretical framework which will then (in 
following chapters) be applied to the data presented.
THE DEBATE
The fluctuations in economic activity experienced by 
the world capitalist system in the 1970s and 1980s have 
generally been recognized as symptoms of something more than 
merely the traditional business cycle. Many economists 
believe that the past decade (or more) has been a period of 
relative stagnation of that system. Mainstream
conservatives claim that tampering with the competitive 
market economy has produced stagnation. They point to OPEC 
and the growth of government expenditures and regulations as 
the source of declining private investment, accumulation and 
employment. Liberals decry the lack of appropriate 
'industrial policies' by the leading capitalist nations' 
governments. They speak to the need to have a government
2
concerned with social justice in the face of a widening gap 
between the wealthy and the poor. This government should 
work with the private business sector (which itself needs 
ethical refurbishment) in a cooperative framework of 
national planning to promote economic growth and opportunity 
in the face of stagnation. The liberals are skeptical of 
the purely market-based solutions to stagnation advanced by 
the conservatives. Pointing to the example of Japan, 
liberals see the need for an expanded role of government in 
stabilizing the process of production and accumulation. 
Radicals, having long believed that the laws of motion of 
capitalist production generate stagnation, express relief 
that the post-war expansion has run its course and have 
returned to an analysis of Marxian and neo-Marxian crisis 
theory in their attempts to explain the causes of the 
current economic malaise.
This resurgence of interest in crisis theory among 
radicals has reopened numerous debates on such topics as: 
the labor theory of value, the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall, underconsumption, overproduction, 
disproportionalities, class struggle, and the role of 
technological change, to name just a few.^ An analysis of 
this literature leads one to the conclusion that while the 
left is united in identifying the symptoms of current 
capitalist stagnation, there is a good deal of disagreement 
concerning its causes.
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One of the key components in many of these debates has 
been the question of the form of interaction of firms in the 
modern capitalist system. The question is whether the 
modern capitalist system is dominated by competitive 
relations between units of capital, or has the process of 
concentration and centralization of capitals, originally 
exposed by Marx, led to the formation of monopolies that are 
able to transcend the forces of competitive capitalist 
production and accumulation. A resolution of this debate is 
important since the viewpoint adopted has significant 
consequences regarding:
1. the choice and characterization of the laws of 
motion that govern the process of production and 
accumulation of modern capitalism;
2. the interpretation given to the historical course 
of capitalist development since its inception;
3. the understanding to be received from the specific 
investigation of the concrete relationships and 
interactions existing between units of capital in 
modern capitalism, including the movement of capital 
between countries.
The participants in this debate can be divided into two 
schools of thought. One group, designated as the monopoly 
capital theorists (or Neo-Marxists), contends that the 
growth of large 'monopolistic* corporations in the modern 
capitalist system has rendered obsolete many parts of Marx's
4
analysis of capitalist production and accumulation. Hence, 
they believe that the laws of motion discovered and exposed 
by Marx In capital must be discarded and replaced by new 
laws which take Into account the existence and dominance of 
monopoly elements in the modern economy."* The second group, 
which could be called the non-monopoly theorists (or 
traditional Marxists), argues that the process of
concentration and centralization of capital has not led to 
the destruction of the competitive nature of capitalist
interaction and, hence, the laws of motion discovered by
Marx are still appropriate to the analysis of modern 
capitalism. In order to better understand the debate, the 
rest of this chapter will undertake the following
progression:
1. an analysis of the role of competition envisioned 
by Marx.
2. an investigation of the elimination of competition 
advanced by the monopoly capital theorists and the 
impact of the growth and dominance of monopolies on 
on the laws of motion of the capitalist system.
3. a review of the criticisms of the monopoly capital 
school by the traditional Marxists.
4. an analysis of the significance of this debate in 
explaining capital exports in general and, speci­
fically direct foreign investments in the U.S.
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THE ROLE OF COMPETITION IN CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION ACCORDING
TO MARX
Paul Sweezy has remarked that for Marx
competition was an elemental force, somewhat 
comparable to the force of gravity, which 
keeps the parts of the system in place and 
interacting with each other in intelligible
ways."4
A careful reading of Marx's work, however, indicates that 
such a view is one-dimensional and, hence, Inappropriate. 
Gravity, which operates in one direction only, is a poor 
metaphor for a concept that in Marx's view was dialectical 
by nature. A true understanding of Marx's conception of the 
role of competition requires a dual perspective,
simultaneously comprising forces of attraction as well as 
forces of repulsion.
Many theorists initially assume a competitive framework 
for their investigations for the sake of simplicity. This 
allows them to develop concepts about production,
circulation, distribution and reproduction with which they 
explore the relations that exist in the system and the 
process by which it develops under these competitive
conditions. Once this abstract model is understood these 
theorists turn their attention to how the 'more realistic' 
assumption of some form of imperfect competition changes the 
system's relations and alters the process of development. 
Mainstream economists tend to emphasize that either form is 
equally plausible but they generally profess their faith in
6
the virtues of competition's market discipline. Monopoly
capital theorists often utilize a similar approach in order
to argue the impossiblity of applying a competitive
framework to the modern day monopolistic e c o n o m y .  ^ Marx,
however, did not assume the existence of competition
(perfect or otherwise) as did the other classical
economists. Competition did not have to be assumed in his
framework because capitalism necessitated competitive
relations. The assumption of capitalist production
relations (as a mode of production) was sufficient since,
from Marx's view, the relationship of one capital to many
capitals in this mode must be of a competitive nature.
Conceptually competition is nothing other than
the inner nature of capital. its essential
character, appearing in and realized as the 
reciprocal interaction of many capitals with 
one another, the inner tendency as external 
necessity.6
Thus, the role of competition exposed by Marx was intimately 
connected to (appears as a logical result of) Marx's 
development of the laws of motion of capitalist development. 
These laws explain the path and set the limits to capitalist 
production and accumulation.
Marx argued that the process of capitalist production 
and accumulation would lead to the progressive growth and 
general extension of the capitalist system. As Ernest 
Mandel has pointed out, Marx used his reproduction schemes 
to illustrate the internal rationale and logic of continued 
capitalist development.7 Marx did not believe, however,
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that this process of capitalist growth would be a smooth 
one. instead, accumulation would proceed In an uneven and 
disrupted fashion, producing not only periods of capitalist 
expansion, but also periods of stagnation and decline (or 
crises). According to Marx, capitalist crises result from a 
rising organic composition of capital (growing capital
intensity) which produces overaccumulation (excess 
commodities, capital and labor) and a long-term decline in 
the rate of profit. This leads to stagnation of investment 
and, hence, retards accumulation. This decline in the rate 
of profit and accumulation heightens the forces of
capitalist competition as capitalists struggle to prevent 
devalorization of their capital. In the Marxian scheme, the 
process of capital devalorization is a counterforce which 
helps to restore profitability for the surviving capitalists 
who expand production and accumulation until their efforts 
at expansion are thwarted by a new crisis, whereby the 
process of competitive devalorization is repeated. Through 
this movement capitalist production is Increasingly
socialized (takes on a social character) while profits 
remain the source of enrichment for private appropriation. 
Marx argued that in order to survive this process of uneven 
and disrupted accumulation, the capitalist must continually 
strive to attain a size that is greater than his rivals.
The cheapness of commodities depends, all 
other circumstances remaining the same, on the 
productivity of labour, and this depends in 
turn on the scale of production. Therefore,
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the larger capitals beat the
smaller...Everywhere the increased scale o£ 
industrial establishments is. the
starting-point for a more comprehensive 
organization of the collective labour of many 
people, for a broader development of their 
material motive forces, i.e., for the 
progressive transformation of isolated
processes of production, carried on by 
customary methods, into socially combined and 
scientifically arranged processes of
production.8
While Marx did not develop a complete theory of
capitalist crises, he made his view clear that only an
analysis of the competitive forces of capitalism would
provide an adequate foundation for understanding their
development.
World market crises must be conceived as the 
real gathering together and forcible smoothing 
out of all the contradictions of bourgeois 
economy,..No crises can exist unless sale and 
purchase become separated from each other and 
come into conflict, or the contradictions 
inherent in money as means of payment come to 
the surface; unless therefore crises at the 
same time emerge in the simple form - as the 
contradiction inherent in money as means of 
payment. But these also are mere forms. 
general possibilties of crises, and
consequently also forms, abstract forms, of 
actual crisis. In them the nature of crises 
appears in its simplest form, and, in so far 
as this form is itself its simplest content, 
in its simplest content. But it is not as yet 
a content which has a determinate 
cause....(Tihe real crisis can only be 
presented on the basis of the real movement of 
capitalist production, competition and 
credit-in so far as crisis arises from the 
forms characteristic of capital, its 
properties as capital, and not from its mere 
existence as commodity and as money.
Further, Marx felt that the forces of competition were
themselves a variable that depended on the pace of
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accumulation, with relative stability during periods of
prosperity followed by cutthroat competition during periods 
of stagnation as individual capitalists attempted to
maintain the value of their capitals in the face of
declining sales and profits.
It is clear, however, that this kind of actual 
devaluation of the old capital would not take 
place without a struggle, and that the 
additional capital C could not function as 
capital without a struggle. That competition 
which results from the overproduction of 
capital would not cause a fall in the rate of 
profit. Rather the reverse. Since the 
reduced rate of profit and the overproduction 
of capital spring from the same situation, a 
competitive struggle would now be 
unleashed... Whatever the circumstances, one 
part of the old capital would have to lie idle 
as far as its property as capital was 
concerned, i.e., the property of functioning 
as capital and being valorized. As to which 
section is particularly to be affected by this 
idling, this is decided in the course of the 
competitive struggle. As long as everything 
goes well, competition acts, as is always the 
case when the general rate of profit is 
settled, as a practical freemasonry of the 
capitalist class, so that they all share in
the common booty in proportion to the size of 
the portion that each puts in. But as soon as 
it is no longer a question of division of 
profit, but rather of loss, each seeks as far 
as he can to restrict his own share of this
loss and pass it on to someone else. For the
class as a whole, the loss is unavoidable.
But how much each individual member has to 
bear, the extent to which he has to
participate in it, now becomes a question of 
strength and cunning, and competition now 
becomes a struggle of enemy brothers. The 
opposition between the interest of each 
individual capitalist and that of the
capitalist class as a whole now comes into its 
own, in the same way as competition was 
previously the instrument through which the 
identity of the capitalists' interests was 
asserted.10
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For Marx, then, capitalist competition must be viewed 
from a dual (dialectic) perspective. At certain times 
(periods of prosperity) capitalist competition acts to 
establish norms of operation, an identity of capitalists' 
interests, an orderly division of surplus and relatively 
stable accumulation and reproduction. During periods of 
stagnation and crisis this relative stability is destroyed. 
It is during these periods that the competitive struggle, 
which is unleashed, produces changes in the way the surplus 
is divided, a redefinition of capitalist alliances and a 
restructuring of the norms of operation and accumulation. 
For Marx, an understanding of the forces producing periods 
of capitalist growth as well as periods of stagnation 
require a dialectical and functional view of competition 
between capital.
The competitive struggle that is unleashed is
functional in the sense that it produces counteracting
forces that act to restore the rate of profit and, hence,
production and accumulation.
But other agencies come into play at the same 
time. Stagnation in production makes part of 
the working class idle and hence places the 
employed workers in conditions where they have 
to accept a fall in wages, even beneath the 
average: an operation that has exactly the 
same effect for capital as if relative or 
absolute surplus-value had been icreased while 
wages remained at the average...The fall in 
prices and the competitive struggle, on the 
other hand, impel each capitalist to reduce 
the individual value of his total product 
below its general value by employing new
11
machinery, new and improved methods of labour 
and new forms of combination. That Is, they 
impel him to raise the productivity of a given 
quantity of labour, to reduce the proportion 
of variable capital to constant and thereby to 
dismiss workers; in short, to create an 
artificial surplus population. The
devaluation of the elements of constant 
capital, moreover, itself Involves a rise in 
the profit rate. The mass of constant capital 
applied grows as against the variable, but the 
value of this mass may have fallen. The 
stagnation in production that has intervened 
prepared the ground for a later expansion of 
production - within the capitalist limits. 1
THE MONOPOLY CAPITAL THEORISTS 
Earlv Baran and Sweezv
With the publication of their book, Monopoly Capital: 
An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order in 1966, 
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy proclaimed (in the tradition of 
Rudolf Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin, and Josef Steindl) that 
the development of the forces of monopoly had made Marx's 
analysis of the laws of motion of capitalist development 
insufficient because Marx was examining the stage of 
competitive capitalism. They believed that an analysis of 
post-war capitalist societies must begin by recognizing that 
the forces of monopoly, not competitive capitalist 
interaction, are the dominant forces operating in modern 
capitalist accumulation.
Decision-making in these post-war societies is 
conducted by "a tiny oligarchy resting on vast economic 
power and in full control of society’s political and 
cultural apparatus. The large corporations in these
12
countries possess freedom which allows them ''to exercise
undisturbed their vast monopoly p o w e r s . " ^  <rhe current
stage of capitalism has seen competitive forces give way to
monopoly power which has produced a movement toward
non-price competition. In addition, the large profits of
the monopoly corporations have released these firms from
domination by bankers since internal funds are sufficient to
finance all possible Investment and expenditures. These
firms, operating in a world of oligopolistically
administered prices, attempt to maximize their profits by
lowering their production costs and, hence, raising their
profit margins. And these efforts to produce a higher
profit margin for the firm create a growing surplus for the
economy as a system.
if it Is true, as we have argued, that 
oligopolies succeed in attaining a close 
approximation to the theoretical monopoly 
price and if their never-ceasing efforts to 
cut costs,...are generally successful, then it 
follows with inescapable logic that surplus 
must have a strong and persistent tendency to 
rise...This means that under monopoly 
capitalism, declining costs imply continuously 
widening profit margins...(W)e can formulate 
as a law of monopoly capitalism that the 
surplus tends to rise both absolutely and 
relatively as the system develops.... By 
substituting the law of rising surplus for the 
law of falling profit, we are therefore not 
rejecting or revising a time-honored theorem 
of political economy: we are simply taking
account of the undoubted fact that the
structure of the capitalist economy has
undergone a fundamental change since that
theorem was formulated. What is most 
essential about the structural change from
competitive to monopoly capitalism finds its 
theoretical expression in this substitution. 4
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For Baran and Sweezy, then, stagnation occurs not from 
a fall in profits, but rather from a rise in the surplus. 
This shifts the problem of capitalist economic stability 
from one of restoring profitable accumulation to one of 
absorbing an ever-growing surplus. According to Baran and 
Sweezy, the problem that confronts the capitalist is 
insufficient demand leading to unplanned inventory 
accumulation and the resultant cutbacks in production. As a 
result, "(t)he stimulation of demand - the creation and 
expansion of markets - thus becomes to an ever greater 
degree the leitmotif of business and government policies 
under monopoly capital ism.
Baran and Sweezy then proceed to examine the factors
that influence the ability of the economy to absorb the
growing surplus. Their analysis attempts to expose the
limitations of the countertendencies (capitalist consumpton
and investment, the sales effort, and civilian and military
government expenditures) which in their view act to absorb
the surplus. They conclude that none of these
countertendencies will provide a solution to the problem of
insufficient aggregate demand.16
Twist and turn as one will, there is no way to 
avoid the conclusion that monopoly capitalism 
is a self-contradictory system. It tends to 
generate ever more surplus, yet it fails to 
provide the consumption and investment outlets 
required for the absorption of a rising 
surplus and hence for the smooth working of 
the system. Since surplus which cannot be 
absorbed will not be produced, it follows that
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the normal state of the monopoly capitalist 
economy is stagnation."
Finally, Sweezy and Baran date the rise of the forces
of monopoly to 1870 and conclude that the transition from
the competitive to the monopoly stage was complete by 1907.
The first world war and the automobile boom of the 1920s
'submerged' the forces of stagnation only temporarily as
evidenced by the return to stagnation in the 1930s. This
stagnation has remained the normal situation ever since
except in times of war and war-related prosperity. And as
this stagnation has dragged on, capitalism has become an
increasingly irrational system (as proclaimed in the title
of Baran and Sweezy's last chapter)18. For them, the system
becomes irrational when the development of monopolies leads
to the elimination of the equivalent exchange that had
existed in the stage of competitive capitalism.
Only on the basis of equivalent exchange was 
it possible to realize the more rational 
utilization of human and material resources 
which has been the central achievement of 
capitalism. At the same time, it must never 
be forgotten that the rationality of quid pro 
quo is specifically capitalist rationality 
which at a certain stage of development 
becomes Incompatible with the underlying 
forces and relations of production...(D)uring 
the life span of capitalism itself, quid pro 
quo breaks down as a rational principle of 
economic and social organization.
The giant corporation withdraws from the 
sphere of the market large segments of 
economic activity and subjects them to 
scientifically designed administration. This 
change represents a continuous increase in the 
rationality of the parts of the system, but it 
is not accompanied by any rationalization of 
the whole. On the contrary, with commodities
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being priced not according to their costs of 
production, but to yield the maximum possible 
profit, the principle of quid pro quo turns 
into the opposite of a promoter of rational 
economic organization and instead becomes a 
formula for maintaining scarcity in the midst 
of plenty.19
THE MONOPOLY CAPITAL THEORISTS REVISITED 
More than twenty years have passed since Baran and 
Sweezy first published Monopoly Capital. Their intention at 
that time was to bring Marxian analysis of capitalist 
development into the twentieth century by incorporating into 
the foundation of their theoretical analysis the "obvious 
fact" of the existence of large monopolist firms in the real 
worId.
We must recognize that competition, which was 
the predominant form of market relations in 
the nineteenth century Britain, has ceased to 
occupy that position, not only in Britain, but 
everywhere else in the capitalist world...It 
is therefore impermissible to ignore monopoly 
in constructing our model of the economy and 
to go on treating competition as the general 
case. In an attempt to understand capitalism 
in its monopoly stage, we cannot abstract from 
monopoly or introduce it as a mere modifying 
factor; we must put it at the very center of 
the analytical effort.20
If this transfer of focus proved successful, the
authors felt that a major factor causing the "stagnation of
Marxian social science" since the end of the Second World
War would be eliminated. Yet, unfortunately (though not
suprisingly) these twenty years or so of continued analysis,
criticism, reflection, and debate have produced few, if any,
new insights into the operation and reproduction of modern
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monopoly capitalism from its exponents. Instead, one might
well argue that the Introduction and growing theoretical
acceptance of a capitalist system dominated by all powerful
monopolistic firms has made it increasingly difficult to
comprehend the direction {let alone causal factors) of
future growth and development of the capitalist world
system. The reason for this theoretical stagnation is that
the monopoly capital model employed by these theorists leads
them to deny the possibility of internally generated
capitalist growth and development.
The norm of mature capitalism Is stagnation, 
not vigorous growth. In the absence of 
powerful extraneous stimuli, of which there 
are no signs anywhere on the horizon, the 
stagnation drags on and, except for occasional 
zigs and zags, feeds on itself. *
The political implication that follows from this
analysis is that capitalism as a reproducable economic
system is limping along in poor health, if not in the throes
of its final demise. The development of monopolies has
intensified the internal contradictions of capitalist
production and accumulation to such a degree that expanded
reproduction becomes Increasingly difficult and only
possible on increasingly irrational grounds. And, if this
is true, then it is only a matter of time before socialism
is called upon to replace the inherently irrational system
of capitalism.
(C)apitalism is an antagonistic system. It 
survives beyond its comparatively rational and 
historically necessary competitive stage only
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by intensifying its antagonistic and 
irrational character 1stlcs....(T)he prevalence 
of surplus capacity makes waste (i.e., the 
production of luxury goods such as military 
hardware, and unproductive outlays on 
circulation, like advertising) enormously 
profitable....By the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century monopoly capitalism had 
emerged: a society which was increasingly 
irrational even by capitalist standards, and 
which sustained itself (and this is where Marx 
may have underestimated capital) by its very 
irrationality. In fact, the massive 
contradictions of the contemporary 
socioeconomy in the advanced industrial 
states....are due almost entirely to the fact 
that socialism as a mere objective necessity 
is long overdue.22
While the message has thus remained the same, the years 
that have passed since Monopoly Capital was first published 
have produced a number of interesting points of criticism 
from traditional Marxists which has prompted defensive 
responses from the neo-Marxians. This dialogue has focused 
on a number of areas of contention which the monopoly 
capital theorists have attempted to clarify. A
classification of the major points of clarification is 
offered below:
1. The role of competition in the monopoly
stage of capitalism (MSC).
2. A further delineation of the operation 
of the variables in the monopoly capital 
model.
3. The role of the state in the MSC.
4. The role of imperialism and under­
development in the MSC.
18
5. An attempt to reconcile monopoly capital 
theory with traditional Marxian value 
- theory.
The rest of this chapter will restrict itself to a 
consideration only of the first point and the implications 
of this competition-monopoly debate for analyzing DFI in the 
United States. Obviously, a resolution of the 
competition-monopoly debate has significant implications for 
the remaining points of contention. These issues, however, 
cannot be addressed at this time since to do so would take 
one beyond the scope of this thesis.
Writing in 1981, Sweezy claimed that the early work on
monopoly capital by authors such as Thorsteln Veblen, Rudolf
Hilferding and V.i.Lenin did not attempt to argue that the
development of the monopoly stage brought about the
elimination of competition.
What is at issue in the transition from 
competitive to monopoly capitalism, therefore, 
is not at all the elimination of competition 
but rather a change in the forms and methods
of competition.
J. B. Foster supports this position.
Tracing its ancestry to both Hilferding and 
Lenin, neo-Marxian monopoly capital 
theory....does not assume that the present 
economy is 'noncompetitive', but merely that 
the nature of competition is radically 
transformed with price competition, in 
particular, playing a much smaller role.
Under conditions of oligopolistic rivalry, 
competition is ....'co-respective1, each firm 
carefully taking into account the price, 
output, and investment strategies of its major 
oligopolistic (or monopolistic) competitors.
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This leads to a situation, in highly
concentrated markets, which Is roughly
analogous to that of a single firm monopoly.
Yet, the monopoly capital theorists do not anywhere 
investigate how the development of capitalist production and 
accumulation has "transformed the nature of competition" 
in the past or how it continues to do so in the present. 
Instead of analyzing how the increasing concentration and 
centralization of capital brought about in the process of 
capitalist development continually alters the competitive 
environment of further capitalist accumulation, the monopoly 
capital theorists continue to argue (despite the softened 
approach) that the transformation is one in which the 
competitive environment is changed into one "which is 
roughly analogous to that of a single firm monopoly". From 
this transformed and now static stage of monopoly capitalist 
theory it is then contended that capitalismis trapped by its 
(monopoly) internal logic into a position of permanent 
stagnat ion.
Sweezy recognizes that the elimination of competition 
(equated with price competition) is not complete. He 
identifies three cases where competition may still exist in 
modern capitalism. These are: (1) small markets as yet not 
transformed by oligopolies; (2) oligopoly markets during 
periods of battles over market share; and (3) new industries 
which have yet to go through the "shakedown process which, 
in effect, repeats the experience through which many older
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industries had to pass many years earlier."2^ Sweezy goes 
on to claim that these are, however, short-lived exceptions 
that "should not be allowed to obscure the truth" of the 
dominance of monopoly administered pricing in modern 
capitalism. Foster is even more direct. For him, "the 
determining element within the modern economy is one of 
impure monopoly, in which the nature of competition is 
transformed."26
But again, no analysis of how the nature of competition 
continues to be transformed is presented. Instead, we are 
presented with an approach that sees the "transformation" as 
already completed, and the result of this transformation is 
permanent economic stagnation. This paper takes the 
position that such an analytical framework denies the 
dialectical nature of capitalist interaction. The process 
of capitalist accumulation and development can only be 
understood if it is recognized that this process continually 
negates existing relations and through this negation 
reproduces capitalism's competitive nature at a higher level 
and in new forms. 22
TRADITIONAL CRITICISMS OF THE MONOPOLY THEORISTS 
A number of traditional Marxists have expressed similar 
criticisms of monopoly capital theory. Steve Zeluck agrees 
that- modern capital ism is best characterized by a 
generalized monopoly mode. He goes on to argue, however, 
that such a system of universal monopoly leads to the
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elimination of the individual monopolist's advantage due to
the necessity of any such firm having to trade with other 
monopolists. Zeluck's analysis leads him to conclude that 
the interaction between monopoly firms attempting to 
maintain their monopoly advantage (defined as the ability to 
set price above value) produces two possible outcomes in the 
long-run. One possibility is generalized inflation as the 
monopolies participate in a time-lagged process of catch-up 
where one firm Initially succeeds in increasing prices only 
to be followed by a second and then a third, etc. The end
result of this interaction is rising nominal prices but, no
net gain for the individual firm. This then led Zeluck to 
the second possibility that a system of generalized monopoly 
produces a competitive interaction process between 
monopolies.
(E)ach monopolist, in his capacity as seller, 
sets his own price above value. His price Is 
determined not by his cost, or by the average 
cost in the industry, but Is limited only by 
the buyer's ability to pay. In short, the 
monopolist sets an administered price. But 
this (selling] monopolist will quickly 
discover in a world of other monopolies, the
results are not the same as in a situation in
which the monopolist Is the exception. For 
now the same monopolist must also buv from 
other monopolists, who also can (appparently) 
set their prices above value, and try to gain 
pure monopoly prof its....As a result, the 
price of commodities will not turn out as 
intended, above value, but will end up 
determined by value after all, just as in 
competition. Indeed that is just the point. 
Universal monopoly eliminates the potential 
gains of isolated, single monopolies. 
Universal or generalized monopoly becomes its 
own negation, turns into its opposite,
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competition. More monopoly becomes
less....(A)s the quantity of monopoly 
Increases its qualitative significance 
decreases, and in fact reverses itself, 
tending to turn any monopoly-administered 
prices into their opposite, competitive 
ones. ®
Ernest Mandel, in his book, Late Capitalism, undertook 
a parallel (and more substantial) challenge of the monopoly 
capital view of post-World War II capitalist development. 
He identified the period 1945-1970 as a distinct new phase 
of monopoly capitalism, called "late capitalism". One of 
the characteristics of this new phase is growth of 
competition between monopolists. Mandel maintained that 
even if one ignored the effects of technological change on a 
firm's monopoly position, oligopolistic industries were 
limited in their ability to acquire permanent surplus 
profits because the continuation of permanent above average 
profits would require either permanent unequal exchange with 
the non-monopolized sectors of the economy (the 
non-monopolized sectors would then earn permanent below 
average rates of profit), or a permanent rise in the social 
rate of surplus value (i.e., a permanent decline in the 
value of labor power). Mandel proceeded to argue that both 
of these processes were self-1imlting in the medium and long 
term since, in both cases, monopoly profits would inevitably 
be reduced. He concluded that the main error of Baran and 
Sweezy
. . . .derives from an eclectic attempt to 
combine Marx's labour theory of value with a
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neo-classical theory based on Keynes' concept 
of "total demand"....Monopolies cannot 
emancipate themselves from the operation of 
the law of value. Competition must in the 
long-run reassert itself, although not 
necessarily price competition....(N)ot a 
single monopoly in a single branch of 
production has succeeded in withdrawing itself 
from the law of value in the long-run. After 
an initial phase in which substantial monopoly 
profits were obtained, all have sooner or 
later gone through phases of cyclical decline 
in sales. They are thus all threatened by the 
danger of permanent over-capacity or a 
relative structural decline in sales, if these 
have not already set in. The ability of the 
monopolies to secure long-term stability of 
profits, proclaimed by several bourgeois 
authors and others who claim to be Marxists, 
is a myth29
Mandel pointed out that despite all of the efforts by
the state to prevent a fall in the monopoly's rate of
profit, the post-War accelerated expansion
....has led to a new phase of accelerated 
concentration and centralization of capital, 
which has made the multinational corporation 
into the decisive organizational form of late 
capitalist enterprise....As the forces of 
production out-grow the national state, they 
likewise gradually out-grow the State's role 
in controlling the industrial cycle and 
promoting economic upswing and growth. The 
more the monopolies think they have withdrawn 
from the law of value nationally, the 
they become subject to it internationally90
Mandel went on to identify the forces that have played 
"an exceptional role" in making the multinational 
corporation the "determinant organizational form of big 
capital". One factor was change.. in production, 
transportation and communication technology that 
significantly raised capital requirements of investment as
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well as the production volume generated by these new 
investments. Additionally, many industries that had become 
dominated by large oligopolistic production at a national 
level during the stage of classical imperialism possessed 
incentives to expand abroad due to the existence of a 
limited home market and a large investable surplus which 
resulted from domestic marketing and pricing arrangements. 
A third factor was the need to circumvent trade barriers 
which are themselves caused by "(t)he uneven development of 
the various big Imperialist powers (or regions), and the 
protectionist or partially protectionist policies which they 
p u r s u e . L a s t l y ,  Mandel claimed that the growing 
centralization of capital on a national scale produces an 
increase in the degree of specialization and rationalization 
of control over capital. This in turn allows the 
development of the corporation's global view which promotes 
direct foreign investments since it "permits preferences for 
new investments to be determined by objective criteria 
irrespective of national or international conditions".33
Stephan Hymer and Robert Rowthorn have argued that 
modern technology requires large corporations able to 
transcend limitations of the domestic market.33 Writing in 
1970, their analysis of the dialectics of the MNC led them 
to conclude that the European merger movement of the 1960s 
had produced administrative structures more able and willing 
to establish foreign subsidiaries of an efficient size.
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Coupled with greater financial strength brought about by
these consolidations and a growing share of foreign markets, 
Hymer and Rowthorn predicted a large expansion of European 
direct investment abroad both inside and outside the United 
States. The U.S. multinationals would not attempt to 
restrict entry into their domestic market. Rather, they 
would respond by picking up the pace of their investments 
abroad.
We can therefore expect a period of
intensified multinationalization (almost 
amounting to capital flight) over the coming 
decade (1970s) as both U.S. corporations and 
non-U.S. corporations try to establish
world-wide market positions and protect 
themselves from the challenges of each
other.34
The significance of these analyses is the position of
primacy given the multinational corporate form of
organization within the dynamically competitive world
capitalist system. In addition, Mandel draws important
distinctions between the various forms capital assumes
during the process of its progressive internationalization.
To clarify the long-term tendencies of 
development of the international
centralization of capital and its relationship 
to the late capitalist state, it is essential
to make a strict distinction between the
internationalization of the realization of
surplus-value (the sale of commodities), the 
internationalization of the product ion of
surplus-value (the production of commodities), 
the internationalization of the purchase of
the commodity of labor power (or the specific 
market for this commodity) and the
internationalization of the power of command 
over capital which is ultimately always based 
on the internationalization of capital
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ownership.... In the past there was only 
marginal Internationalization of production of 
surplus-value in actual manufacturing 
Industry, outside of the domain of raw 
materials. Today it constitutes the really 
new and specific aspect of the
internationalization of capital in the late 
capitalist epoch.... this development started 
Immediately after the Second World War....and 
has today become a world-wide phenomenon which 
for the first time actually provides an 
lmmedlately International framework for the 
competition of capital35
In Mandel's view, the capitalist economies embarked on a new
form of development in the period following the Second World
War. In the place of national corporate oligopolies, and an
emphasis on the export (realization) of commodities to
foreign markets, arose the integrated multinational
corporation and the thrust to produce commodities (create
surplus-value) in foreign markets. 3^
And it is precisely this development that is missed by
the monopoly capital theorists. They fall to grasp the
significance of this change of form of capital exports as
well as the impact of this change on continued capitalist
development and accumulation because the model of the
capitalist system that they employ excludes an analysis of
this change from the outset. Sweezy and Baran's view that
large corporations "are free to exercise undisturbed their
vast monopoly powers" is a misconception related to the
inappropriate level of abstraction applied to their analysis
of capitalist production. The authors recognize that the
capitalist system has always possessed an international
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character, placing significant importance on an 
understanding of this concept.
From its earliest beginnings in the Middle 
Ages capitalism has always been an 
international system. And it has always been 
a hierarchical system with one or more leading 
metropolises at the top, completely dependent 
colonies at the bottom, and many degrees of 
superordination and subordination in between.
These features are of crucial importance to 
the functioning of both the system as a whole 
and its individual components, though this is 
a fact the importance of which borgeouis 
economists have consistently ignored or denied 
and even Marxists have often underestimated.3"
Yet, despite their stated intention to place "the
international character of the system at the very center of
the analytic focus",38 Sweezy and Baran build the foundation
for their analysis of the ills of capitalism within a single
nation-state.
Now Marx derived his theoretical model of the 
competitive capitalist system from study of 
Britian, by far the richest and most developed 
capitalist country of his day. This was 
necessary and unavoidable. And on the same 
principle a theoretical model of the monopoly 
capitalist system must be based on study of 
the United States, which is today as far ahead 
of other countries in terms of capita1ist 
development as Britain was in the nineteenth
century....The purpose of this book is to
begin the process of systematically analyzing 
monopoly captialism on the basis of the 
experience of the most developed monopoly 
capitalist society3^
The monopoly model developed by Sweezy and Baran (and 
subsequently utilized by other monoply theorists) thus 
excludes from analysis an investigation of the significance 
of growing international cross-penetration of capitalist
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production and accumulation as a whole. While It was both 
necessary and unavoidable that Marx would build his analysis 
and draw his generalizations about capitalist production by 
studying only Britain, since world capitalism was at a stage 
in its development where production relations were dominated 
by local, regional and emerging national units of capital; 
this is no longer the case. The growth of International 
production and the resulting emergence of the multinational 
corporation as "the decisive organizational form" of modern 
capitalism makes an analysis based on the level of the 
nation-state useless for an exploration of the forces that 
are operating to shape the current stage of capitalist 
development.^
The futility of this approach becomes obvious when 
Baran and Sweezy turn to a discussion of the growth of the 
multinational corporation. From the context of their 
monopoly model they assume that the expansion of United 
States corporate investment abroad is an expression of the 
attempt to vent (find investment outlets for) the growing 
economic surplus. Their concern is to show that this 
investment will not cure the economic malaise of monopoly 
capitalism produced by insufficient aggregate demand, 
deficient surplus absorption and the resulting perpetual 
stagnation. Using data from the Survey of Current Business. 
Baran and Sweezy show that in the period from 1950-1963 
income from direct foreign investments by U.S. corporations
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was greater than direct foreign investment outflow. This
analysis leads them to conclude that
....foreign investment, far from being an 
outlet for domestically generated surplus, is 
a most efficient device for transferring 
surplus generated abroad to the investing 
country. Under these circumstances, it is of 
course obvious that foreign Investment 
aggravates rather than helps to solve the 
surplus absorption problem.
While the conclusion that foreign investment pumps 
surplus out of recipient countries is not incorrect, the 
analysis hardly captures the significance of multinational 
production and exchange in the post-war period.^ once it 
is recognized that the increase in direct foreign Investment 
and the resultant growth of multinational corporate activity 
is an expression of growing competition produced by a 
reduced rate of profit and the overproduction of capital 
(not as an attempt to vent the economic surplus but as an 
attempt to raise profits in the face of a tendency for 
profit rates to fall), the data presented by Baran and 
Sweezy take on new meaning.
CONCLUSION: COMPETITION. MONOPOLY AND 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Werner Olle and Wolfgang Scholler, in their analysis of 
German foreign investment in the post-war period, have 
criticized monopoly capital theory.^ They argued that 
viewing the export of capital as a vent for the economic 
surplus was appropriate during the historically specific 
stage of Lenin's classical imperialism. The form of capital
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exports in.this period was primarily one of loan capital.
The principals in this export of capital were 
foreign governments and municipalities 
(debtors) and large domestic banks which 
centralized investment-seeking capital from a 
large number of creditors.... It was this 
specific historical phenomenon of steeply 
rising exports of loan capital around the turn 
of the century which Lenin interpreted as the 
outcome of the "rule of the monopolies".’^
Agreeing with Mandel, the authors went on to point out 
that continuing to focus on capital exports as a 'safety 
valve' by which the domestic surplus can be vented, prevents 
the monopoly capital theorists from offering a valid 
explanation of the process of direct foreign investment and 
the resultant growth of multinational production. Instead 
of venting surplus, Olle and Schoeller argued that the 
change in form of capital exports from portfolio to direct 
investment, which began during the phase of world-wide 
economic stagnation in the late 1960s, represents the 
beginning of a structural reorganization of the world 
economy. The major features of this structural 
reorganization can be summarized as: (1) a world-wide
increase in direct foreign investment; (2) a relative 
weakening of the position of the former dominant investing 
countries (i.e., the U.S. and Britain); and (3) the 
emergence of new recipient countries (primarily the U.S. and 
the newly industrializing countries of the third world). 
Their analysis of these developments for West Germany led 
them to conclude that
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....monopoly-theory is neither historically, 
theoretically nor empirically convincing as an 
analysis of the internationalization of 
productive capital, and, in fact, yields 
practical conclusions which further diminish 
the applicability of the theory to real 
circumstances by narrowing down its field of 
vision to embrace only "a handful of large 
companies". The formulation of capital export 
as "monopoly raised to a higher power" in 
reality represents a retreat from the real 
world "at a higher p o w e r < T ) h e  stage which 
the world capitalist system has now reached 
contains a tendency which is forcing 
companies, regardless of their size, to 
undertake a global reorganization of their 
manufacturing processes on pain of 
extinction....(M)onopoly theory's....partial 
approach obstructs any qualitative
specification of the three interlinked 
sub-processes which mark out the current 
reorganization of the world economy: the
worldwide reorganization of production sites; 
the reorganization of the structure of 
production itself; and the reorganization of 
production techniques. It is the historically 
unique combination of innovations in site, 
products and processes in a phase of world 
economic stagnation which constitutes the 
substance of the reorganization of the world 
economy over the last ten years. The causes 
and consequences of this particular new 
development in the world economy demand an 
explanation.... Such an explanation cannot be 
built upon the conservatism implicit in 
monopoly-theory, but on a historically 
grounded theory of international competition45
This paper shall adopt the position that the current 
"innovations in site", reflected by the growth of direct 
foreign investment in general and direct foreign investment 
in the United States in particular, cannot be analyzed from 
a monopoly capital theoretical perspective. Indeed, the 
monopoly model offers no explanation for the growing 
international cross-penetration of capital between the
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developed capitalist countries in the 1970s and 1980s. The
inability to analyze this structural change is a direct
outcome o£ the static and stagnant monopoly model developed
from an incorrect interpretation of the forces determining
modern capitalist production and accumulation. As John
Weeks has argued,
"the monopolies that stalk the pages of the 
writings of Baran and Sweezy have no existence 
beyond the work of those authors. For these
monopolies, which at will set prices, control 
and suppress innovation, and the like, are
idealistic resurrections of 'feudal monopoly* 
before competition".46
In a futile attempt to rebuke the traditional Marxists,
Sweezy contends that Marx had Inklings of the Impending
transition to the MSC. He claimed that Marx believed that
the development of joint-st,ock companies and growth of
monoplies marked the beginning of the end of the capitalist
system through a phase of transition to the development of
socialism. Sweezy refered to the following passage from
Capital, Volume III, to support his contention.
This is the abolition of the capitalist mode 
of production within the capitalist mode of 
production Itself, and hence a self-abolishing 
contradiction, which presents itself prima 
facie as a mere point of transition to a new
form of production. It presents itself as
such a contradiction even in appearance. It 
gives rise to monopoly in certain spheres and 
hence provokes state intervention. It
reproduces a new financial aristocracy, a new
kind of parasite in the guise of company 
promoters, speculators and merely nominal 
directors; an entire system of swindling and 
cheating with respect to the promotion of
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companies, issue o£ shares and share dealings.
It is private production unchecked by private 
ownership,^
■'1
Sweezy feels that this shows that Marx and Engels 
mistakenly believed that the impending transition would be 
one to a completely new mode of production, that is, 
socialism. According to Sweezy this shortcoming was due to 
the fact that these changes were just beginning during the 
time of their writings as well as Marx being "too optimistic 
(as most revolutionaries are likely to be)".^® What Sweezy 
and the monopoly theorists fail to see, however, is that 
Marx believed that these developments produced a 
"self-abolishing contradiction". Further along in chapter 
27 of Volume III, Marx makes it clear that he sees these 
developments, and the growing social nature of production 
and accumulation they usher in, as having the potential to 
produce either a transition to socialism or to a new form of 
capitalist production relations.
Expropriation is the starting-point of the 
capitalist mode of production, whose goal is 
to carry it through to completion, and even in 
the last instance to expropriate all 
individuals from the means of production 
which, with the development of social 
production, cease to be means and products of 
private production, and can only remain means 
of production in the hands of the associated 
producers, as their social property, just as 
they are their social product. But within the 
capitalist system itself, this expropriation 
takes the antithetical form of the 
appropriation of social property by a few; and 
credit gives these few ever more the character 
of simple adventurers. Since ownership now 
exists in the form of shares, its movement and 
transfer become simply the result of
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stock-exchange dealings, where little fishes 
are gobbled up by the sharks, and the sheep by 
the stock-exchange wolves. In the joint-stock 
system, there is already a conflict with the 
old form, in which the means of social 
production appear as Individual property. But 
the transformation into the form of shares 
still remains trapped within the capitalist 
barriers; instead of overcoming the opposition
between the character of wealth as something
social, and private wealth, this
transformation only develops this opposition 
in a new form....Capitalist joint-stock 
companies as much as cooperative factories
should be viewed as transition forms from the 
capitalist mode of production to the
associated one, simply that in the one case
the opposition is abolished in a negative way, 
and in the other in a positive w a y . ^
Thus, contrary to the claims of Sweezy, it appears that
Marx felt that the result of concentration and
centralization could take one of two paths. One is that the
increasing socialization of production could lead to the
positive growth of a socialist transition. The other path
is that individual competitive expropriation gives way to
'associated* expropriation and accumulation within
capitalist limits, (i.e., a negative way). And, for Marx,
this negative capitalist development could only continue in
a competitive framework.
In practical life we find not only 
competition, monopoly, and the antagonism 
between them, but also the synthesis of the 
two, which is not a new formula, but a 
movement. Monopoly produces competition, 
competitors become monopolists....and the more 
the mass of the proletarians grows as against 
the monopolists of one nation, the more 
desperate competition becomes between 
monopolists of different nations. The 
synthesis is such that monopoly can only
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maintain Itself by continually entering Into 
the struggle of competition. ^
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CHAPTER NOTES
1. Foreign investment, in general, and direct foreign 
Investment, in particular, have a long history in the growth
of the capitalist world economy. Indeed, one aspect to this
thesis will be to explore early DFI undertaken In the United 
States at the turn of the century. The thesis will, 
however, attempt to establish that the current wave of DFI 
in the United States is both qualitatively and
quantitatively different from earlier adventures into the 
U.S. market. The foundation for this expanded role of DFI 
was established after World War II, with DFI in the U.S. 
gaining momentum since the late 1960s. Chapter II will 
present aggregate data to show historically the development 
of this foreign penetration. Chapter IV will undertake a 
disaggreated analysis of this presentation utilizing a
sample population of 135 foreign firms.
2. Some of the more informed discussions of these topics 
can be found in the works chronologically listed below: 
Michael Kalecki, "Class Struggle and the Distribution of 
National Income", Kvklos. 24, 1970; Andrew Glyn and Bob
sutciiff, British capitalism,_workers. ami tlis Profit
Squeeze. N.Y., Monthly Review Press, 1974; James O'Conner, 
"Productive and Unproductive Labor", "Politics and Society. 
5, no. 3, 1975; Raford Boddy and James Crotty, "Class
Conflict and Macro-Policy", Review of Radical Political
Economics. 7, Spring, 1975; Michael Bleaney,
Underconsumption Theories. N.Y., International Publishers,
1976; Edward Wolf, "Unproductive Labor and the Rate of
Surplus Value in the United States, 1947-1967", Research in 
Political Economy, 1, 1977; Anwar Shaikh, "An Introduction 
to the History of Crisis Theories", U.S. Capitalistm in 
Crisis. N.Y., Union for Radical Political Economics, 1978;
Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism. London, Verso, 1978; Ben
Fine and Larry Harris, Rereading Capital. N.Y., Columbia
University Press, 1979; Paul Sweezy, "Marxian Value Theory 
and Crises", Monthly Review. 31, no. 3, July-August, 1979; 
Howard Sherman, "Inflation, Unemployment and the
Contemporary Business Cycle", Socialist Review. 9, no. 2, 
March-April, 1979; John Weeks, Capital and Exploitation. 
Princeton, N.J., Princeton University, 1981; S. Bowles, D. 
M. Gordon and T. E. Weisskopf, Bevond the Wasteland. N.Y.,
Anchor Press, 1983.
3. There is some question over whether the new "laws" of
motion derived from the monopoly framework require that 
Marx's laws {i.e., the labor theory of value, the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall and the replacement of the
concept of surplus value with the one of economic surplus)
be discarded or merely amended. Naturally, the monopoly 
capital theorists emphasize that they seek only to amend
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Marx '3 laws o£ motion to take Into account the modern day 
reality of monopoly dominated production. A3 an example, 
J.B. Foster claims that "the law of value operates in its 
fullest sense - establishing an orderly relationship between 
production and exchange - only as long as competition 
between capitals serves to enforce the innermost relations 
of the system in a straightforward way....Since capitalism 
is becoming increasingly irrational from the standpoint of 
its own logic, it is necessary to recognize that the theory 
of a purely capitalist economy, where the law of value 
operates virtually unhindered, is no longer an adequate 
guide to the present as history; which means that it is 
necessary (even at the risk of abandoning pure economic 
logic) to find ways of adapting theory to take account of 
modifications In the laws of motion of the system. It is at 
this point that Marxian value theory, given the link made 
between the quantitative and qualitative aspects of value 
relations, proves itself to be far superior to all other 
economic paradigms, enabling it to incorporate the monopoly 
factor into the core of its analysis." See J.B. Foster, The
Theory of Monopoly Capitalism; An Elaboration of Marxian
Political Economy. Monthly Review Press, N.Y., 1986, pp.
72-3. Or see, for instance, Henryk Szlajfer who "would 
insist that the category of economic surplus introduced by 
Baran and Sweezy is an analytical category adjusted to 
conditions of modern capitalism. It is a category enabling 
an evaluation of the economic possibilities of labor 
emancipation, as well as an instrument for the critical 
analysis of the way these possibilities are taken advantage 
of within the framewok of modern capitalism. In this sense, 
the category of economic surplus is not an alternative to 
the category of surplus value. On the contrary, it is a 
consistent and historically justified development of the 
surplus value category". See H. Szlajfer, "Economic Surplus 
and Surplus Value Under Monopoly Capitalism", in J.B.Foster 
and H. Sxlajfer, eds., The Faltering Economy; The Problem of
Accumulation Under Monopoly Capitalism. Monthly Review
Press, N.Y., 1984.
What Foster fails to see, however, Is that Marx never 
believed that the opertion of the law of value would proceed 
"virtually unhindered". The operation of the law of value 
encounters resistance and countertendencies in all 
historical stages of capitalist development. Indeed, one 
could view (at a high level of abstraction) the transitional 
stages of development historically experienced by the 
capitalist mode of production as structurally altered 
expressions of changes in the forms of resistance and 
countertendencies which act to hinder the operation of the 
law of value. The "guide to the present as history" requires 
an analysis that takes into account both the tendency of the 
law's operation as well as the altered forms of resistance 
encountered and countertendencies produced. A framework that
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seeks to "adapt" the law by Incorporating "the monopoly 
factor into the core of its analysis" substitutes the 
operation of a countertendency for the operation of the law 
itself, and in the process elevates the countertendency to 
the level of a law that operates independenty of the Marxian 
law of value. This paper takes the position that such an 
approach amounts to discarding the Marxian notion 
altogether. Similar responses could be made to Szlafjer, 
who attempts to defend elevating the concept of a rising 
economic surplus to the level of a law which can explain the 
system's motion by arguing that this substitution is 
"historically justified" by the development of monopolistic 
production. Further development of these arguments, 
however, lies beyond the scope of this investigation which 
will attempt to focus on the competitlon-monopoly 
controversy.
4. Paul Sweezy "Monopoly Capital and the Theory of Value", 
The Faltering Economy, pp.28-29.
5. See for instance, Michael Kalecki, "Class Struggle and 
Distribution of National Income", Kvklos. vol. 24, 1971. 
Reprinted in M Kalecki, Selected Essavs on the Dynamics of
tilfi Capitalist Economy. 1933-1970. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge MA., 1971. Also, reprinted in J.B. and H. 
Szlajfer, The Faltering Economyf Op.cit., p.79, Kalecki 
begins his analysis with the following:
We shall first abstract from all
semimonopolistic and monopolistic factors, in 
other words, we shall assume so-called perfect 
competition. Let me add immediately that this 
is a most unrealistic assumption not only for 
the present phase of capitalism but even for 
the so-called competitive capitalist economy 
of past centuries: surely this competition was 
always in general very imperfect. Perfect 
competition, when its actual status of a handy 
model is forgotten, becomes a dangerous myth.
6. Karl Marx, Grundr isse. First Vintage Books, 1973, 
pp.414,
7. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism. Verso, 1978, Gresham 
Press, Old Woking, Surrey. See pages 21-31.
It is obvious that schemes designed to prove 
the possibility of periodical equilibrium in 
the economy, despite the anarchical 
organization of production and the
segmentation of capital into competing 
individual firms, will be inadequate for use 
as analytical tools to prove that the 
capitalist mode of production must. by its
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very essence, lead to periodic ruptures o£
equilibrium, and that under capitalism
economic growth must always lead to
disequilibrium just as It Is itself always the
result of it. (p.27).
8. Karl Marx, Capital. Volume I, First Vintage Books,
Verso, 1977. (In the U.S. by Random House Inc., N.Y.),
pp.777-780.
9. Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Volume I, pp.
377-387.
10. Karl Marx, Capital. Volume III, Penguin Books, N.Y.,
1981, pp. 361-62.
11. Ibid.. pp.363-64.
12. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital. 1966,




16. As will be seen below, this paper takes the position 
that Baran and Sweezy's emphasis on the monopoly elements of 
capitalist interaction is misplaced, ill-advised and the 
source of subsequent analytical errors. Yet even if one
accepts their assumption of monopolistic domination, a
significant problem with their analysis is that they fail to 
take into account all of the factors that influence the
countervailing forces of surplus absorption. An example of
this is evident in their analysis of military expenditures 
and the ability of these expenditures to absorb the surplus. 
They assert that these expenditures are subject to two 
limitations. The first is that current technology
(capital-intensive) has limited the ability of military 
spending to create jobs and, hence, stimulate aggregate
demand. The second limitation is the growing political 
opposition to further stock-piling of nuclear armaments. 
They conclude from this that military spending offers no way 
out of the surplus absorption problem. In reaching this
conclusion they have overlooked a number of important 
factors. First, while the job-creating power of military 
spending has been reduced it has not been eliminated.
Congressional pressure for new programs to bolster regional 
employment is as strong as ever. In addition, their
argument fails to account for the ability of governments to 
negotiate the retirement of 'old* missiles and the building
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of new ones to replace them. Further, Sweezy and Baran fail 
to see that technological developments have created a new 
area for spending, namely anti-nuclear armaments
(satellites, lasers, space stations, etc.). Most
Importantly, the authors fail to perceive that military 
spending involves much more than the production of just
bombs. A growing share of military spending is directed 
towards non-armament hardware such as computers,
communications, and delivery vehicles, all or which offer an 
unending range for technological Improvements and, hence, 
further investment and surplus absorption. Similar 
criticisms of Baran and Sweezy's reasoning could be advanced 
against the arguments that civilian government expenditures, 
the sales effort, capitalist consumption and private 
investment spending provide inadequate outlets for the 
(supposed) ever-growing surplus.
17. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly capitalism, p.108.
18. See Monopoly Capitalism, pp. 336-67.
19. Ibid. . pp. 336-37.
20. Ibid.. p. 6.
21. Editors, Monthly Review. May 1983, p.13.
22. J.B. Foster, "The Limits of U.S. Capitalism: Surplus
Capacity and Capacity Surplus", in The Faltering Economy;
The Problem of Accumulation Under Monopoly Capitalism, eds. 
J.B. Foster and H. Szlajfer, Monthly Review Press, N.Y., 
1984, p. 211. Foster's conclusion emphasizes how little 
monopoly capital theory has advanced in the last 20 years as 
it bears an uncanny resemblance to Baran and Sweezy's 
projections in 1966:
As the world revolution spreads and as the 
socialist countries show by their example that 
it is possible to use man's mastery over the 
forces of nature to build a rational society 
satisfying human needs of human beings, more 
and more Americans are bound to question the 
necessity of what they now take for granted.
And once that happens on a mass scale, the 
most powerful supports of the present 
irrational system will crumble and the problem 
of creating anew will impose itself as a sheer 
necessity. (Monopoly Captlallsm. p.367.)
23. P.M. Sweezy, "Competition and Monopoly", The Faltering 
Economy. eds., J.B. Foster and H. Szlajfer, 1984. Monthly 
Review Press, p.31. Reprinted from P.M. Sweezy, Four 
Lectures on Marxism. N.Y.,Monthly Review Press, 1981.
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24. J.B. Foster, Ihfi Theory q£ Monopoly Capitalism: An
Elaboration of Marxian Political Economy, p.69. This line 
of reasoning has been developed in response to a criticism 
of monopoly capital theory put forth by Willi Semmler. See 
"Competition, Monopoly, and Differentials of Profit Rates: 
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence", Review 
of Radical Political Economics, 1982, 13(4). Semmler argued 
that two streams of thought have been presented in 
post-Marxian analysis of modern capital,
one stream emphasized the abolition of 
competition. Power, especially regarding 
prices and profits, becomes the dominant force 
in the economy, bringing about a persistent 
hierarchy of profit rates. The other stream 
holds to the Marxist notion that, regardless 
of the genesis of oligopolies and oligopoly 
groups, capitalism is regulated by the 
self-expansion and competition of capital. 
Monopoly is related to special cases and, in 
the long run, is threatened by competition 
from other capitals, (p.43).
Semmler goes on to admonish later post-Marxian 
economists (M. Dobb, M. Kalecki, 0. Lange, P.M. Sweezy, J. 
Steindl and H. Sherman) for picking up on only "one 
tradition" in the post-Marxian literature.In addition, 
Semmler argues that little empirical evidence exists to 
support the existence of a persistent hierarchy of profit 
rates. (The question of the ability to prove empirically 
the position of one side or the other in the 
monopoly-competition debate will be returned to later.)
25. P.M. Sweezy. "Competition and Monopoly", The Faltering 
Economy, p. 40.
26. J.B. Foster, "The Limits of U.S. Capitalism", The 
Faltering Economy, p.211.
27. The re-emergence of competition after periods of 
intense consolidation and monopolistic dominance is a 
necessity. The re-emergence of competition is the market 
expression of the resurgence of the discipline of the law of 
value (which for capitalism is a reproductional necessity) 
in its quantitative capacity, thereby giving expression to 
its qualitative existence. Slajfer fails to comprehend this. 
See: Henryk Szlajfer, "Economic Surplus and Surplus Value 
Under Monopoly Capitalism", in J.B. Foster and H, Szlajfer, 
The Faltering Economy. In this work Szlajfer supports the 
position of Sweezy, Foster and other monopoly capitalist 
theorists who hold that a theory of price determination 
under modern capitalism is Indeterminant. Szlajfer writes,
If the model of monopoly
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cap!talism....destroys, in effect, 'economic 
theory' as a whole, then within the Marxian 
labor theory of value the main result of this 
model is the loss of the timeliness of the 
'quantitative aspect' of the labor theory of 
value. The 'qualitative aspect' of this 
theory, pointing to the sources of profit and 
surplus value, remains valid, (p. 274).
This is a weak attempt to reconcile Marxian value theory 
with the supposed existence of administered prices in the 
long-run. If, however, one rejects the ability of 
monopolies to permanently escape the forces of competition, 
then the ''timeliness of the quantitative aspect" of the law 
of value in the long-run is restored. This question shall 
be returned to later with an investigation of long-run 
fluctuations in the rate of growth and development of DFI in 
the capitalist system.
28. Steve Zeluck, "On the Theory of the Monopoly Stage of
Capitalism", Against the Current. Fall, 1980, vol. 1, no. 1,
p,46. While this abstract theoretical approach is 
intellectually amusing it hardly serves as a refutation of 
monopoly capital theory in the real concrete process of 
capitalist interaction. There are three reasons why this
approach is insufficient. First, the analysis suffers from 
the same static approach which grips the work of all the 
monopoly capital theorists. It does not analyze the 
continuing dynamic process of concentration and 
centralization in modern capitalism but, instead, implicity 
assumes that this process stops with the single firm 
monopolization of every industry. Second, the analysis is 
developed at the wrong level of abstraction, that of the 
monopolized industry Instead of at the level of many 
capitals which increasingly transcend standard industry 
classifications. Last, the analysis suffers from an
incorrect focus on the sphere of circulation and price 
determination instead of the production and appropriation of 
surplus value. To his credit, Zeluck recognizes the limits 
of his approach. He concludes that,
What is required beyond this negative critique 
is a positive theory of how the growing 
concentration and centralization of capital in 
the post-war period has affected the forms of 
crisis in a still competitive economy.... The 
alternative to monopoly capital and 
administered prices theory....must begin from 
an examination of tendencies to falling 
profits, intensified competition, and a 
constant alteration of capital surplus and 
shortage within the business cycle, (p.51).
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29. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism,. 1978. Verso, London, P. 
530-39.
30. Ibid.. p. 560.
31. Ibid.-, p.320.
32. ibid.., p.321.
33. Stephan Hymer and Robert Rowthorn, "Multinational 
Corporations and International Oligopoly: the Non-American 
Challenge", in C.P. Kindleburger, e d ., The. International 
Corporation,. Cambridge, MIT Press, 1970.
34. Ibid., p.
35. Ernst Mandel, Late Capitalism, pp.323-324.
36. As shall be seen in the chapter reviewing the 
literature on direct foreign investment, some theorists have 
argued that the internationalization of productive capital 
has proceeded in waves beginning as early as the turn of the 
century. See, for instance, Stephan Hymer, "The 
Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven 
Development", in J. Bhagwati, ed., Economics and World Order 
from the 1970s to the 1990s. Collier-Macmillan, N.Y., 1972,
p.121.
37. Monopoly Capital, p. 178.
38. ibid..
39. Ibid.., pp. 6-7.
40. Analyzing modern capitalism at the level of the nation 
state is analogous to Marx limiting his analysis of 
capitalist production and accumulation to Liverpool, 
excluding the rest of England. Had this been the case,
'Marxian economics' would surely have been relegated to an 
obscure footnote by economic historians.
41. Monopoly Capital, p. 108.
42. The point is that the framework used by the monopoly 
capital theorists prevents them from even asking the 
appropriate questions concerning the role of foreign 
investment. For example:
We are only interested in foreign investment 
as an outlet for investment-seeking surplus 
generated in the corporate sector of the
monopoly capitalist system. And in this
respect it neither does nor can be expected to 
play an important role. (See Monopoly Capital.
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p. 105)
43. Werner Olle and Wolfgang Schoeller, "Direct Investment 
and Monopoly Theories of Imperialism," Capital and Classr 
no. 16, Spring, 1982, pp. 41-60.
44. Ifr.itj. / p. 48.
45. Ibid., pp. 56-57.
46. John Weeks, Capital and Exploitation. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1981, pp. 165-66. Weeks 
reaches this conclusion in a unique manner. He argues that 
competition in the capitalist system is determined by the 
very relations of production, the capital-wage labor 
relation.
Under capitalism, the relations of 
production-labor power as a commodity 
prevent the permanent monopolization of 
production in any branch of industry, for the 
form of capital's exploitation of labor 
continuously creates the conditions for 
competition...Centralization does not reduce 
competition - causality runs the other way 
from competition to centralization...Since the 
process of centralization does not eliminate 
the alienation of labor but intensifies and 
advances it, centralization does not eliminate 
competition. Modern monopoly emerges as the 
synthesis of the competitive contradiction and 
the process of centralization. (See pp.
163-65) .
47. Karl Marx, Capital. vol. Ill, p. 569.
48. p. sweezy, The Faltering Economy, p. 30.
49. Ibid.f pp. 571-2.
50. Karl Marx, Collected WbEkS, VI, Ill£____Poverty__ q£




THE COMPETITIVE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CAPITAL AND DIRECT 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
COMPETITION. MONOPOLY AND THE PARADOX 
OF_ INCREASING CONCENTRATION
In this chapter data will be presented to support the 
position that the growth of the internationalization of 
productive capital in the post-World War II period 
corresponds to a new stage in the development of the world 
capitalist system. It shall be argued that a basic 
deficiency of the theory of generalized monopoly capital is 
its failure to adequately comprehend and Integrate the 
changes that have occurred in the capitalist global economy 
since the end of World War II. As was seen In the previous 
chapter, the reason for this failure is an inappropriate 
focus on capital accumulation within one nation-state under 
the control of powerful monopolies and oligopolies. Within 
this framework international relations of exchange and 
investment are "tacked on" to an otherwise closed domestic 
monopoly economy. In addition, once this static model of 
monopoly capital at its "highest stage" is accepted, any 
further conceptualization of periods or stages in 
capitalism's continued development becomes meaningless. The 
stagnation of this highest stage simply drags on and on, 
except for occasional periods of external stimulation.
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In the last chapter it was noted that the monopoly 
capital theorists believe that the spread o£ monopolies was 
a natural outcome of Marx's law of increasing concentration 
and centralization of capital. The development of a 
generalized monopoly environment in capitalist societies, in 
turn, makes the laws of motion developed by Marx (in his 
analysis of the competitive stage of capitalism) inadequate. 
Erected in their place are the notions of ever-rising 
surplus and permanant stagnation. The monopoly capital 
theorists have proclaimed their mission to advance Lenin's 
theory of imperialism by placing monopoly at the center of 
the analysis. Baran and Sweezy point out:
....that neither Lenin nor any of his
followers attempted to explore the 
consequences of the predominance of monopoly 
for the working principles and "laws of
motion" of the underlying capitalist 
economy.... Lenin, who was strongly Influenced 
by Hllferding's analysis of the origins and 
diffusion of monopoly, based his theory of
imperialism squarely on the predominance of 
monopoly in the developed capitalist 
countries. But as also noted, neither he nor 
his followers pursued the matter into the
fundamentals of Marxian economic theory.
There, paradoxically enough, in what might 
have been thought the area most immediately 
involved, the growth of monopoly made the 
least Impression.1
A careful reading of Lenin, however, reveals that it 
was no paradox that Lenin chose not to pursue the matter of 
the apparent contradiction between the process of increasing 
concentration and centralization of capital and the Marxian 
conception of competition between capitals. Lenin did not
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confront the apparent contradiction because he did not 
believe one existed. In a polemic against Hilferding, Lenin 
wrote that:
....the most deep-rooted economic foundation 
of imperialism is monopoly. This is
capitalist monopoly, i.e., monopoly which has 
grown out of capitalism and exists in the
general capitalist environment of commodity 
production and competition, and remains in 
permanent and insoluble contradiction to this 
general environment. Nevertheless, like all
monopoly, this capitalist monopoly inevitably 
gives rise to a tendency to stagnation and
decay. As monopoly prices become fixed, even 
temporarily, the stimulus to technical and, 
consequently, to all progress, disappears to a 
certain extent and to that extent, also the 
economic possibility arises of deliberately 
retarding technical progress....Certainly, 
monopoly cannot, under capitalism eliminate 
competition in the world market completely and 
for a long period of time (and this, by the 
by, is one of the reasons why the theory of 
ultra-imperialism is so absurd). Certainly 
the possibility of reducing cost of production 
and increasing profits by introducing 
technical Improvements is an influence in the 
direction of change. Nevertheless, the 
tendency to stagnation and decay, which is the 
feature of monopoly, continues, and in certain 
branches of industry, in certain countries,
for certain periods of time, it becomes
predominant.2
Thus, Lenin made it clear that he believed capitalist 
monopoly exists in a generally competitive environment and 
that (like Marx) monopoly "remains in permanent and
insoluable contradiction" to this generally competitive 
environment. This contradiction gives rise to a movement of 
synthesis through which monopolies continually find it 
necessary to enter into the competitive fray. And this
movement itself lays the foundation for renewed monopoly
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positions. Thus, monopoly appears permanent because It 
always exists, but it is in fact temporary, because the 
competitive environment continually generates challenges to 
and produces transformations of the monopoly positions 
within thl3 environment. (It is precisely this situation 
which elevates finance capital to a position of 
predominance). In Lenin's view, the rise of monopolies and 
finance capital in the particular concrete conditions 
existing at the end of the 19th century led to the 
conclusion that the tendency toward stagnation and decay 
would become predominant "in certain branches of industry, 
in certain countries, for certain periods of time".
MONOPOLY THEORY AND MULTINATIONALIZATION
The lack of a dialectical conception of the competitive
process by the monopoly theorists leads to further confusion
regarding the internationalization of capital and the
proliferation of the multinational corporation (MNC). Their
fundamental error results from an attempt to use a general
monopoly framework to explain the process of the
internationalization of productive capital and the formation
of MNC’s. Writing in 1978, Sweezy points out that
....the pioneer MNC's were the oil 
companies....Multlnationality was forced on 
them by geographical conditions.... In more 
recent times, and especially since the Second 
War, geography has been less important and the
imperatives of monopolistic business strategy
(emphasis added) more important. A
corporation starts with an export market and 
then, to protect it from competition, moves to
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assemble and then manufacture its products on 
the spot.
The reasons Sweezy cites for this monopolistic strategy
of neutralizing potential competition included the pull of
cheap labor supplies, tariff and non-tariff barrier costs of
exporting and the monopoly firm's belief that, if it doesn't
invest someone else will. Sweezy reasons that the
imperatives of monopoly business strategy have produced two
types of multinationalization. In the first case direct
foreign Investment occurs between developed countries,
creating an "interpenetration of each other's territory by
national oligopolists".^ Sweezy defines imperialism as the
process through which national oligopolies and monopolies
team up with the nation-state to expand beyond their
borders. In his view, direct investment between developed
countries poses few problems for the state and must
therefore be of little iivtportance in understanding
imperialism.
(I Interpenetration does not pose any 
particularly urgent problems for the 
state.... Since all these countries have well 
developed capitalist systems and stable state 
structures, and since they are all deterred 
from putting obstacles in the way of this kind 
of capital movement by the credible threat of 
retaliation, the states involved have not 
found it necessary or useful to adopt policies 
or apply measures with respect to foreign 
capital greatly different from those in force 
domestically.5
»
Sweezy noted the Japanese "exceptionalism" in lagging 
behind in the process of interpenetration, but, predicts
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that they will slowly open their markets to foreign capital.
The second type of multinationalisation occurs between 
the developed core countries and the underdeveloped
periphery. From Sweezy's perspective, imperialism 
necessarily focuses on the role of the MNC's in the Third
World. Nevertheless, he claimed that one is better able to 
understand the MNCs if one first analyzes some of the 
characteristics of their activities between developed 
countries.
Here there is a strong and persistent tendency 
toward interpenetration of each other's
territory. This fact has been obscured by the 
special conditions which existed in the years 
immediately after the Second World War. At 
that time U.S. corporations were the only ones 
in a position to move freely on the 
international stage....As more and more U.S. 
corporations moved into Europe, especially 
after the establishment of the Common Market, 
it began to appear that the MNC was a 
specifically American instrument for
establishing hegemony....More recently,
however, we can see that this is not really 
so. European and Japanese corporations have 
the same reasons for wanting to establish 
branches and subsidiaries in the United States 
as U.S. corporations have for invading Europe 
and Japan....The reason is basically simple: 
the more markets an oligopolist is represented 
in, the stronger will be its competitive 
position vis-a-vis rivals in each and every 
one of them".6
From Sweezy's perspective nothing more needs to be said 
as he abruptly shifts to an investigation of MNC's in the 
Third World, where (for Sweezy), the imperialistic aspects 
of the MNC and nation-state activities can be grasped.
Sweezy, then, explained the growth of direct foreign
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Investment penetration between developed countries as the 
outcome of monopoly business strategy. Yet, while he has an 
inkling that this has something to do with competition, his 
failure to understand the dialectic of competition and 
monopoly (and the antagonism between them which in practical 
life presents itself as a movement by which monopolies 
strive to maintain themselves by entering into the 
competitive struggle), leads him to see DFI between 
developed countries as simply an extension of oligopolistic 
rivalry across borders. These self-perpetuatlong
oligopolies simply become internationally intertwined. 
There is no understanding of how this growing 
Interpenetration undermines old monopolistic positions, 
alters the nature of competitive capitalist relations and 
leads to a restructuring of the fractions of the capitalist 
class within and between each country.
This conclusion Is supported by Sweezy's comments on 
the lack of contradictions within the developed countries 
between the state and the MNC's, since the developed 
countries' governments are (somehow or other) all to be 
viewed as pursuing the same (identical) Interests. His 
comments on Japanese reluctance to participate in the 
process of multinationalisation and interpenetration seem 
particularly ironic in light of the most recent controversy 
in U.S.-Japanese trade relations and the imposition of 
penalty tariffs by the Reagan Administration due to the
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7
alleged dumping of computer chips on world markets.
Clearly, the internationalization of capital and, 
specifically, the interpenetration of productive capital 
between the developed countries does pose problems for the 
states of these countries. Additionally, this International 
interpenetration of productive capital is just as much an 
aspect of imperialism and the drive for hegemony as is the 
multinationalisation between the developed core countries 
and the underdeveloped periphery.
Vladimir Lenin, in his attacks on Karl Kautsky's
concepts of imperialism and particularly the possibility of
ultra-imperialism, criticized him for onesldedly and
inaccurately connecting imperialism with the annexation of
backward "agrarian" regions.
The characteristic feature of imperialism is 
precisely that it strives to annex not only 
agricultural regions, but even highly 
industrialized regions (German appetite for 
Belgium; French appetite for Lorraine), 
because, 1) the fact that the world is already
partitioned obliges those contemplating a new 
partition to stretch out their hands to any 
kind of territory, and 2) because an essential 
feature of imperialism is rivalry between a 
number of great powers in the striving for 
hegemony, i.e. for the conquest of territory, 
not so much directly for themselves, as to
weaken the adversary and undermine his 
hegemony. (Belgium is chiefly necessary for 
Germany as a base for operations against
England; England needs Bagdad as a base for 
operations against Germany, etc.)**
The true paradox of this situation is that the monopoly 
capital theorists, who proclaim their attempt to update the 
neo-Leninist tradition, fall into the same trap as Kautsky.
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1) They arbitrarily focus on the activities of MNC's in the
Third World; 2) they fall to see how DFI in the U.S. is the
modern expression of an attempt to "weaken the adversary and
undermine his hegemony"; 3) they fall to comprehend the
significance in the change of form of the
internationalisation of capital as an expression of the
heightened forces of competition which acts to undermine old
monopoly positions arid redefine the structures of
accumulation. The fundamental cause of these errors is a
misconception of the modern capitalist business enterprise
operating in a generally monopolistic framework. As M.
Herold and N. Kozlov have noted,
(t)he concept of a capitalist enterprise (an 
individual capital) can be formulated at 
different levels of abstraction. It is 
possible to remain at a high level of 
abstraction (capital in general) and yet 
derive certain insights from the analysis of 
an individual capital In regard to, for 
example, the investigation of the labor 
process. In fact, the concept of capital as 
self-expanding value is produced at this level 
of abstraction....But to understand the 
determinants of capitalist enterprise 
behavior, it is necessary to proceed to a 
lower level of abstraction, from capital in 
general to a multiplicity of capitals and the 
action of capital upon capital, i.e., 
competition. The accumulation of surplus 
value becomes "problematic" because the 
accumulation of a particular capital takes 
place (can only take place) in the proximity 
of other capitals which are all trying to 
drive away and exclude each other from 
markets, i.e., to destroy each other.9
Table 2-1 below summarizes the major distinctions 
between the monopoly and non-monopoly theorists regarding
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DFI and multinational production.
Table 2-1: Haloi Plutlacti o M  Retvcca MonoDaly Capital and Cnipetltlve Capital Thcarlata 
Monopoly capital theorists Coipetltlie capital theoilita
















Relegated to DC-LDC relations 




Vorld capitalist systea 
Coapetltlon-aonopoly dialectic 
General decline in rate of profit
Foraer aonopoly position onderalned 
Related to both DC-LDC and DC-DC 
Interpenetration source of conflict 
Rational vlthln capitalist H a l t s
Before proceeding, it should be made clear that the 
argument presented in no way implies that DFI by developed 
countries in the periphery is secondary. Instead, the 
argument is that an understanding of the role of MNC's in 
modern capitalism's imperialist expansion requires analysis 
of both interpenetration of capital between developed 
countries, as well as developed countries' capital 
penetration of the underdeveloped periphlral areas. Only an 
integrated view can expose the full operation of imperialism 
in modern capitalism. It is, however, beyond the scope of 
this paper to present such an integrated framework. The 
goal is more modest. This work seeks simply to show the 
extent of the interpenetration of capital between developed 
countries and the impact of the growing interpenetration on
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the fractions of capital within the United States. In this 
it is recognized that the analysis is of a partial nature.
THE CIRCUITS OF CAPITAL AND THE
INTERNATIONAL!ZATION OF CAPITAL
A number of radical economists (C. Palloix, B. Fine and 
L. Harris, E. Mandel, W. Semmler, M.Herold)10 have argued 
that the conception of imperialism developed by Lenin was 
historically specific to the particular social formations 
that existed at the turn of the century. These theorists 
contend that a perlodisation of capitalist development is 
possible at two levels of abstraction. At one level it is 
conceived through an analysis of transformations in social 
relations and class struggle which develop as accumulation 
proceeds. This analysis generally corresponds with an 
investigation of the reproduction of particular social 
formations within a given nation-state. A second conceptual 
periodisation of the capitalist mode of production based on 
the reproduction of the world economy views the process of 
capital accumulation producing a tendency of capital to tran 
of capital has existed since the inception of the 
capitalist system. The expansion of capital produces both 
its internationalization and International competition which 
assume different forms in different periods of capitalism's 
development. An analysis at this level focuses on these 
transformations of the internationalization of capital and 
competition which provide the basis for conceptualizing 
distinct stages in the development of the world capitalist
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system.
This group of traditional Marxists contends that an 
adequate understanding of the internationalization of 
capital and its modern expression, the MNC, can only be 
achieved through an analysis of the circuits of capital and 
the process of their progressive and successive 
internationalization as capital accumulation and 
reproduction occur. This viewpoint focuses on the concept 
of the circuits of capital developed by Marx in Volume II of
Capital•
At the highest level of abstraction capital is seen as
self-expanding (valorizing) value in motion through the
spheres of circulation and production.
Capital, as self-valor 1 zing value, does not 
just comprise class relations, a definite 
social character that depends on the existence 
of labour as wage-labor. It is a movement, a 
circulatory process through different stages, 
which itself in turn includes three different 
forms of the circulatory process. Hence it 
can only be grasped as a movement, and not as 
a static thing. *
The functional forms that industrial capital 
alternatively assumes and discards In its movement through 
the spheres (stages) of production and circulation are: 
commodity capital (C), money capital (M), and productive 
capital (P). Marx focused on the movement of industrial 
capital since in his view (labor theory of value) Industrial 
capital dominates over the other types (merchant capital and 
interest-bearing capital) by virtue of its unique status as
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the source of surplus value.
Industrial capital is the only mode of 
existence of capital in which not only the 
appropriation of surplus-value or surplus 
product, but also its creation, is a function 
of capital. It thus requires production to be 
capitalist in character; its existence 
includes that of the class antagonism between 
capitalists and wage-labourers.... The other 
varieties of capital which appeared 
previously, within past or declining 
conditions of social production, are not only 
subordinated to it and correspondingly altered 
in the mechanism of their functioning, but 
they now move only on its basis, thus live and 
die, stand and fall together with this basis.
Money capital and commodity capital, in so far 
as they appear and function as bearers of 
their own peculiar branches of business 
alongside industrial capital, are now only 
modes of existence of the various functional 
forms that industrial capital constantly 
assumes and discards within the circulation 
sphere, forms which have been rendered 
independent and one-sidedly extended through 
the social division of labour.12
Figure 2-1 illustrates the movement of industrial 
capital through its three circuits.
In its movement, the reproduction of each form of
capital comprises a circuit; M-M1 the money circuit, P-P* 
the production circuit, and C-C* the commodity circuit. In
its movement capital in the money form Is advanced to
Figure 2-1. The Circuits of Capital
M--C
mp
.P..,C'--M'— C' ...P'...C" 
""‘mp
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acquire the commodities labor power (L) and means of 
production (mp). These are then put into production from 
which a new commodity emerges whose destination is the 
market. The commodity that results from production, (C'), 
possesses the surplus value extracted from the workers in 
production. The produced commodities must then be sold 
(realized) as capital reassumes the money capital form. 
Expanded reproduction requires the accumulation of surplus 
value in the money form which is then advanced again (C*) to 
resume production on an expanded scale (P'). (For 
simplicity this example assumes that all of the accumulated 
surplus is reinvested in expanded production. In Volume II 
of Capital. Marx undertakes an in-depth analysis of the 
circuits of capital under many different assumed conditions 
of capital's circulation in order to investigate the 
conditions which influence the intertwining of different 
capitals and to analyze the reproduction of the capitalist 
economy and bourgeois society in its totality.)
The recent application of the analysis of the circuits 
of social capital to the internationalization of capital 
views the historical development of capitalism as the 
unfolding of the progressive internationalization of 
capital. This development can be delineated into stages 
based on which of the circuits of capital dominate the 
International intertwining of the accumulation process. The 
transition from one stage to another can be recognized
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quantitatively in data that reflect (imperfectly) capital's
changing form of movement. The internationalization of the
circuit of commodity capital is reflected in the
internationalization of the purchase and sale of commodities
(i.e., rising imports and exports between countries). The
internationalization of the circuit of money capital appears
in the growing movement of portfolio and direct investment,
though there is some debate whether this movement is to be
seen primarly in portfolio form. The internationalization
of the circuit of productive capital is reflected in the
increasing internationalization of production though, again,
there is some question whether this movement is empirically
visible in the establishment of production bases abroad
(DFI) or in the growth of intra-firm trade between the MNC's
internationally-based subsidiaries. Fine, Harris and Mandel
view the key criterion to be the establishment of production
bases while Palloix and Herold emphasize inter-subsidiary
trade. Supporting the latter position Gryorgy Adam, the
late Hungarian economist, writes:
The optimal international redistribution of
firms' resources, is conceived of not as an 
objective projected into a more or less
distant future, but rather as an effective 
concentration of production in zones where 
costs are lower, and sales on the most 
lucrative markets. From this vantage point, 
production series which previously were
justified (rational) by national cost
considerations, lose their justification at 
the world level, once there can be
international displacement of production.
This implies that MNE's (now) establish a 
rising number of affiliates abroad within a
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recognized schema of not supplying all or even 
a part of the host country market, but rather 
to export to third countries as well as to the 
parent firm's home country.^
Palloix presents a similar view.
The internationalization of production 
indicates in effect the internationalization 
of the act of P itself, outside of the 
internationalization of circulation. The 
multinational industrial firm, with an 
internal circulation of products among its 
subsidiaries in place of a circulation of 
commodities, in a way expresses this 
internationalization of production. 4
Though this paper does not intend to address all
aspects of disagreement noted above, it should be remembered
that in Marx's view the unity of the circuits ensures that
the internationalization of any circuit transforms the
movement (internationally) of all the circuits.
The total circuit presents itself for each 
functional form of capital as its own specific 
circuit, and indeed each of these circuits 
conditions the continuity of the overall
process; the circular course of one functional 
form determines that of the others. It is a 
necessary condition for the overall production 
process, in other words for the social
capital, that this is at the same time a
process of reproduction, and hence the circuit 
of each of its moments....
As a whole, then, the capital is 
simultaneously present, and spatially 
coexistent, in its various phases. But each 
part is constantly passing from one phase or 
functional form into another, and thus 
functions in all of them in turn. The forms 
are therefore fluid forms, and their 
simultaneity is mediated by their succession.
Each form both follows and precedes the 
others, so that the return of one part of the 
capital to one form is determined by the 
return of another part to another form. Each 
part continuously describes its own course, 
but it is always another part of capital that
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finds itself in this form, and these
particular circuits simply constitute 
simultaneous and successive moments of the 
overall process.
It is only in the unity of the three circuits 
that the continuity of the overall process is 
realized....The total social capital always 
possesses this continuity, and its process 
always contains the unity of the three
circuits.15
Therefore, while each stage in the development of the 
world capitalist system (self-expanding value) can be 
characterized by the form of capital that dominates its 
internationalization, the progressive lnternationalization 
of one of the circuits leads to accommodating changes in the 
other circuits. (Even in the case of the circuit of 
commodity capital which, chronologically, was the first to 
dominate the international expansion of capital, the 
progressive Internationalization of the commodity circuit 
produced changes in the other circuits which could be viewed 
as the beginnings of their international "movement".)
In his analysis of the effect of the
internationalization of capital on capital accumulation in
Iran and Iraq, Patrick Clawson acknowledged the
"simultaneous and successive moments of the overall
process". Clawson noted that,
(iIndustrial components, manufactured in 
several different countries are assembled in 
another country; the finished product is then 
shipped to many countries. This international 
production, which up until now has been under 
the domination of the MNC, marks the start of 
the period of the Internationalization of the 
circuit of productive-capital....(L)ocal and 
imperialist capital seek Integration of the
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Third World economy into a world production 
system. For Iran and Iraq, the form this 
integration takes is primarily the integration 
of the petroleum industry Into a petrochemical 
industry....(T)he internationalization of the 
circuit of productive-capital reinforces In a 
qualitatively higher fashion the
internationalization of the other circuits 
(just as the internationalization of the 
circuit of money capital qualitatively 
reinforced the internationalization of the 
circuit of commodity-capital). 6
From this viewpoint, the growth of DFI both generally, 
and in the U.S. in particular, is seen as a significant 
transition from the stage of monopoly imperialism, so 
characterized by Lenin. In that stage the dominant type of 
internationalization was money capital in the form of loans 
(portfolio capital) and a growing world credit market. The 
transition to direct investment, while still representing an 
altered path of money capital's internationalization, lays 
the foundation for the internationalization of the circuit 
of productive capital. By establishing production and 
distribution bases in numerous countries (whether originally 
destined for the home market or third countries via 
intrafirm transfers), the MNC creates a world network of 
capital that changes the plane of capital's operation in all 
its circuits. The transition to DFI qualitatively and 
quantitatively increases the degree to which capital, moving 
through its circuits, becomes internationally intertwined 
with the circuits of other capitals. In this view, then, 
while the act of DFI itself is not seen as the 
internationalization of productive capital, DFI remains an
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Indicator of its Internationallzation, since its result, the 
progressive creation of an international network of 
production and distribution bases, lays the foundation for 
expanded internationalization of the productive capital 
circuit, P-P'.
Herold has noted the apparent contradiction between the
two views of this Internationalization, but stresses that,
in fact, the two views reinforce one another.
Some authors (R. Vernon, C-A Michalet, etc.) 
have noted the tendency for a centralisation 
of U.S. investments in Center nations, near
the market, Europe the implantation of MNEs'
affiliates in Center markets which might
appear, at first, to contradict Gyorgy Adam's 
point.(above)....Others have reported on the 
basis of surveys that the main inducement to 
set up foreign affiliates, Is to be present 
"in the market".
Adam is referring to the articulation which 
operates in the realisation of dominant 
capital on the base of dominated capitals 
through the "absorbing" of their products in 
its circulation of commodities; whereas 
Vernon, et. al., are emphasizing the 
valorisation process of dominant capital 
(namely the producing subsidiary), leading to 
a commodity ultimately sold/realised on Center 
markets. In fact, the two views are 
complementary.17
THE PER-IODIS ATI ON OF CAPITALISM 
As noted in the previous section, the concept of two 
periodisations of capitalism has been advanced, one, at the 
level of the social formation and the other at the level of 
the reproduction of the world capitalist system. B. Fine 
and L. Harris provide a framework for the periodisations 
which is summarized in Table 2-2 below:
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Table 2-2: Stages In Development of 
the Capitalist Ifode of Production
International 
fori of
Stage Social Poriatlon Bioanslon
1 Laissez-faire C o u o d l t f
2 Monopoly Money
3 State-aonopoly Productive
Source: B. Pine and L. Harris, Hertadlag Capital
Fine and Harris point out that one could argue (as E.
Handel does in Late Capitalism) that,
....the perIodisations simply coincide with 
each other. However, even If this could 
correspond to the historical development of 
capitalism as a world system, it could not 
render the dual principles of periodization 
redundant. For the two sets of stages through 
which capitalism progresses are not united in 
a simple fashion in which the characteristics 
of each are added together or necessarily 
reinforce one another.18
Indeed, their viewpoint is that concepts such as
imperialism, the state and the MNC, which Involve a more
complex (lower) level of abstraction than that of
periodisation, require an Integration of the two processes
of periodisation. They believe that Lenin successfully
integrated these two processes in his development of the
concept of imperialism,
....which was not a theoretical tract....It 
was not concerned with highly abstract 
concepts but with the complexities of concrete 
social format ions....Lenin identified the 
characteristics of the stages of monopoly 
capital and the export of capital, the latter
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primarily in the form of money capital. it 
was the articulation of these two highly 
abstract stages in a world made up of social 
formations of Britain, France, etc., with 
their concrete histories, interrelations and, 
most Importantly, relations with social 
formations dominated by pre-capitalist modes 
of production - it was this articulation which 
Lenin named imperialism.^
Fine and Harris conclude that modern capitalism has
undergone a transition to what they call the stage of state
monopoly capitalism (SMC) which, like Lenin's monopoly
stage, integrates the two processes of periodisation, taking
into account two tendencies which are specific to the
current stage of capitalist development. These tendencies
are (1) increasing state Intervention in economic
reproduction and (2) increasing Internationalization of
productive capital. The first tendency results from an
intensification of crises and the class struggle that
accompanies them, while the second tendency is a product of
the competitive expansion of capital internationally, which
is itself intensified by crises.
In Lenin's treatment, inter-imperialist 
rivalry as an economic struggle took the form 
of the division of the world among competing 
blocks of capital ("capital
associations")....The "capital associations" 
with which Lenin was concerned were cartels
and trusts which, corresponding to the
predominance of the internationalization of
commodity and financial capital, divided the 
world into markets and spheres for lending.
Today also "capital associations" exist, but 
as multinational corporations competing for 
the division of the world into markets, 
financial areas, and production bases. This 
corresponds to the dominance of productive 
capital as the form which is
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Internationalized. These blocks o£
capital....and today's national states are 
again the agents in inter-imperialist rivalry. 
But,....the respective elements around which 
cooperation and rivalry occur in the present 
period are transformed. It follows that a 
general assertion of inter-lmperiallst rivalry 
is sterile: analysis requires examination of 
the particular antagonism and cooperation 
which arise when the mode of production is at 
the SMC stage and capital is internationalized 
as productive capital.
Finally, if it is recognized that the post-war period 
has witnessed a change In the form of the 
internationalization of capital, then it becomes necessary 
to investigate the impact of the growing international 
expansion of productive capital on: (1) Imperialist rivalry, 
including the debate over the question of super-imperialism 
versus ultra-imperialism; (2) the general competitive 
environment in which separate units of capital become 
increasingly intertwined; (3) the operation of the other two 
circuits of capital; (4) the relationship between the 
nation-state and both domestic and foreign capital; and (5) 
the overall operation of the circuit of social capital, 
including an investigation of the impact on the cyclical and 
fluctating nature of capitalist accumulation as well as the 
renewed potential for disruptions and crisis.
It should be obvious that it is not possible to address 
all of these questions in this thesis. The rest of this 
chapter will focus on the overall quantitative dimensions of 
the internationalization of productive capital in reference 
to the growth of DFI In the United States. This analysis
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will highlight the macroeconomic characteristics of this 
process in terms of the historical trend by country of
origin and broad industrial classification of the area of 
investment. In addition, a measurement of the relative 
Interpenetration of productive capital will be presented.
As was pointed out in Chapter I, the intention of
Chapter IV is to investigate some of the implications of the 
internationalization of productive capital for the cycle of 
production and accumulation in reference to the long-run 
concept of waves of relative expansion and contraction of 
economic activity. As was also indicated, Chapters V and VI 
will return to an investigation of the concrete (at the 
level of the firm) penetration of foreign productive capital 
in the U.S. social formation. This will reopen the 
unity-rivalry debate, by analyzing how the process of DFI in 
U.S. manufacturing is altering the general competitive 
environment of capitalist accumulation, and the effects of 
this growing intertwining of capital on the structure of the 
bourgeoisie within the U.S.
DFI IN THE U.S. AND THE INTERPENETRATION OF CAPITAL
In this section the quantitative dimension of DFI in
the U.S. will be explored. The data used in this section, 
covering the period from 1950 to 1985, come from various 
issues of the Survey of Current Business, a publication of 
the United States Commerce Department.2* The data are not 
perfect due (in part) to reliance on the firm's response to
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survey questions, yet they serve as a starting point. 
Moreover, there are three Inconsistencies In the data which 
should be noted at the outset.
First, the Commerce Department's definition of what 
constitutes DFI was changed in 1974. Before 1974, direct 
investment was defined as the ownership, direct or indirect, 
by a single foreign person (including an associated group of 
foreign persons) of at least 25 percent of the voting stock 
of an incorporated U.S. business enterprise, or an 
equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business 
enterprise. Beginning with 1974, the ownership criterion 
was lowered to ten percent. The Commerce Department 
estimates that this change resulted in a (paper) DFI 
increase of about five percent.
Second, also in 1974, the Commerce Department changed 
the method for reporting the ownership of U.S. affiliates by 
country. The foreign parent is the first foreign person 
(firm), in the ownership chain of the U. S. affiliate. The 
person in the ownership chain that is not owned more than 50 
percent by another person is deemed the ultimate beneficial 
owner (UBO). Before 1974, estimates for some affiliates, 
particularly those whose foreign parents were holding 
companies, were classified by country of UBO; beginning with 
1974, estimates were classified consistently by country of 
foreign parent. As will be seen in Tables 2-4 and 2-5, the 
geographical effects of this change were significant.
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Third, the data published by the Commerce Department 
are derived from three benchmark surveys or censuses, taken 
in 1959, 1974 and 1980. The 1959 benchmark data were used 
by the Commerce Department to derive estimates for 1950-58 
(by extrapolating backward) and for 1960-73 (by 
extrapolating forward). The 1974 benchmark data were used 
to derive estimates for 1975-79. The 1980 benchmark data 
were used to derive estimates for 1980-85. This method thus 
produces incongruencies which are due to the changing size 
of the universe caused by more detailed survey techniques as 
well any changes in concepts or definitions introduced in a 
specific benchmark year, such as those discussed above.
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Table 2-3, below, Is supplemented by pre-1950 data 
supplied by D. McClain.





selected years, billions of corrent 
Overage laaoal
late of Growth I Nannfactore
1114 1.3 — 15
1915 .1 -7.1 10
1934 1.5 3.5 37
1937 1.9 0.2 39
1941 2.3 4.9 31
1950 3.4 4.4 34
1950 (.9 7.3 30
19(5 l.t 5.0 40
1970 13.3 0.6 4(
1175 27.7 15.1 41
1910 03.0 24.5 40
1915 102.1 17,1 33
Source: Survey of Current Business
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What i s  m o s t  e v i d e n t  f r o m  t h i s  t a b l e  i s  t h e  e x p l o s i v e  
o v e r a l l  g r o w t h  o f  DFI i n  t h e  U . S .  s i n c e  t h e  l a t e  1 9 6 0 s .  The  
l a s t  c o lu m n  s h o w s  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  DFI a s  a  p e r c e n t  o f  t o t a l  
DFI I n  t h e  U . S .  T h i s  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  i n  t h e  p o s t - w a r  p e r i o d ,  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  DFI w a s  g a i n i n g  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  s h a r e ,  r e a c h i n g  
a p e a k  i n  1 9 7 0  a n d  d e c l i n i n g  t h e r e a f t e r .
T a b l e  2 - 4  g i v e s  a  c o u n t r y  b r e a k d o w n  o f  t h e  d o l l a r - v a l u e
o f  t h e  DFI p o s i t i o n  In t h e U . S . f o r t h e m a j o r i n v e
c o u n t r  i e s . T a b l e 2-5 s h o w s t h e b r e a k d o w n  i n t e r m s o f
o f  t o t a l  f o r  t h e sam e c o u n t r i e s a n d  t i m e  p e r i o d .
Table 2-4: Direct foielgn Investaent position in the U.S. at yearend 
by selected conntry, 1950-1985, five year intervals, Billions of corrent dollars
Cointrv 1950 1955 19(0 19(5 1970 1975 1910 191$
Europe: (total) 2227 330 4707 (075 9554 11514 54(00 120901
United (Ingdot 11(1 1749 2241 2152 4127 (331 14105 437(6
■etherlands 334 (13 947 1304 2151 5347 19140 1(124
Svitierland 341 522 773 940 1545 2131 5070 11040
Geriany OSS nss 103 209 (10 1401 759( 14417
France nss nss I K 200 216 13(9 3731 (295
Canada 1024 1542 1934 2311 3117 5352 121(2 16671
Japan nss nss II lit 229 591 4723 19116
Latin Aierica nss nss nss 1(1 241 2774 9(90 17050
Other 135 1(5 111 51 .... 122 3(1 1795 9291
111 Areas 33)1 SB7( (910 0797 13270 276(2 13046 112951
Source: S u m y  of Cnrrent Bnsiness
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Table 2-5: Direct foreign livestieot 
by selected cointry, 1)51-1915, five y
CQBDttY
tlofl in tbe U.S. at yearend 
intervals, percent of total
_195fl_ 1)55 19(0 19(5 1970 1)15 19*Q_ 191
(5.7 (6.4 (1.1 O . l 72.0 (7.2 (5.9 ((.
34.( 34.5 32.5 32.4 31.1 22.) 17.0 23.
9.8 12.1 14.1 14.0 1(.2 19.3 23.0 1).
10.3 10.3 11.2 10.7 11.( 7.7 (.1 (.
DS3 nss 1.5 2.4 5.1 5.1 9.1 7.
m s nss 2.4 2.3 2.2 4.) 4.5 3.
30.3 30.4 20.0 27.2 23.5 19.3 14. ( ).
OSS nss 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.1 5.7 10.
DSS nss nss 1.0 1.9 10.0 11.( ).











Source: Snrvev of Cnrrent Baslneas
The data reflect a change in the positions of the
major investing countries during the post war period.
Canada, the United Kingdom and Switzerland have all
experienced a significant decline in share as other
countries have accelerated their growth of direct investment 
in the U.S., particularly since 1970. While the growth of 
share for the Netherlands was stable from 1950-80,
significant penetration by the Germans and Japanese occurred 
after 1975. One interesting aspect is that although the
major Investors experienced relatively large changes in
share, the total for all of Europe has had only a slight 
variation, trending up until 1970 and down thereafter.
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Finally it should be pointed out that the large increase for 
Latin America from 1970-75 is due to the definitional change 
that accompanied the 1974 benchmark revision. The change in 
classification from UBO (holding companies) to first foreign 
parent led to the (paper) growth of DFI in, primarily, just 
one country In Latin America: Netherlands Antilles. This
classification change was reflected by a proportionate 
(paper) reduction in the reported position of the United 
KIngdom.
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Table 2-(: Direct Foreign Investment position in the U.S. at yeareid, by expanded country
listing 1)00-1)05, x l l l o M  of dollars, percent of total and aainal growth rate
Ret Anneal rate
1 U 0  1)10 \ D O S  1)IS % Gain (Loss) of growth
Conntrv S valie of total S oaloe of totgi of Share 1)00-1)05
111 countries 13046 102)51 17.11
Canada 121(2 14.( 1(570 3.1 (5.5) (.52
Belgiu* 1551 1.) 22)0 .1 (1.0) 0.04
France J731 4.5 (2)5 3.4 (1.1) 11.03
Geriany 75)( ).l 14417 7.) (1.2) 13.(7
Italy 000 0.5 1401 .0 .3 27.30
Leienboorg 2(1 0.3 504 .3 0 17.40
Retherlands 1)140 23.0 3(124 15.7 (3.3) 13.55
United Kingdon 14105 17.0 43766 23.3 (.) 25.42
Denaark, Greece, 
1 Ireland 311 0.4 112) .( .2 23.42
Sweden 1(70 2.0 2304 1.3 (.7) 7.30
Switzerland 5070 (.1 11040 (.0 (.1) 1(.04
Other Europe 042 1.0 1471 .1 (.2) 11.31
Japan 4723 5.7 1311S 10.4 4.7 32.26
Australia, lew 
Zealand,
S. Africa 420 .5 2702 1.5 1.0 44.56
Latin Aierica )(7I 11.t 17050 ).3 (2.3) 11.9)
Kiddle Bast )1( 1.1 4)51 2.7 l.( 40.20
Other Africa, 
Asia, Pacific 450 .5 1530 .1 .3 27.16
Source: Sotvev of Cnrrent Rnslaess
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Table 2-6 provides an expanded country picture for the 
period from 1980 to 1985. These data show that the high 
rate of growth of the United Kingdom and Japan led to
significant share gains which were mirrored by share losses 
for almost all of Europe as well as Canada and Latin 
America. The large rates of growth of DFI in the U.S. for 
the countries of Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa and the 
Middle East were based on an originally low level of
investment by these countries and hence did not lead to 
significant changes in their percentage share.
Tables 2-7 and 2-8 give a further breakdown of DFI in
the U.S. by broad Industry category for the 1950-1985 period 
in the form of both dollar values and percent of total 
investment.
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Table 2-7: Direct Foreign Investment position In the U.S. at yearend by industry
classification 1950-1905, five year intervals, allllons of dollars
Vholesalea Banking/Insurance/
Tear 111 Areas Petro. M o . _ T r a d e Finance/leal Estate Other
1950 3391 905 1130 10(5 709
1955 507f 053 1759 ... 1999 9(5
19(0 (910 1231 2(11 ... 1010 1251
19(5 0797 1710 3970 ... 21(9 1991
1970 13270 2992 (190 999 225( 000
197S 27((2 (213 11305 9099 3929 1290
1900 93016 12200 32993 115(0 10197 0196
1915 102951 20123 (0790 27519 95037 20(79
a. Prior to 1970, Wholesale Trade is included vlth Other DFI. 
Source: Survey of Current Inslness
Table 2-1: Direct Foreign Investment position is the U.S. at yearend b y  industry 
classification 1950*1915, five year intervals, percent of total
Vholesale Banking/Insurance/
Tear Petro. Hf«. Trade Finance/Beal Istate Other
1950 11.9 33.( 31.9 23.1
1955 K . O 39.7 ... 29.5 19.0
19(0 17.9 37.0 — 2(,2 10.1
19(5 19.9 39.5 ... 29.7 1(.9
1970 22.5 9(.3 7.5 17.0 (.7
1975 22.5 91.2 17.5 19.2 9.5
1900 19.7 39.7 13.9 21.9 9.0
1905 15.9 33.2 15.0 25.1 11.3
Source: Survey of Current Business
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These tables show that during the post-war period, 
petroleum and manufacturing Increased their share of the 
total penetration until the early 1970s and declined 
thereafter. Trade, Financial and other industries reached a 
trough in their shares in the early 1970s and have Increased 
their relative penetration since then. Table 2-9 gives a 
more detailed breakdown for the period from 1980-1985.
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Table 2-9: Direct foreign investment position In the U.S. at yearend 
by expanded Industry listing, 1)80*1)85, nlllions of cnrrent dollars, 
percent of total and annual rate of growth
1)11


















Source: Survey of Curreut
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The penetration index calculated in Table 2-10 shows 
the ratio of European DFI in the U.S. versus U.S. DFI in
Europe. A value greater than one signifies relatively 
greater European penetration of the U.S., while a value of 
less than one shows larger relative U.S. penetration. 
Immediately following the Second World War, European firms 
had a greater presence in the U.S. than U.S. firms had in 
Europe when considering total DFI. This position of
dominance declined steadily in the period after 1950, 
reaching a trough (italicized) in the early 1970s as U.S. 
corporations expanded direct investment more rapidly than
did their European counterparts. This trend was reversed
after 1975 and, in the span of one decade, Europe regained 
its overall penetration advantage.
Table 2-10: Buropean-United States DFI Interpenetration, 1)50*10
Penetration lades
lear US DFI la K r o n e K r o n e  DFI in US




1)50 173J 2227 1.205 .2)7
1955 1004 3 3 0 1.122 .277
1)60 4(01 4707 .705 .234
1945 13)05 (Q7( .414 .100
1)90 25255 3554 .378 .1)0
1975 4)105 10504 .377 .204
1)10 9(539 54(00 .5(6 .370
1915 10(7(2 129)16 1.132 .436
Source: Snrvev of Cnrrent laslness
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The last column in Table 2-10 shows the relative 
interpenetration of European and United States 
manufacturing. Here it is indicated that European direct 
investment in U.S. manufacturing lagged behind U.S. 
penetration of Europe throughout the post-war period, the 
index reaching a trough in the late 1960s and trending up 
since then.
Table 2-11 presents the penetration indices for the 
largest foreign investing countries (excluding Netherland 
Antilles). The data by country reflect the same pattern as 
Table 2-10. All countries exhibit a declining trend in the 
early post-war period (with six countries reaching a trough 
in 1970, two in 1975 and one in 1965), followed by a growing 
penetration in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Table 2-11: Direct foreign imrestient pee 
Conatrv 1950 19S5 196






Doited lingdoi 1.379 1.227 .69 .557 .516 .4 5 .49 1.2
Retberlands 3.976 3.714 3.34 1.901 1.426 1.6 1 2.35 5.1
Svltret land 13.921 12.732 3.14 .139 .169 .4 5 .15 .6
Geriany ... — .10 .016 .141 .1 1 .49 .1
Trance ... ... .22 .124 .110 .2 1 .41 .1
Sweden — ... 1.43 .613 .335 .4 3 1.13 2.5
fielgUa t 
Ltieibotrg ... — .61 .294 .221 .2 9 .29 .5
Canada .211 .237 .17 .156 .141 .1 2 .27 .3
Japan ... ... — .239 .167 .1 1 1.55 1.1
Soorct: li ClXICflt Blliltas
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CONCLUSION
The data presented in this chapter can be summarized in 
the following four general categories:
(1) Overall Trend: Total DFI in the U.S. during the 
post-war period can be divided in two periods. From 1950 to 
1970 DFI grew relatively slowly, averaging 7.06 percent 
annually. Since then, the pace of DFI in the U.S. has 
quickened considerably, growing at an annual rate of 19.06 
percent.
(2) Regional Distribution: DFI in the U.S. originates 
primarily from the other developed capitalist countries. 
Within the developed countries, major gains were made during 
the period by the Netherlands, Germany and Japan at the 
expense,primarily, of the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Switzerland. During the early 1980s the United Kingdom 
appears to have reversed its downward trend. If, in fact, a 
large part of Latin American DFI is by subsidiaries of 
British holding companies, then the United Kingdom's DFI 
share in 1985 is not significantly different from what it 
was in 1950. Despite the shifting of the relative positions 
of some countries, the stability of the overall European 
share (in the range of 65 to 70 percent) Indicates that DFI 
in the U.S. is largly a European affair.
(3) Sectoral Distribution: The separation of the 
post-war period into two time frames, 1950-1970 and 
1970-1985, is supported in the analysis of broad Industrial
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sectors. From 1950 to 1970 manufacturing DFI gained in 
share of total, while trade and financial DFI diminished in 
3hare. In the period from 1970 to 1985, the trends have 
been reversed, with banking and other financial services 
experiencing particularly rapid growth in the early 1980s.
(4) EEI Interpenetration: Using the relative
penetration of DFI as an indicator of U.S. economic and 
hegemonic strength, the data clearly suggest that U.S.
imperial power versus its major rivals has declined since 
1970 .
Three of the most frequently used indices of a
country's international economic strength are its trade
balance, the valuation of its currency on the world market,
and its foreign investment position (or balance of
payments). The declining trade balance of the U.S. since
the early seventies has been well-documented, while the
decline in the value of the dollar has been particularly
dramatic in recent years (currently hovering at post-war
lows against most other major currencies). This chapter has
shown that in the area of direct investment, U.S.
imperialist dominance is also being eroded, a development
forecast by Ernest Mandel in the early 1970s:
(t)he law of uneven development has continued 
to prevail, shifting the international 
relationship of forces in inter-imperialist 
competition. American Imperialism....slowly 
losing its productivity lead over its European 
and Japanese rivals....is currently attempting 
to reverse this secular development by 
stepping up capital exports to its imperialist
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rivals and increasing the international 
centralization of capital by acquiring 
substantial capital ownership within the 
economies of its competitors. But the 
long-run faster accumulation of capital in 
Western Europe and Japan Inevitably means-ln 
conditions of accelerated dollar
devaluation-greater opportunities for West 
European and Japanese capital exports to the 
USA than for American capital exports in the 
opposite direction. American imperialism has 
tried to rescue itself from its dilemmas by 
hitherto successful pressure on its rivals to 
revalue their currencies, but this in the end 
can only lead to a further acceleration of 
European and Japanese capital exports as 
compared with American.^
Fine and Harris, who are critical of the misuse of
indices (trade balance, ownership of foreign capital,
balance of payments, international currency value, etc.) in
attempting to determine a country's internatlonal economic
power, point out that
Significantly, all these indices, whatever 
their economic merits, remain aloof from the 
role of political power and working-class 
struggle.
This thesis recognizes the limits of such aggregated 
indices, which Ignore political power and working-class 
struggle as well as the concrete conditions of 
intercapital1st competition within and between countries. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to integrate the 
state and class struggle into the analysis, the concrete 
conditions of DFI on international capitalist competition 
will be returned to in Chapter V through an analysis of data 
from a sample of 200 firms with sizable investment positions 
in the U.S. Before proceeding to the firm level data,
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Chapter III will review the literature on DFI in the 
while Chapter IV will further examine 
internationalization of productive capital in terms of 
potential relationship between direct Investment flows 
long-run fluctuations (waves) in economic growth.
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CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
IN UNITED STATES MANUFACTURING
INTRODUCTION
Direct foreign investment (DFI) has not been an 
historically predominant feature of capitalism. From 1864 
to 1913, total international investment grew from $4 billion 
to $44 billion.^- As of 1913, 90 percent of this
international investment was portfolio capital flows 
(purchases of securities and bonds), with the United Kingdom 
supplying 75 percent of the total.2 During the 1920s the 
United States surpassed the United Kingdom as the world's 
largest international lender while Europe became an 
international debtor. Yet, while the positions of the major 
nations underwent a significant change, the volume of 
international Investment remained fairly stable during that 
decade. The total amount of international debt in 1929 was 
about the same as it was in 1913. During the 1920s, DFI 
grew in Importance, accounting for 25 percent of all foreign 
investment. In the 1930s, DFI's share of total foreign 
Investment Increased further. This, however, was due to the 
collapse of the international financial capital market as a 
result of the depression rather than a significant expansion 
of DFI itself. As observed in Chapter II, the major
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expansion of DFI began after World War II. United States'
corporations dominated this growth in the 1950s and 1960s,
while they were Increasingly joined by non-U.S. corporations 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. As a significant movement,
then, DFI Is primarily a post-World War II development.
The growth of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) 
and their progressive penetration into Europe in the early 
post-war period led to the publication of The American 
Challenge in 1 9 6 7 .  ^ in this book, Frenchman J.J. 
Servan-Schreiber argued that U.S. direct investment
penetration in Europe was threatening the survival of 
(weaker) European firms in an increasing number of 
industries. To overcome this threat and prevent Europe from 
becoming a colony of the United States, Servan-Schreiber 
proclaimed that the appropriate remedy required positive 
policy action rather than negative responses. Instead of 
placing restrictions on inward DFI or attempting to 
disenclave the U.S. corporations, the governments in Europe 
should promote mergers and consolidations of European firms 
in order to help European capital attain a size that would 
make it internationally competitive as well as provide 
subsidies to those corporations to aid research and 
development in advanced technologies.
As noted in Chapter II, Servan-Schreiber's book was 
outdated by the time it was published. Positive action 
(primarily the European merger movement) in the 1950s and
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the early 1960s had produced corporations that were 
increasingly using DFI to penetrate the U.S. market by the 
end of the latter decade. The growing DFI penetration of 
the American economy at that time to the beginning of 
extensive research into what has been called the 
non-American challenge (i.e,. attempts to explain the growth 
of European, Canadian and Japanese MNCs).
One of the first economists to emphasize this
development was John Leontiades. He believed that the
merger of British Petroleum and Standard Oil of Ohio in
1969, giving British Petroleum control of Sohio, marked a
significant turning point in the historical role of direct
investment in the capitalist world economy.
It may be a portent of things to come that the 
largest overseas investment commitment of 1969 
was made not by a U.S. firm abroad but by a 
British company investing in the United 
States....The presence in increasing numbers 
of astute and affluent European firms In the 
U.S. market is a new competitive 
element....The real counter to the U.S. 
investment initiative may well be an increase 
of European direct investment abroad, 
particularly in the United States.
Corresponding to the continued growth of DFI in the
United States in the 1970s and early 1980s, there has been a 
blossoming of the literature on this subject. This chapter
shall present a review of the major studies of DFI in the
United States during this period. It will focus on the
method of analysis employed, the variables studied and the 
major conclusions reached by the various authors. In order
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to provide a framework to interpret the results of these
studies, first there will be a review of the applicability
of traditional (neo-classical) trade and investment theory
to the concept of direct investment, followed by a short 
coverage of the general literature on DFI theory after which 
the specific literature on DFI in the United States will be 
presented.
DFI AND TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY
Neoclassical international economic theory has not been 
of great assistance in explaining the growth of DFI and the 
MNC (U.S. or otherwise). Traditional theory divides its 
examination of international economic activity into two 
areas of specialization: trade relations between
nation-states, and finance and investment relations, again 
between nation-states. Of course, the theoretical framework 
which has served as the foundation for both areas is one of 
perfectly competitive markets, free commodity trade based on 
national factor endowments, internationally mobile financial 
capital and stable world welfare growth.
Within this framework trade theory focused on 
explaining commodity trade relations (imports and exports) 
between countries. Thus, the development of this 
perspective concentrated the analysis on such questions as: 
the factors that determine the observed trade patterns; the 
conditions that establish equilibrium in trade relations; 
the effect of international trade on a country’s terms of
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trade with other countries; the aquisition of the welfare
gains from trade; and the impact of trade policy (tariffs, 
subsidies, quantitative restrictions, common markets, 
preferential trading partners, etc.) on international trade 
relations.
As Franklin Root has noted, it Is not surprising that
traditional trade theory has been weakened by the growth of
international production.
By concentrating on trade only at the national 
level, economists until recently have left to 
marketing and management scholars the task of 
explaining the behavior of the International 
firm. As long as international trade was 
largely carried on by intermediaries while 
producers remained at home, this neglect was 
not serious. But today international firms 
have burst the confines of the individual 
nation-state to carry on their operations 
throughout the world. It has become 
meaningful to talk about the comparative 
advantages of such firms as they bring to bear 
on world markets a mix of productive factors, 
technological innovation, and entrepreneurial 
drive. It is no longer possible to understand 
the trade of the Industrial countries (notably 
the United States) unless full account is 
taken of the behavior of international firms.
The theory of International trade must become 
part of a broader theory of international 
economic relations if we are to understand the 
forces now shaping the world economy.
Meanwhile, international finance and investment theory 
were primarily concerned with the monetary aspects of 
international trade and portfolio capital movements between 
separate nation-states. From this perspective, neoclassical 
theory sought to: identify the factors that determine
(influence) the international exchange rate of a country's
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currency; expose the forces that cause disequilibrium in a 
country's balance-of-payments; explain the national 
processes of adjustment that are likely to follow 
balance-of-payments disequilibrium; and illustrate the need 
to promote international liquidity in order to grease the 
wheels of commerce. Long-term capital movements between 
nations were explained through the use of a model of 
portfolio investment. The dominant explanatory variable in 
the movement was hypothesized to be the existence of 
interest rate differences among countries.6
THEORIES OF DFI IN GENERAL
Since traditional international economic theory proved
incapable of providing any reasonable explanation of the
growth of DFI and the progressive spread of the MNC, the
1960s and 1970s saw new theories advanced to explain these
developments. As F. Root has pointed out,
....the contemporary scope of direct foreign 
investment and multinational enterprise is 
mainly owing to developments of the last 
quarter century. Although economists are now 
busily engaged in theory building, as yet, no 
single dominant theory of direct foreign 
investment has emerged to match the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade.
Instead we have several theories, but....for 
the most part, they are complementary rather 
than rival explanations of direct foreign 
investment.7
Market Imperfection Theories Of DFI 
In contradiction to neoclassical international trade 
and investment theory, with its emphasis on perfect 
competition and world welfare gains derived from free
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mobility (trade) of commodities and financial capital, 
mainstream theories of DFI focus on the existence of market 
imperfections and the firm's ability to exploit these 
imperfections across national boundrles. The market 
Imperfections that confront the firm In its international 
operations derive from either non-firm specific (industry or 
country variables) or firm specific factors (knowledge, 
technology, organization, economies of scale). While many
of the studies conducted in this manner combine both
non-firm and firm specific factors in the analysis of DFI,
this section presents a brief breakdown of this literature 
based on a division between macroeconomic (non-firm 
specific) and microeconomic (firm specific) variables. 
Macroeconomic factors.
Many studies have emphasized the role of industry and 
country factors in explaining the pattern of DFI. One
frequently expressed view is that DFI occurs in response to 
government intervention into market transactions (e.g., 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, income and property taxes, 
regulations, etc.). Since different governments are
responsible for the policies of different nations, this view 
holds that differences in government policy between nations 
create the incentive for the firm to undertake DFI to 
service foreign markets. It is hypothesized that without 
such differences in government policies internationally, the 
firm would choose to service the foreign market through
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exports. This is an important aspect of all market 
imperfection theories that should be emphasized. All of 
these theories (both non-firm and firm specific) directly, 
or implicitly, assume that in the absence of firm, industry 
or country market imperfections, the firm would prefer to 
use exports as the instrument to service foreign markets due 
to the (assumed) inherent disadvantages (cultural, language, 
coordination, etc.) of operating a production facility on 
foreign soil. This, of course, exposes the neoclassical 
roots of this school, since, in the absence of market 
imperfections, trade relations would become dominant.
Another macro-view holds that DFI occurs as a response 
to imperfections in international capital markets. Firms 
from a country whose currency commands a risk-adjusted 
premium (a high rate of exchange with other currencies on 
the international market) will have an advantage in 
investing abroad. This view claims that the country pattern 
of direct foreign investment over time reflects changes in 
currency premiums.®
A third view emphasizes the desire of firms to 
diversify their operations. Thus, it is argued that DFI 
occurs as a response of the firm (often in terms of the 
shareholder or individual Investor) that is motivated by a 
desire to reduce the risk to the stability of its earnings 
over time. If economic fluctuations (business cycles) are 
less than perfectly correlated between countries, then firms
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can reduce the risk to earnings stability through a process
of international diversification. This diversification 
could occur through exports, portfolio investment or direct 
investment. It is contended, however, that direct 
investment has distinct advantages over the other two 
methods of international diversification because It places 
the firm in a position to take advantage of imperfectly 
correlated disturbances between separate national factor and 
product markets. Exports fail to do so, while portfolio 
investment operates exclusively in the international capital 
market which tends to be more closely correlated between 
countries due to the high degree of mobility of financial 
capital internationally in response to interest rate 
d i fferent ials . ®
Another view that is frequently cited by the news 
media, holds that DFI can be best understood as a behavorial 
process under conditions of imperfect knowledge and 
uncertainty. In this context, the timing of DFI depends on 
chance stimuli, both internal and external to the firm, with 
the frequency and Intensity of the stimuli determining the 
propensity of the firm to undertake the foreign investment. 
From such a perspective the motivation of the managers of 
the firms are the key aspect in explaining DFI. The 
managers are often seen as possessing a desire to learn, or 




Other studies have emphasized specific monopoly 
advantages possessed by the firm in the product market, In 
the factor market (technology, skills, organization, etc.), 
or due to internal or external economies of scale. The 
major early (1960s) developments in this theory can be 
attributed to Stephen Hymer, Charles Kindleberger and 
Richard Caves.^
According to these authors, DFI is undertaken by firms 
which possess an advantage that is internationally 
transferable through such an investment. Since the 
investing firm confronts a natural (assumed) disadvantage 
vis-a-vis a local firm, it will only engage in direct 
investment if that will produce earnings that are greater 
than the export option. In addition, such earnings must be 
greater than those of local firms, since the investing firm 
will be operating at higher costs due to its natural 
disadvantage. In order to overcome this disadvantage, a 
firm undertaking DFI must possess some countervailing 
superiority which can be transferred abroad and not be 
duplicated by local firms.
This theory is also known as the "industrial 
organization" or "monopolistic competition" theory of DFI, 
since most firms that possess internationally transferable 
advantages are large in size (sales, assets, net worth, 
etc.) and operate in relatively mature oligopolistic
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{concentrated) industries. one variant sees DFI as an
instrument in the battle for world market share, where 
oligopolistic competitors attempt to match rivals move for 
move, producing a bunching of DFI by industry. thus, DFI 
to these analysts is seen as essentially defensive in
nature. Direct investment is undertaken in an attempt to 
maintain market share previously established through export 
penetrat ion.12
One of the commonly accepted rationales for explaining 
the timing of DFI is the concept of the product life cycle, 
first introduced by Raymond Vernon in 1966.13 This approach 
emphasizes technological innovation as a countervailing 
advantage that Is stimulated by some threat of loss or
promise of gain in the domestic market. Vernon hypothesized 
that once a new innovation occurs, product development goes 
through three stages. In the new product stage, production 
is undertaken in the domestic market of the innovator and 
foreign markets are serviced through exports. In stage two, 
the export of the now mature product comes under increasing 
competitive pressures in foreign markets from local
producers. This leads to the decision to undertake DFI if 
the firm calculates that such a step is preferable to either 
continued exports or licensing as an instrument for 
maintaining the exploitation of its (dwindling) monopoly 
advantage.^ The third stage occurs when the product has 
become standardized and growing competition from other
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producers leads to DFI in low wage countries to service 
(through exports) both the home market and other developed 
sales markets.^
As D. McClain has remarked, the firm specific market 
imperfections theory of direct investment became "the" 
accepted theory during the 1970s because of its predictive 
power.
Direct investment tended not to occur in those 
industries best approximated by the perfectly 
competitive model for goods and factors. 
Multinationals did not tend to license their 
advantages, or enter into joint ventures with 
local partners. And cross-investments did 
take place in the same industry, in part 
because firms possessed differential 
advantages, but also because of the dynamics 
of oligopolistic behavior. 6
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s research into the market 
imperfections hypotheses proliferated.^ The culmination of 
this theoretical thrust may be best represented in John
Dunning's, International Production and the Multinational
Enterprise. which presents an "eclectic" theory of DFI 
that attempts to synthesize traditional trade and location 
theory (macro variables) with the concepts of monopolistic 
advantage and the ability of the firm to Internalize the 
externalities produced in imperfect market conditions (micro 
variables).^-9 Yet, while this theoretical perspective has, 
in a sense, been filled out by these refinements, the basic 
theme has remained essentially unchanged. As D. McClain has 
pointed out, the story remains unaltered,
....direct investment behavior is a response
99
to market imperfections. The spatial 
dispersion of economic activity Introduces an 
imperfection into the frictionless perfectly 
competitive model, since operating in 
different locations Imposes different costs on 
a firm; costs of coordination and 
communication will be higher at a distance.
Other frictions are introduced by governmental 
policies. A firm must possess "ownership 
endowments sufficient to overcome the costs of 
producing in a foreign environment". And the 
market for the sale of these endowments must 
be imperfect if it is to the firm's advantage 
to "internalize" them....
Whether or not the words "internalization 
hypothesis", "eclectic theory" and
"appropriability theory" will resonate more 
and longer than explanations of direct 
investment behavior labeled "market
imperfections", "monopolistic competition" and 
"industrial organization", only time will 
tell....However, in my opinion, the recognized 
essence of the direct investment behavior all 
these words describe is unchanged from its
exposition in Hymer's thesis.20
F. Root claims that the principal contribution of the
"eclectic" theory is an explanation of the distribution of
international production by country.
Both firm and country-specific endowments 
(natural resources, labor, energy,
geographical location, markets, government 
policies, and so on) are necessary for foreign 
involvement. When it is most profitable for 
an MNC to internalize its monopolistic 
advantage in a foreign country, then the MNC 
favors investment in that country. Otherwise, 
it exploits the country market through export 
or licensing.23.
Beyond the market imperfections explanation of DFI, the 
only major theory advanced by mainstream economists relates 
specifically to Japanese DFI. This view, developed by 
Kiyoahi Kojima and Terutomo Ozawa, sees a basic distinction 
between Japanese and United States DFI.22 Japanese foreign
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investment is trade-oriented (promotes trade based on 
comparative advantage between nations), while U.S. DFI is
anti-trade oriented (generates trade patterns that violate
comparative advantage). United States DFI originates in 
oligopolistic industries where it replaces exports, while 
Japanese DFI occurs in competitive industries where, due to 
domestic resource constraints on growth, DFI promotes trade 
and world welfare. A further discussion of this approach 
and its relation to DFI in the U.S. is presented later in
this chapter.
Absorption of Surplus Theory.
As seen in Chapter II, one stream of radical thought 
characterizes DFI as an effort by the monopolistic firm to 
vent (absorb) its investable surplus outside the domestic 
economy due to inherent and perpetual stagnation. DFI is
considered by adherents of this view as "the imperative of 
monopolistic business strategy".23 Beyond this general 
assertion and the relegation of DFI between developed 
countries to a secondary status (unimportant aspect of 
imperialism), the generalized monopoly model offers few 
insights into the causes of DFI in general (let alone the 
growing interpenetration of capital between developed 
countries). Such a perspective, which abandons Marxian 
value theory as well as the laws of increasing concentration 
of capital and a tendency of the rate of profit to fall, 
dismisses the significance of the growing interpenetration
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of productive capital because it is Incapable of explaining
this development. According to this account,
interpenetration represents the simultaneous attempts of 
firms from different countries to vent their surplus in 
another country. Even if one were to accept this untenable 
position (which even Sweezy finds impossible to completely 
swallow - see Chapter II), it requires an explanation of how 
the contradictions of this movement are resolved. No such 
attempt has been made by the monopoly capital theorists 
because it would require the resurrection of Marx's 
dialetical view of competition and hence the demise of the 
general monopoly framework upon which all of their work is 
built.
The Internationalization of Capital.
Before Stephen Hymer's untimely death in 1974, his 
theoretical interests turned toward a Marxian analysis of 
the MNC.^4 Based on his interpretation of Marx, Hymer felt 
that capitalist production was characterized by three
cardinal facts: a. that the concentration of capital leads
to increasing socialization of capital; b. that the
increasing organization of labor produces social labor, and 
this evolves, through a process of competition into the 
progressive division of labor and the uniting of the labor
to the natural sciences; c. that the expansion of capital 
and growth of the productive forces leads to the creation 
and progressive transformation of the world economy.
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In Hymer's view, increasing concentration ("The Law of 
Increasing Firm Size") leads to stages in the development of 
the organizational structure of production and 
a c c u m u l a t i o n . ^  He characterized the five steps in the 
transition of production as the workshop, the factory, the 
national corporation, the multidivisional corporation, and 
the multinational corporation. The evolution from step to 
step is brought about by the process of capital accumulation 
itself as growing material production, including 
technological change, leads to the need for a restructuring 
of the organization of production. The transition to a new 
stage brings with it changes in the division of labor (both 
within the firm and the world economy), changes in market 
relations, changes in the forms of competition between 
individual capitals, and changes in the hierarchical 
structure of organization and control. Each stage in the 
evolution involves a process of both differentiation (a 
proliferation of organizational layers) and integration (new 
forms of hierarchical - top down - control).
Agreeing with Chandler and Redllch^, Hymer argued that 
the organizational structure of the MNC can be analyzed at 
three levels of tasks: (I) policy; (II) decision-making; and 
(III) administration. Level III activities involve the 
day-to-day operations of the line officers. Level II 
administrators manage and coordinate the activities of Level 
III managers. Level I represents top management whose
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function Is one of goal-determinatIon, planning and
direction. Hymer claims that applying this scheme to the
evolving multinationalizatIon of production,
....suggests a correspondence principle 
relating centralization of control within the 
corporation to centralization of control 
within the International economy....
Level III activities would spread themselves 
over the globe according to the pull of 
manpower, markets and raw materials....
Level II activities, because of their need for 
white-collar workers, communication systems, 
and information, tend to concentrate in large 
cities....
Level I activities, the general offices, tend 
to be even more concentrated than Level II 
activities, for they must be located close to 
the capital market, the media, and the 
government.27
In his work with Robert Rowthorn, Hymer undertook an 
empirical analysis of MNC's in a direct response to 
Servan-Schreiber's warning of the "American challenge".2® 
Their air was to analyze the "dialectics of the MNC", the 
thrusts and counterthrusts (engaging-disengaging) of MNC's 
competing for world markets. Accordingly, DFI was seen as 
one of the chief instruments used by the MNC's to defend and 
expand world market share.
Hymer and Rowthorn concluded that the "American 
challenge" was a myth. U.S. corporations were not 
outperforming (based on growth rates) their European rivals. 
European corporations grew faster than their U.S. (parent) 
counterparts from 1957 to 1967. Europeans, however, felt 
threatened (myoplcally) by the higher rate of growth of U.S. 
subsidiaries operating in Europe. The U.S. corporations,
1 0 4
meanwhile# responding to the perceived threat to their world 
market position from the Common Market and Japanese,
expanded DFI in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s in order
to take advantage of rapid growth in those markets for 
American-type goods, to secure cheap labor and to address 
the fact that they saw their European competitors growing 
faster (getting a larger share of the foreign market) than 
they were.
American firms were thus presented with an
opportunity and a challenge. Growth of 
foreign markets and labor supply made it
attractive to invest abroad; growth of
European and Japanese firms made it necessary. 
American firms did not invest substantially in 
continental Europe and Japan in the late 
forties and early fifties when they had the
most political influence. Only after the 
development of the Common Market did they make 
their greatest effort, just as it was serious 
competition from Japanese firms that spurred 
the great drive to get into Japan. It is more 
competitive pressure than foresight which 
guides capitalists to expand. 9
Hymer and Rowthorn proceeded to point out that the U.S. 
direct investment in Europe produced a countermeasure in the 
form of a merger movement which resulted in qualitative and 
quantitative changes in the organizational structure of 
European capital. These changes included the development of 
new administrative structures (exhibiting a greater 
resemblence to U.S. firms) and an increase In corporate 
size, creating greater financial strength and allowing the 
consolidation of overseas operations. The increased foreign 
market share justified the European decision to undertake
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DFI, while their growing financial strength increasingly
made it possible.
The authors predicted that the European merger movement
would, at first, lead to heavy European DFI outside the
United States where it was easier (less costly) to enter and
experience could be gained. Once the organizational
structures were created and operational and financial
strength was sufficient, this would be followed by
substantial investment in the U.S. U.S. corporations,on the
other hand, finding it easier to counterattack abroad than
to resist incursions into their own market, were likely to
respond by assigning an even greater role to DFI, including
an Increasing scramble to penetrate and capture markets in
the less-developed and communist countries.
We can therefore expect a period of 
intensified multinationalization (almost 
amounting to capital flight) over the coming 
decade (1970s) as both U.S. corporations and 
non-U.S. corporations try to establish 
world-wide market positions and protect 
themselves from each other.30
While Hymer never utilized the concept of the 
internationalization of the circuits of capital in his 
analysis, he made it clear that he posessed a dialectical 
view of competition and concentration similar to that of 
Marx.
If present trends continue,
multinationalization is likely to increase 
greatly in the next decade as giants from both 
sides of the Atlantic (though still mainly 
from the U.S.) strive to penetrate each 
other's markets and to establish bases in
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underdeveloped countries, where there are few 
indigenous concentrations of capital 
sufficiently large to operate on a world
scale. This rivalry may be intense at first
but will probably abate through time and turn 
into collusion as firms approach some kind of 
oligopolistic equilibrium. A new structure of 
international industrial organization and a 
new international division of labor will have 
been born. 1
Utilizing Hymer's views as a point of departure, John
Roemer developed a four-stage theory of competition that
attempted to explain DFI by emphasizing the competitive
aspects of capital's international movement as opposed to
focusing on an Individual firm's ability to exploit its
monopoly advantages.^2 After analyzing trade patterns
between the United States and Japan, Roemer presented a
model of the stages of international competition that tried
to integrate trade and foreign investment flows within a
competitive world capitalist system. This model
hypothesized that the country pattern of international
capital flows could be explained through an analysis that
stresses the evolutionary nature of capitalist competitive
relations. According to Roemer, calculations which attempt
to bring into perspective a country's international
competitive position as trader and investor,
....need to be put into a descriptive 
framework of international interaction, and 
then *n1j9 a theory of international 
hegemony.^
In this view, each nation strives for hegemony of the 
world capitalist system because, if achieved, it bestows
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political power to the hegemonic country that surpasses its 
economic power.
It is hypothesized that the country in the 
leading economic position has, in some sense, 
political power greater than its economic 
strength seems to warrant. For the U.S. since 
World War II this power has been evidenced 
primarily in two ways: (1) the
internationalization of the dollar as currency 
and (2) the reliance of all capitalist 
countries on the U.S. for military protection 
from the "communist threat." The U.S. has 
been allowed to run a deficit in its 
international payments in order to (1) create 
exchange reserves for other countries (for 
which a deficit was, on the whole, tolerated 
in the 1950s), and (2) allow for U.S. military 
expenditures and foreign aid (for which a 
deficit was tolerated in the 1960s).
The country in the leading economic position, 
then, had the right--unique among all 
countries--to operate from a position of debt.
In this sense its political power is "greater" 
than its economic power. And the tolerance of 
its debt position serves to increase its 
political and economic power through the 
addition of military strength it makes
possible, as well as the right to invest
abroad on credit. But because of the debt
position, international hegemony is very 
tenuous, and the turning points in economic 
strength rather than the absolute magnitudes 
become critical. If other countries have
become competitive, and the leader is 
operating from a debt position, then the 
turning point provides an opportunity to 
foreclose. (Obviously, the process is not 
this mechanical, but— simply stated--when the 
leading power's international economic 
strength begins to wane, the rationale for 
others tolerating its debt position loses some 
of its force. *
Roemer's four stages used to describe the development 
of international competition between developed capitalist 
countries in the post-World War II period follow:
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Stage I : The country's share in the world
exports o£ manufactures starts to rise.
Stage II: The rise in the country's trade
share slows (or its trade share becomes 
stable), and its share in world direct foreign 
investment in manufactures starts to rise.
Stage III; The country's trade share in 
manufactures starts to fall, but its 
investment share continues to rise.
Stage IV: The country's trade share continues
to fall and its share in manufacturing foreign 
investment starts to fall also.-”
Roemer argued that in stages two and three the
instrumental form of international competition changes
progressively from trade penetration to direct investment
penetration as a country attempts to maintain or improve its
place in the hegemonic hierarchy.
....the appropriate instruments of economic 
competition to be considered in determining 
international position vary over time. Trade 
and foreign direct investment appear to have 
been the most important (in the private 
sector) for the post-World War II period, but 
in the past this was not the case....It is 
suggested that the forms of competition change 
as a consequence of increased competition.
The evolution of the forms of competition 
occurs in two ways. First, as competition 
among capital exporters increases, the terms 
on which investment is made in host countries 
are bid down. For example, where there is 
U.S.-Japanese competition, an investment 
project might be awarded to a Japanese firm in 
preference to a U.S. firm because the Japanese 
proposal calls for 51 percent local ownership 
whereas the Americans have proposed a 
wholly-owned subsidiary. Second, because of 
the Increased competition accompanying a loss 
of political hegemony by a leading country, 
the host countries have more maneuverability, 
and can dramatically modify the terms on which 
they import capital, without fear of 
reprisal. 6
Thus, Roemer established a link between the evolution
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in the forms of capital exports (in Palloix's terminology, 
the evolution in the forms of the internationalization of
capital) and increased competition among the advanced
countries during a period of hegemonic decline.37
In order to test his hypothesis, Roemer developed a
measurement of a country's internationally-oriented capital 
(G-share), which is the sum of the country's foreign capital 
stock (DFI) plus the internationally-oriented domestic 
capital (domestic capital producing for export), as a
percent of the world's total internationally-orlented 
capital. In his view, the key variable, the G-share,
measures the country's share (calculated as capital) in 
total world trade and foreign investment in manufactures. 
Roemer's analysis of the G-shares of the four major
capitalist countries (the United States, West Germany, Great 
Britain, and Japan) from 1960 to 1971 led him to conclude 
that,
....international competition in the 1960s 
seems consistent with the four-stage 
hypothesis and the model of international 
hegemony proposed here. Each of the four 
major industrial countries examined 
exemplifies a different stage. The U.S. 
reached a critical turning point with respect 
to its share of International capital sometime 
in the late 1960s, moving from Stage 3 to 
Stage 4 in 1968. The U.S. still dominates 
internationally oriented capital in absolute 
share....but the current International
monetary crisis and crisis of international 
political leadership were to be expected from 
the U.S. reaching a turning point. 8
Roemer further pointed out that the increased
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competition and the growing multlnatlonallzatlon of 
production will likely lead to the development of new forms 
of capital export. He believed that this change was taking 
shape in the movement of stage four countries away from 
direct investment towards instruments that give greater 
control to the host country, such as, production-sharing 
agreements, untied technology packages in exchange for 
manufacturing output or resources, and new forms of 
bilateral and multilateral a i d . ^
In conclusion, Roemer's analysis placed oligopolistic 
corporations in a general worldwide competitive framework 
which undergoes transformations in the forms of capital 
exports as the hegemonic power of the leading nation is 
increasingly challenged under conditions of growing rivalry. 
While he recognized that his work did not present a 
developed theory of international imperialism and hegemony 
nor provide an explanation of the causes of the changing 
positions of the developed countries studied, his analysis 
led him to conclude that the growing international 
competition and relative decline in U.S. hegmony creates the 
conditions for either: (1) an increase in the host countries 
(LDC's) strength and control over the DFI package, allowing 
them a greater ability to "unravel" foreign Investment into 
its components, but maintaining domestic control, or (2) 
war, because periods of transition in hegemony are highly 
unstable and, hence, the likelihood of war is greatest.
Ill
According to this position, in a period of transition 
of capitalist hegemony, DFI can be seen as an instrument or 
weapon (either defensive or offensive or both) in the battle 
for world markets between corporations from the developed 
capitalist countries. This battle occurs in both the 
less-developed periphery (a scramble for resources and 
production bases for export) as well as between and within 
the developed countries themselves (a scramble for sales, 
technological knowledge, and production bases for local 
sales) . 4^
LITERATURE REVIEW OF DFI IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Descriptive Investigations 
The growth of DFI in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s 
led to an increase in American interest in this inward flow. 
Pursuant to a 1974 Congressional Act, requiring the
investigation of the extent of DFI in America, the U.S.
Commerce Department published a nine volume study on the 
subject in 1976.41 This study, utilizing a quantitative 
sample of 7200 replies to questionnaires, attempted to
establish the scope and magnitude of DFI in the United 
States, as well as the degree of foreign control of American 
industry, land and real estate. The report is divided into 
sections that focus on specific industries, state and 
federal regulations, taxation, land law and the policies and 
laws of other countries.
The report concluded that, while DFI in the U.S.
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economy was relatively small, It was an instrument that
provided jobs and other benefits to the host area and should 
not be discouraged. It further reported that the concern 
over OPEC direct Investment was unsubstantiated, though the 
need to improve data collection was noted. Regarding the 
cause of DFI in the U.S., the study stated (in the market 
imperfections tradition) that DFI orignates from both "pull” 
(mainly macroeconomic factors specific to the U.S.) and
"push" (mainly firm specific microeconomic factors) 
var iables.
The Commerce Department's (on-going) efforts to 
determine the extent of DFI in the United States has been
supplemented by the work of J.S. Arpan and D .A. Ricks. 
These authors published a Directory of Foreign Manufacturers 
in the United States in 1974 that was subsequently updated 
in 1 9 7 9 . ^  The directory was established by mailing 
questionnaires to 1900 corporations, supposedly U.S. 
affiliates of non-U.S. firms. This survey yielded 1246 U.S. 
manufacturing firms controlled by foreign parents. Arpan
and Ricks reported that the majority of these firms were 
wholly-owned (100%) subsidiaries of foreign parents who 
usually (5 out of 6) directly financed the initial entry 
which most often was in the form of new construction (90%) 
rather than through the acquisition of an existing firm.^
In another study, Mira Wilkens (and others) also 
investigated the scope of DFI in the United States, placing
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particular focus on the early history (pre-World War II) of 
inward direct investment.^  Wilkens utilized official 
government documents as well as Cleona Lewis' 1938
publication, America's Stake in International Investments.
to provide a detailed analysis of both the U. S. and 
non-U.S. International business pioneers since the 1850s.^ 
In this work, Wilkens admits that the perspective remains 
incomplete due to the fragmented and partial nature of the 
available data on early direct investments.^
In addition to these nation-wide surveys, a number of
studies have investigated the extent of DFI by non-U.S.
corporations in particular American states. An example of 
this work is M. Wilkens' 1977 report to the Secretary of the 
State of Florida on the magnitude of DFI In that state. 
She was commissioned to determine nationality of investor, 
industry involved and the region of Florida selected in 
order to identify the State's options and aid in the
implementation of appropriate policies. Wilkens reported 
that, while it was impossible {given voluntary survey 
methods) to determine the exact extent of DFI in Floridian 
manufacturing, 111 foreign manufacturing facilities were 
identified in a broad range of industries. Firms from 
Canada and Latin America were disclosed to possess the
majority of these operations. She concluded that the 
benefits of DFI in Florida outweighed the costs and that the 
state should actively promote further foreign involvement in
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Florida.
Other studies have attempted to establish the magnitude 
of DFI and foreign control in particular (competitive) 
Industries (real estate, banking, farming, fishing and 
publishing and printing). An example is J.J. Sullivan and 
P.O. Heggelund's investigation of Japanese expansion into 
the U.S. fishing industry.48 The authors presented a 
listing of Japanese corporate involvement by date of entry, 
dollar value of investment and percentage of equity at 
entry. They concluded that, though Japanese investment 
penetration in U.S. fishing was still small, it was growing 
due to Japanese desires for supplies, stimulus from the 
Japanese government and the appreciation of the yen.
Market Imperfections Theories
Most research into DFI in the U.S. utilizes some aspect 
of the market imperfections model discussed previously. 
Though these generally mainstream studies use the same 
conceptual framework, they can be divided and categorized 
based on the focus of the particular analysis. The 
categorization used in this section divides the studies into 
three groups, Including: (a) general non-empirical studies
of DFI in the U.S.; (b) studies of developed country
patterns of DFI in the U.S.; and (c) studies of developing 
(less developed) country patterns of DFI in the U.S.
115
General Non-empirleal Studies
Some writers on DFI in the U.S. have taken an approach 
that might best be called journalistic impressionism.^ 
These authors, like the popular news media and the business 
journals, frequently produce a laundry list of factors 
(derived from a casual observation of partial data) that are 
used to explain the recent growth of DFI in the U.S. These 
listings usually include some combination of the following 
items: (1) depreciation of the dollar; (2) undervaluation of 
the U.S. stock market; (3) availability of raw materials; 
(4) lower U.S. labor costs; (5) greater U.S. labor 
productivity; (6) political stability of the U.S.; (7) sheer 
size of the U.S. market; (8) greater rate of return on 
investment in the U.S.; (9) U.S. protectionist policies;
(10) fear of future U.S. protectionist policies; (11) need 
to be close to the market to service customers; (12) desire 
to be close to the market to gain knowledge and 
technological expertise; and (13) exploitation of investing 
firm's technological advantages-often leading to the 
creation of a listing of the characteristics of these 
advantages.
The conclusion that either this or that factor (or some 
given combination of factors) is responsible for the current 
direct investment "invasion" of the United States is 
Invariably based on either limited analysis of aggregate 
data or a selective number of arbitrary case studies. An
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example of the former Is Earl Fry who listed just about all 
conceivable macroeconomic variables, including the desire of 
the firm for the freedom offered by the U.S., as factors 
determining the growth of DFI in America.50 The latter case 
Is illustrated by J.J. McAttee who, after conducting an
analysis of case studies of foreign tender offers for four 
U.S. corporations, concluded that acquisition activity In 
the U.S. Is Increasing because of (1) the relative decline 
In labor and raw materials cost in the U.S.; (2) the
potential for growth In the U.S. market; (3) the 
depreciation of the dollar; and (4) the political safety 
offered by the U. S . 51 The result of this approach is 
consistent. A grab-bag of country, industry, firm and 
politically specific factors is advanced to "explain" the 
Increased foreign penetration, frequently accompanied by
general assertions that restricting DFI in the U.S. would be 
detrimental to America's national interest.
Studies of Particular Developed Countries/Areas
The publication of three books In the early 1970s 
marked the beginning of an expanding analysis of the growing 
presence of foreign producers in the United States. These 
books, by Nicolas Faith, Christopher Tugenhat and J.D. 
Daniels, created the framework for debate and future
research into the causes of this "reverse" investment 
flow.52
1. DFI from Europe. These early studies tended to
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focus on European DFI, since Japanese DFI was virtually 
non-existent and Canadian DFI was historically seen as 
unique due to Canada's proximity and economic ties with the 
U.S. Faith argued that though the Europeans were coming for 
a variety of reasons, they could best be viewed as explorers 
who have come with desires to learn about market conditions, 
by-pass middlemen in the distribution of their goods, adapt 
their operations to the local conditions (pressures) and 
take advantage of the large size of the U.S. market.^ These 
non-firm specific factors were obtained through analysis of 
a few case studies of both large and small foreign 
corporations, as well as private interviews with a few 
foreign investors. Tugenhat employed a similarly skimpy 
review of selective aggregate data to conclude that the 
increased pace of European direct investment was caused by 
the European merger movement and expanded international 
capital markets which created the conditions to take 
advantage of the size of the U.S. market and a greater 
proximity to the customer. To be successful in this 
attempted penetration, Tugenhat argued that the firm must 
have the necessary resources and skills (managerial, 
technical, administrative) to be competitive. Daniels, 
seeking to explain why foreign firms are Investing in the 
U.S., made use of interviews with a sample population of 
forty European firms, soliciting replies that Indicated the 
operation of both macroeconomic and microeconomic market
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imperfections were responsible for the growing European 
manufacfuring presence.^
Further research into European DFI in the U.S. 
continued in the ensuing years. James Ward investigated the 
extent that European firms adapt their product and promotion 
strategies to the U.S. environment.^ Utilizing a survey 
questionnaire of 53 manufacturing and sales subsidiaries of 
foreign parents (and follow-up interviews with five firms), 
he reported that while 65 percent of the products were 
adapted, most of the changes required little cost. The 
causes of this adaptation were either the desire to meet 
consumer needs or to address competitive pressures from 
other firms. In addition, 71 percent of the surveyed firms 
reported promotional changes due to cultural factors.
Analysis of the historical development of European 
multinationals has been published by Laurence Franko. In 
these studies, firm level data gathered from company 
interviews and individual company histories published in 
Europe, were employed as well as aggregate data from the 
Survey of Current Bu3ine33 and the Harvard Comparative 
Multinational Enterprise Project. Franko's work on the 
pioneer European multinationals (dates of entry, dollar size 
of Investment, number of foreign subsidiaries created 
annually) led him to conclude that, while the existence of 
European MNC's actually predated the development of U.S. 
MNC's, the process of European multinationalization had not
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been constant, going through spurts of expansion (during the 
1920s and between the end of World War II and 1952) as well 
as phases of stagnation (during World War I, World War II 
and 1953 to 1958).56
In studying the timing of European corporate 
penetration of the U.S. market, Franko surmised that U.S. 
government trade barriers were the most common cause of 
European direct investment, followed by European 
technological superiority operating through the product life 
cycle.57 In 1978, Franko concluded that the growth of 
non-American DFI was leading to the creation of a new 
economic order. The three factors that were responsible for 
this were: (1) the decline of U.S. exports and the growth of 
European exports (where DFI is viewed as being positively 
related to exports); (2) the closing of the technology gap 
and the development of internationally oriented management 
structures by the Europeans; and (3) the push toward energy 
saving and pollution control technologies in which the 
Europeans (due to historically differing national 
conditions) possessed natural advantages.58
2. DFI from the United Kingdom. In his 1972 book, 
Phillip Colebrook claimed that the historical analysis of 
British foreign investment yielded three timeframes, dating 
from pre-1914, 1914-1945 and 1945-1970.58 Unfortunately, 
this assertion is quite arbitrary and Colebrook demonstrated 
little empirical evidence to support the contention.
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Nevertheless, he concluded that the growth of British DFI In 
the U.S. since World War II has been caused by both
macroeconomic and microeconomic imperfections. Colebrook 
placed particular emphasis on: (1) a counterattack on U.S. 
DFI in Britain; (2) the circumvention of American trade 
barriers; (3) the ability to gain acccess to raw materials;
(4) the need to defend and retain export markets, and (5) 
the desire to recoup rising research and development costs.
Direct foreign investment by British firms has been
more substantially investigated by J.M. Stopford.60 His
examination of early (pre-1914) British foreign investment
divides British firms into two groups. One group consists
of 14 large British multinational pioneers, all leaders of
domestic oligopolies, and the other group includes the rest
of British industry.6-1- Stopford, using data from Harvard's
Comparative Multinational Corporation Project, notes that
the latter group tended to focus its early DFI within the
British Commonwealth due to macroeconomic (favorable
tariffs, favorable political climate, acquisition of raw
materials, etc.) factors, while the pioneers undertook a
major commitment to the development of international
manufacturing outside the Commonwealth before 1914, mainly
in Europe and the U.S.
All these companies pioneering the development 
of international manufacturing had the energy 
and ability to take advantage of their special 
skills. These skills were either
technological, or marketing, or, in the case
of Shell, logistical. Many other companies
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might have done the same but chose not to. In 
the cotton trade, for example, very few 
manufacturers entered into foreign trade 
directly - at least three-quarters of the 
exports were handled by foreign merchants 
resident in Manchester - and were not 
therefore Intimately exposed to the pressures 
to invest abroad. This attitude, amounting in 
some instances almost to a casual disdain of 
foreign markets and foreigners, was to be 
observed In many other industries. The 
fourteen pioneers did not suffer from this 
lethargy. That they did not is attributable, 
at least in part, to the influence of 
foreigners within the firms or, in five of 
them, the influence of foreign capital.
....[Tlhese firms chose to establish factories 
abroad on the basis of economic advantage or 
cartel considerations, not Empire loyalty.
With few exceptions, the investments were in 
the high-lncome countries with the greatest 
demand for the products in question. 
Investments in the Empire were almost 
exclusively restricted to the "white" 
dominions, where the burgeoning populations 
had income levels comparable to or higher than 
those in Europe. 2
Stopford went on to point out that the British have 
historically exhibited a high propensity for capital 
exports, classified as either portfolio, direct or 
"expatriate". From 1820-1913, portfolio and expatriate 
capital exports dominated, while, after the First World War, 
direct investment began to grow in significance. Stopford 





He estimated that the share of direct in the total
122
British foreign Investment position Increased to about 20 
percent in 1927 and to over 40 percent in 1939. During the 
inter-war years and continuing until the 1960s, many British 
firms followed the pioneers in establishing production 
facilities abroad. These direct investments remained 
concentrated within the Commonwealth empire and frequently 
occurred only when the British firm was threatened by the 
loss of the market to local manufacturers in the dominions.
In 1976 Stopford further analyzed the reasons for the
changing pattern of aggregate British DFI which, since 1965,
had increasingly shifted away from Commonwealth countries
toward the high income countries in Europe and the U.S.®^
Using data from the Multinational Enterprise Project, he
studied 83 large British multinationals. Sixteen of these
firms were identified as global in scope (defined by foreign
investment share as percent of total), while the rest were
categorized as Commonwealth f i r m s . T h e  study revealed
that the 16 global firms illustrated a significantly smaller
propensity to invest in the Commonwealth from 1900 to 1970
even though almost all 83 firms made their first DFI within
the Commonwealth. In addition, the global firms tended to
use new construction to establish production while the
Commonwealth firms most often acquired existing facilities
in the host country.
The attractiveness of Commonwealth markets for 
investment was principally a function both of 
the British firms being stronger than the
local competition, and of the absence of any
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determined effort being made there by the
large international firms of non-British 
origin. Such investment decisions have 
elements of the standard comparative 
advantage. But advantage is measured only 
relative to, say, the Australian competitor 
and not to the world Industry leader. It is
not the oligopoly game of thrust and 
counterthrust and of exchanging hostages on a 
global basis. The game is almost one of
hide-and-seek....
By contrast, the global investors from early 
In their international expansion have had to 
develop systems for transfering knowledge
among countries. Reliance on good men acting
independently in their territories is not an
adequate prescription for competing on a 
worldwide basis. The tendency among those 
firms has been to develop organizational
systems and procedures for assessing each new 
market in a manner resembling those of the 
Amer icans.66
3. DFI from West Germany. Both Bernhard Klinner and 
Vassilis Droucopoulis have Investigated German direct
investment abroad, since World War II, using German
aggregate government data.®^ Klinner divided the analysis
into three time periods. From 1962 - 1966, German
investment flowed to other European countries. From 1967 
1971, German investment penetration focused on the 
less-developed countries and the U.S.; while, from 1972 
1976, direct investment going to other European countries 
began to decline. Klinner deduced that during this period 
(1962 - 1976) the changing pattern of German DFI was caused 
by both macroeconomic factors (desire for safety, the 
appreciation of the deutsche mark, the need to secure raw 
materials, the desire to improve market coverage and 
overcome Import restrictions) and microeconomic factors
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(cost advantages of German firms in production and
transportation). Klinner concluded that,
The principal motives for German investments 
in other countries - improved market coverage 
from a location nearer at hand, cost
advantages in production and transportation, 
avoidance of Import restrictions by consumer 
countries - are likely to retain their 
stimulating effect in the future®®
V. Droucopoulis examined the expansion of West German
DFI from 1955 to 1975, concluding that its increasing pace,
concentrated In manufacturing in the developed countries,
was narrowing the penetration gap between West German and
United States multinationals. He saw the causes of
Germany's growing U.S. investment as the rising
international value of the deutschemark, improving German
domestic wages, German government regulation of pollution
and the progressive saturation of the German market. In
Droucopoulis' view, non-firm specific factors are
responsible for the expansion of German penetration as
German firms have been forced to venture overseas.
Until now, the West German and Japanese 
economies have been contrasted to the U.S. and 
U.K. ones. The former showed a much higher 
rate of internal investment and their 
international success rested upon the export 
of their own manufactures. The two major 
"Anglo-Saxon" economies, by contrast, are 
dominated by banking and finance capital that 
invests abroad directly, and by large 
international firms which also export their 
investments rather than finished products. It 
now seems, however, that West Germany is 
moving closer to the "Anglo-Saxon" model, if 
it can be called that; partly because the 
strength of its currency allows it to, but 
also because this very strength obliges West
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German companies to protect their overseas
markets by making use of the now often much
cheaper labour to be fgynd outside the borders
of the Bundesrepublik.69
J.M. Stopford's 1980 analysis of West German DFI sought
to explain the cause of the change from asymmetry (U.S.
penetration of Germany greater than German penetretion of
the U.S.) to a position of balance between U.S. and German
DFI f l o w s . s t o p f o r d  presented aggregate direct investment
data from the Survey of Current Business. a sampling of
export/foreign output ratios gathered from corporate reports
of nine German firms and relative hourly wage rates between
the U.S. and Germany for the period from 1970 to 1976. He
noted that Germany's post-World War II export-led strategy
for growth was a necessity brought about by Allied
restrictions until 1952 and the memory of confiscated
properties in the U.S. during both World Wars. Stopford
concluded that four major macroeconomic causes were "shaping
changes" in German DFI. These were: (1) the decline in the
value of the dollar and the relative increase in European
production costs; (2) the undervaluation of the New York
stock exchange; (3) the fear of the leftward political
movement in Europe; and (4) energy shortages and rising raw
material prices.
The stage now seems set for a long-run 
correction of the existing asymmetry in the 
transatlantic balance of investment. With 
German investors setting the pace, the nature 
of international competition among most of the 
world's leading industrial nations will change 
fundamentally during the 1 9 8 0 s . *
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4. DFI__f rom Canada. The analysis of Canadian DFI has
been performed by two Canadian economists, I.A. Litvak and
C.F. Maule. These authors used aggregate Canadian
government data for the period from 1971 to 1976, a survey
of 25 small to medium sized Canadian firms with at least one
affiliate in the United States, and the presentation of five
case studies of large Canadian firms with significant DFI in
the U.S.7  ^ Their investigation leads them to make the
following points about Canadian DFI.
Four key observations can be made with respect 
to CDIA (Canadian Direct Investment Abroad); 
first, most of it is located in the developed 
world; second, the United States with more 
than one-half of the total is the major 
geographical area of concentration; third, the 
manufacturing sector Is the prime area for 
such investment, much of it centered in the 
United States; and fourth, most of the
investment is held in subsidiaries which ace 
100% owned by the Canadian parent company.7-’
Their research indicated that the smaller Canadian
firms undertook DFI as a strategy to defend markets
previously established through exports as well as the
deteriorating political-economic conditions in the domestic
Canadian economy, primarily, the slower growth of that
economy. These firms generally believed that they possessed
superior technology (21 out of 25) and most of the firms (24
out of 25) possessed 100% control of the U.S. affiliate.7^
In their analysis of the impact of Canadian DFI on the
domestic Canadian economy, Litvak and Maule claimed that,
while DFI in the 1960s was a result of positive factors (the
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firm's drive for growth, diversification and the acquisition 
of raw materials), in the 1970s, Canadian firms increasingly 
invested abroad for negative reasons (high domestic 
inflation, Canadian government wage and price controls, 
union strikes, Federal-provincial government disputes and 
corporate tax purposes). In spite of these reservations, 
the authors concluded that, in most cases, since foreign 
markets and domestic jobs would have been lost without 
direct investment abroad, foreign Investment by Canadian 
firms was not detrimental to the Canadian national interest.
5. DFI from Japan. In the 1970s, Yoshi Tsurumi applied 
a variant of the product life cycle hypothesis to explain 
exports to the U.S.75* The logical conclusion of this 
hypothesis provided a rationale for Increasing direct 
investment in the U.S. Tsurumi noted that, in an increasing 
number of industries, Japanese technology had advanced 
enough to produce, for the U.S. market, products not yet 
demanded by the (lower income) consumers in Japan. The 
empirical basis of Tsurumi's analysis is case studies of two 
Japanese companies (Sony and Nippon Miniature Bearing) and 
aggregate data of Japanese DFI in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.
Tsumuri claimed that Japanese producers had passed 
through the first stage of their foreign expansion in which 
domestic labor and land shortages, a rising value of the yen 
and growing competition from producers in the developing
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countries led Japanese firms to undertake DFI In those 
countries. He felt that the second stage of Japanese 
investment expansion would focus on DFI in the developed 
countries, particularly the United States.
,...[I]f Japanese firms desire additional 
sources of managerial and engineering skills 
at reasonable costs, they will have to look to 
the United States, where these talents are 
relatively abundant.
The costs of plant site development and 
building in the United States are 
approximately one-half to one-third of those 
in Japan. Suitable plant sites are nearly 
impossible to locate in crowded Japan and, 
when taken into consideration with the 
strategy of riding the international cycle of 
product and technology into the United States, 
many Japanese manufacturers will contemplate 
obtaining manufacturing and marketing bases in 
that country.76
In a 1979 "Special Survey", the editors of The Oriental 
Economist pointed out that most (70%) of the direct
investment by Japanese manufacturing industries was 
concentrated in the developing (less-developed) countries.77 
It was only since 1975 that Japanese investment in U.S. 
manufacturing operations had become significant. As of
1979, 80 percent of total Japanese investment in the
developed countries was still accounted for by the 
non-manufacturing sector (sales agents and branch offices of 
Japanese trading firms and bank3). The editors predicted 
that a continuation of the yen's appreciation against the 
dollar, the likely rise in American tariff rates and the 
expansion of non-tariff barriers in the United States was 
certain to increase Japanese investments in U.S.
129
manufacturing at an accelerating pace in the 1980s.
Mira Wilkens has studied the direct investment 
relationship between Japan and the United States from 1930 
to 1952. In a paper published in 1982, she points out that 
while the data on Japanese direct investments in the U.S. 
prior to the Second World War is spotty, her studies 
revealed that the vast majority of this investment was 
concentrated in finance and distribution. In her view, the 
character of this early investment helps to explain the slow 
pace of pace of Japanese manufacturing investments in the 
U.S. after the war. Since the Japanese lacked a base of 
productive properties to return to after the war, their 
penetration of the U.S. market was retarded.
6 . Less-Developed and Smaller Developed Countries. A 
number of economists have investigated direct investment in 
America from the smaller developed and less-developed 
countries. In his 1974 dissertation, David McClain 
postulated a "small country product cycle" to explain direct 
Investment in the U.S. by firms headquartered in small, open 
economies in the post-World War II period.^ McClain argued 
that, except for the special relationship of the U.K. and 
Canada to the United States, the small country product cycle 
explained the relative ranking of countries responsible for 
the stock of direct investment in the U.S. (the Netherlands 
and Switzerland ahead of Germany, France and Japan). From 
this view, the small country firm would be forced into
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exporting before the large country firm in order to achieve 
economies of scale for efficient production. Maintaining 
these exports in the competitive U.S. economy would be 
difficult due to the emergence (or counterattack) of U.S. 
producers; hence, based on the product cycle logic, firms 
from small, open economies would make direct investments in 
the U.S. before the firms from the large countries.
McClain's small country hypothesis was supported by the 
work of T. Agmon and C.P. Kindleberger and the other 
contributing authors in their 1977 analysis, Multinationals 
from Small Countries.80 This basically descriptive work 
contains essays on the activities of MNC's from Switzerland, 
Australia and five less-developed countries. In all cases 
the assertion is made that small country MNC's have passed 
through a product life cycle or "establishment chain" that 
explains their relatively early direct investments.
D.E. Kaplan, delivered the results of his research on 
South African DFI from 1977 to 1981 to the American Allied 
Social Sciences Association conference in December of 
1981.®* He indicated that South African DFI was distinctly 
different from other developing capitalist countries. 
Drawing on previous studies of India and Argentina, Kaplan 
noted that these non-advanced countries concentrated their 
direct investments within other developing countries 
(usually lower in the pecking order of the world capitalist 
hierachy) located "close to home". These investments most
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often took the form of joint ventures where the investing 
firm, frequently in a minority position, horizontally 
duplicated existing technological and production processes 
adapted to conditions that prevailed in the developing 
world.
Kaplan's investigation of the available data (published 
press and business reports and public documents of companies 
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) recognized that, 
while the data were incomplete, a number of broad trends 
emerged which allowed the characterization of South African 
direct investment abroad. These characteristics are 
reproducd below:
(1) A tendency to invest in the advanced 
capitalist countries - particularly in the 
U.S. and U.K.
(2) Most South African DFI involves purchase 
of, or partnership with, already existent 
foreign firms. In only a minority of cases 
has a totally new operation been set up.
(3) Joint ventures are common and while the 
terms vary, it would appear that in a number 
of cases South African firms have a majority 
holding.
(4) For some South African firms, foreign 
investment is not a simple extension of
domestic activity but Involves operations in
fields which are quite distinct from, or only 
marginally related to, existent domestic 
operations. This is particualrly true of the 
larger firms - Rembrandt and Anglo American.
(5) The technological component in South 
African DFI is complex but by no means 
confined to an adaptation of existent imported 
technology.
(6) ....[T]he increase in South African DFI, 
particularly to the advanced capitalist 
countries, has been primarily a post-1976 
phenomenon and particularly of the last few
years.
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Kaplan surmised that South African DFI flowed to the 
advanced countries In order to allow the firm to: (1)
protect or advance exports to Its principal markets; (2) 
acquire needed technology; and (3) avoid the political risks 
of investing in black African countries. In addition, the 
aquisitlon of existing firms or the establishment of joint 
ventures appeared to reflect the inherently high barriers to 
penetration of advanced country markets by new entrants.
Kaplan concluded that the uniqueness of South Africa's 
DFI patterns relative to other developing countries resulted 
from the extremely high degree of monopoly in the South 
African economy which, in turn, is explained by the
particular historical development of capitalism in South 
Africa. This high degree of monopoly has produced a market
saturation that limits the South African firms to the size 
and growth of the domestic economy. In this connection, 
increases in South African export prices, primarily gold, 
after 1977 produced higher profits, which fueled both 
further domestic concentration and centralization of
capital, as well as investment abroad by its firms. In
addition, South Africa's massive balance of payments surplus 
from 1978 to 1980 allowed a relaxation of government 
controls over capital exports. Kaplan's analysis, 
therefore, combined a mainstream market imperfections 
explanation of DFI with a radical monopoly capital theory of 
the MNC (capital exports as vent of surplus) to attempt to
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clarify the characteristics of South African international 
expansion in the late 1970s.
In 1986, Y.D. Euh and S.H. Min examined direct 
investment in the U.S. by Korean corporations.83 Their 
analysis, based on a case study of 432 Korean direct foreign 
investments, illustrated that, except for trade and mining, 
these investments tended to be concentrated in other 
developing countries, lower in the socio-economic pecking 
order. This was particularly true in manufacturing where 
investments in the North America accounted for only twenty 
two percent of the total foreign activity in this sector. 
From these observations they conclude that the Koreans are 
following their comparative advantage in adapting 
standardized, small-scale, labor intensive manufacturing 
first to their home market and then, eventually, applying it 
to other developing countries. They predict that Korean 
direct investment penetration of the developed countries 
will hinge on the ability of Korean firms to overcome their 
inherent disadvantages (lack of managers with global 
strategic experience and insufficient domestic capital) in 
the developed manufacturing markets.
The Japanese Macroeconomic Model 
Another group of economists, led by K. Kojima and T. 
Osawa, have argued that the monopoly advantage theory 
(firm-specific market imperfections) which is applicable to 
the oligopolistic markets and firms of the United States, is
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unacceptable as an explanation o£ Japanese DFI.®4 Instead, 
this viewpoint, which appears to have become the offical 
doctrine of the Japanese government, claims that Japanese 
DFI is best understood by applying neoclassical 
international trade theory. They called their theory the 
"factor-endowments analytic approach"; emphasized its
macroeconomic determinants; and combined it with a limits to
domestic growth thesis ("the Ricardo-Hlcksian trap").
These theorists claimed that Japanese DFI was 
distinguished from that of other developed country DFI by
seven unique features. It was characterized by the facts 
that it was: (1) relatively recent (post-1968); (2)
clustered in Asia; (3) concentrated in competitive
industries; (4) concentrated in small and medium-sized
manufacturers; (5) extensively used in the extractive
industries; (6) more willing (anxious) to accept minority
ownership positions; and (7) reliant on external sources of 
funding.®® These characteristics were illustrated with
aggregrate DFI data from Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry for the selected years 1969 and 1973.
These data are broken down into resource-oriented, labor and 
market-oriented, and financial services direct investment.
Kojima and Ozawa reasoned that the major thrust of
recent Japanese direct investment, clustered in Asia, by 
small and medium-sized firms in competitive domestic 
industries (e.g., textiles, electrical appliances, shoes,
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etc.) represented investment going from a comparatively
disadvantageous industry (based on national factor
endowments) in the investing country to an advantageous
industry in the host country. This view held that it was
the marginal firms in an industry that, threatened by
competition from the developing countries, were forced to
invest overseas in order to survive (remain competitive in
world markets). The Japanese government helped this process
(as did the yen's appreciation) by providing financial aid
to the investing firms, who,
....will harmoniously promote an upgrading of 
industrial structure on both sides and thus 
accelerate trade.86
These theorists went on to explain that the reason
pro-trade direct investment accelerated after the late 1960s
was the constraint to further growth encountered in the
domestic Japanese economy. In this view, the rapid
industrialization in Japan after World War II led (in the
1960s) to increasing shortages and, hence, rising prices of
domestic labor and land as well as growing pollution,
congestion and ecological destruction. These factors
stimulated an internal structural shift of production that,
taking into account national factor endowments and
international comparative advantage, forced marginal firms
in competitive industries to seek production sites abroad or
go bankrupt. Ozawa concluded that:
The Western explanation of multinationalism is 
clearly not appropriate for the recent
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Japanese experience; it does not elucidate why 
Japanese national enterprises, small as well 
as large, suddenly and simultaneously took on 
multinational characteristics in the late 
1960s, although most of them had not yet, by 
Western criteria, quite reached the stage at 
which they evolved naturally into 
multinational corporations.... They had been 
driven overseas by the scarcity of production 
factors at home and the growing environmental 
constraints on further industrialization of 
their economy, rather than by the growth of 
their individual internal capacities to 
operate on a global scale. Indeed, the very 
weakness of their capacity to Invest overseas 
on their own led to Japan's unique pattern of 
government-supported and group-oriented
multi-firm investments overseas and to the 
heavy use of external fund3 to finance the 
overseas ventures of individual enterprises.87
This view has been supplemented in a 1984 study by the 
Keizai Koho Center, which is a private, nonprofit
organization that works in cooperation with the Japan 
Federation of Economic Organizations to provide corporate 
views on the Japanese economy.88 It was emphasized that 
Japanese direct investment in the U.S. was different than 
that in the developing nations in a number of respects.
Whereas the latter occurred because of the reasons advanced
by Kojima and Ozawa discussed above, direct Investment in 
America resulted from the draw of U.S. supplies of
resources, goods, funds and information plus the desire to 
be better able to respond to customer needs. In addition, 
Japanese direct investments in the U.S. were characterized 
by a higher percentage of equity ownership and a larger 
relative size of investment than those made in the 
developing countries. The study concluded that increasing
137
cross penetration of investments between Japan and the 
United States will produce a period of "mutually equitable 
investment exchange".
Empirical Studies 
Here, the results of empirical investigations of DFI in 
the U.S. will be detailed. The authors base their work 
either on surveys of sample firms or on reported aggregate 
data in an attempt to quantitatively measure, through 
regression analysis or other statistical techniques, the 
significance of some of the variables that have been used to 
explain the direct Investment flows analyzed above. This 
section divides these empirical works based on the area of 
investigation (country variables, firm specific rates of 
return and capital allocation, oligoplistic reaction and 
exchange of threat, locational preferences and the financial 
health of U.S. firms acquired by foreigners.)
Studies of Country Variables
In a 1973 article published in the Survey of Current 
Business. Robert Leftwich atempted to establish the 
significant variables determining DFI in the U.S. during the 
period from 1962 to 1971.89 He utilized linear regression 
to test the statistical significance of three explanatory 
variables of direct investment in the United States. These 
country variables were: (1) the size of the U.S. market; (2) 
the rate of growth of the U.S. market; and (3) the average 
level of U.S. tariffs. Although Leftwich anticipated that
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all three variables would be positively correlated with DFI 
In the U.S., his results indicated that the size o£ the U.S. 
market was the only statistically correlated one. The 
author did point out, however, that there were many other 
variables (that weren't tested) whose movement may have 
influenced foreign investment in the U.S. during the period.
T.R. Emch used a similar approach in his 1981 
examination of Japanese direct Investment in the U.S. from 
1962 to 1976.^® In this study, he attempted to correlate it 
with: (1) the size of the U.S. market - measured by 
cumulative Japanese exports; (2) the declining 
competitiveness of Japanese domestic production - measured 
by the yen/dollar ratio; and (3) the relative factor input 
costs between the two nations - measured by the ratio of 
Japan's wholesale price index to the United States wholesale 
price index. The results of his statistical analysis, which 
transformed the variables into logarithmic form, indicated 
that all of the variables were statistically significant, 
with direct investment in manufacturing revealing a 
particular sensitivity to the relative factor input cost
between the two countries.
D.S. McClain, in his 1982 paper, tested the
significance of exchange rate variations in explaining the 
pattern of DFI in the U.S.^* In this work, he examined the
correlations, for eight countries (the U.K., the
Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Japan and
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France), of the percentage difference in real exchange rates 
against the dollar from 1970 to 1980 and three separate 
measures of each country's direct Investment in the U.S. 
during the period. In all of the regression tests, none of 
these correlations was significantly different from zero at 
even the 20 percent level of significance. The use of lags 
or percentage changes in real exchange rates did not change 
the results. McClain concluded that, while the test was not 
conclusive, it provided weak evidence that exchange rate 
fluctuations have less Impact on direct investment flows 
than previously surmised in the literature.
Firm Specific Rates of Return and the Optimal International 
Allocation of Capital
In 1972, M.F.J. Prachowny analyzed DFI in the U.S. from 
a firm specific portfolio perspective.^ in his regression 
analysis, covering the period from 1953 to 1964, he found 
that variations in differential expected rates of return on 
investment were significant in explaining variations in the 
ratio of Canadian and British direct Investment in the U.S. 
relative to the total value of equities in Canada and the 
U.K.
D.S. McClain, in his 1974 thesis, complemented 
Prachowny's portfolio analysis approach with a further 
regression study.^ investigating the investment decisions 
of British and Canadian firms in the period from 1952 to 
1971, McClain calculated the correlative significance of:
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(1) liquidity - or competition for project funding; (2) 
portfolio Interdependencies - represented via a 
Tobin-Brainard general disequilibrium framework; (3) tariff 
rates in the U.S.; and (4) capital controls in the U.K. 
McClain reported that,
My results for the U.K. suggested that direct 
investment in the U.S. by British firms was 
related significantly to the desired stock of 
capital in both locations, and to subsidiary 
cash flow in the U.S., but not to cash flow in 
the U.K. Tariffs and the Interest 
Equalization Tax had no direct effect, though 
U.K. capital controls did....
In the Canadian case, a supply model obtained 
as Canadian cash flow proved most Important in 
explaining the flow of direct investment into 
the U.S.
Studies of Oligopolistic Reaction and Exchange qI Threat
Behavior
David Graham, in his 1974 dissertation (and subsequent 
work), investigated the relationship between European direct 
investment in the U.S. and previous U.S. direct investment 
in the same European industries during the post-World War 
period.^ To study this "exchange of hostage" behavior, 
Graham regressed (for Instance) the percentage change in 
British subsidiaries entering the U.S. in time period t, on 
a measure of the percentage change in U.S. subsidiaries 
entering the U.K. In time period t-n. Supplied with data 
from Harvard's Comparative Multinational Enterprise Project, 
Graham's regression analysis led him to the conclusion that 
the exchange of hostage response was strongest in industries 
that were characterized by a high degree of concentration,
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widespread product differentiation and significant
expenditures on research and development.
In 1976, E.B. Flowers tested the theory of 
oligopolistic reaction which Knickerbocker had used to 
explain the "bunching" of U.S. direct investment abroad by 
firms from a particular industry.^ This concentrated entry 
pattern is produced by a "bandwagon effect" on the part of 
firms who scramble, in response to an initial foreign
investment by a firm in the industry, to establish their own 
foreign operations In order to match their oligopolistic
rival and maintain foreign market share.
Flowers1 data were taken from Arpan and Rick's
publication of the Directory, of Foreign Owned Firms in the 
United States. From this, he established a list of 1219 
addresses of forelgn-owned subsidiaries which were mailed 
survey questionnaires plus two successive rounds of 
follow-up mailings. This survey yielded responses from 
about 50 percent of the firms listed. From these, a sample 
of 372 interactions was established. With these data 
Flowers regressed an entry concentration index (= the number 
of subsidiaries entering in a 3 year period) on the standard 
four- and eight-firm Industry concentration indices for 
European and Canadian direct investment.
This study, supporting the theory of oligopolistic 
reaction, was able to explain about half of all European and 
Canadian direct Investment within three years of the first
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investment. Flowers also found that direct Investment in 
the U.S. from the U.K. tended to appear in a reactive 
cluster to previous U.S. penetration of the U.K. He
concluded that, within three years of the clustering of U.S.
investment in the U.K., a reverse clustering of British 
direct investment in the U.S. tended to occur.
In his 1974 thesis, D.S. McClain also analyzed DFI in 
the U.S. at the firm level for the period from 1914 to 1970. 
His data were supplied by Harvard's Multinational Enterprise 
Project which yielded 2051 direct investments in the U.S. 
from 114 non-U.S. multinational firms.^ McClain used 
logistic discrimination analysis on these data to isolate 
the characteristics of U.S. subsidiaries which distinguished 
them from subsidiaries located elsewhere. This analysis was 
able to calculate the likelihood that a subsidiary, once 
formed, would be located in the U.S. McClain examined 
characteristics relating to the subsidiary, the parent firm, 
the industry and the country of origin of direct investors 
in the U.S.
The results of this analysis showed that U.S.
subsidiaries were more likely to be young (recent), to be
greater than 50 percent controlled by the parent and to have 
less than 50 percent of their sales derived from exports. 
Parent firms were characterized by being more diversified 
(at 3-digit SIC level) and likely to devote relatively large 
research and development expenditures as a percent of total
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sales.
In analyzing Industry charachteristics, McClain found
no evidence of either Knickerbocker’s "follow the leader" or
Graham's "exchange of hostage" strategies. In addition,
U.S. subsidiaries were less likely to be in industries
classified as "high technology", with investments in
instruments and chemicals more likely, while those in
textiles were less likely. At the country level, U.S.
subsidiaries were calculated as being inclined to belong to
parents with headquarters in small open economies.
Locational Preferences of Foreign Investors
In 1978, J.S. Little examined the locational decisions
of foreign investors in the United S t a t e s . U s i n g
aggregate data from the U.S. Commerce Department, she
regressed a measure of a given state's share of.- Inward
direct investment on five locational variables. These
macroeconomic variables were the following ratios of a state
to U.S.: (1) fuel costs; (2) hourly wage rates; (3)
unemployment rates; (4) personal income levels; and (5) port
commerce volume. Little's regression results lead her to
conclude that:
Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the 
Mideast and New England remain the areas 
attracting the greatest concentration of 
foreign plants....
Foreign and U.S. investors do not focus their 
investments in the same areas even within the 
same Industries, because they appear to accord 
different weights to various locational 
characteristics. In particular, foreign 
investors seem to give relatively heavy weight
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to state wage differentials and to the 
availability of port facilities while U.S. 
investors are comparatively more concerned 
about regional differences in fuel and power 
costs. Contrary to popular opinion, foreign 
investors do not appear to lay any greater 
emphasis than their qU*S. counterparts on 
avoiding labor unions.”
Financial Health of U.S. Firms Acquired Bv Foreigners
J.S. Little, in the early 1980s, also analyzed the
financial health of U.S. firms acquired by foreigners. In
her 1981 article, she investigated whether foreign firms
were acquiring U.S. firms of above average or below average
financial s t r e n g t h . D r a w i n g  on an annual List of Foreign
Investments in the United States prepared by the U.S.
Commerce Department, Little developed a sample of 78 public
firms from 350 manufacturing acquisitions made from the
second quarter of 1977 to the first quarter of 1980. In
this study, financial strength was measured by the standard
financial ratios of the acquired firm (liquidity, leverage,
debt serviceability) as well as the firm's profitability
three years before acquisition and market assessments.
Little concluded that there was no tendency for
foreigners to acquire financially above-average firms. In
addition, she pointed out that foreigners tend to
concentrate on growth industries for their acquisitions. In
her view, DFI was seen as beneficial to the U.S. because it
brought new capital, new technology and new management
talent to the U.S.
In 1982, Little published the results of a more
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rigorous study concerned with determining whether foreign 
acquisition strengthened or weakened the acquired U.S.
manufacturing company. Here she reduced the sample to 65 
non-financial U.S. firms acquired between 1972 and 1978. 
Standard financial ratios were calculated (liquidity, 
leverage, profitability, growth and fixed Investment) for 
the sample group which were then compared to a control group 
(industry average) for three years prior to acquisition and 
two to three years after acquisition. In these measurements 
Little calculated the percent by which each sample firm's
financial ratios exceeded or fell short of industry
averages. Next, she calculated the average (median) of 
these percentage differences between the strength of the 
sample firms and their Industry standards for each pre- and 
post-acquisition year examined. Finally, the financial 
ratios of both the control group and the sample population 
were tested to determine statistical differences between the 
two groups.
This study led Little to conclude that before
acquisition, firms had above average rates of growth in 
sales and assets, as well as above average leverage. After 
the merger these firms became less profitable, expanded more 
rapidly and Increased net worth more rapidly than the 
industry standard. Finally, she noted the Irony that the 
weakest firms before acquistlon got stronger, while the 
strongest firms became weaker after the acqulstions.
1 4 6
SUMMARY
Most o£ the authors who have analyzed direct foreign 
investment in the United States have utilzed a market 
imperfections framework which sees the growing penetration 
of the U.S. as the result of microeconomic of macroeconomic 
imperfections which make the firm's production advantages 
internationally transferable. These advantages allow the 
firm to overcome what are viewed as the inherent competive 
disadvantages of operating a foreign investment (as compared 
to simply exporting their comparatively advantageous 
products). This development, which has been gaining 
momentum since the late 1960s, is primarily seen as an 
advanced country phenomenon since the developing countries 
(with the possible exception of South Africa) lack the 
ability to overcome the inherently larger competitive 
disadvantages in the developed countries.
Further, it can be noted that the theory of the 
internationalization of capital, with which Hymer and 
Rowthorn predicted growing direct investment penetration of 
the U.S., has recieved little attention to empirical 
research since their original work was published in 1969. 
One of the objectives of Chapter V will be a modest attempt 
to present an empirical update of this position.
Finally, one observes that the monopoly capital 
theorists with their surplus absorption theory are virtually 
silent on the question of the direct investment penetration
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of the U.S. No doubt this can be traced to the fact that 
they continue to cling to a stagnant monopoly model which,
incapable of analyzing the forces of change, preaches the
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additional factor Inputs. In addition, DFI can be 
accomplished without a major change of ownership if new 
construction is used to establish the subsidiary.
3. J. J. Servan Schrieber, Le Defl Arnelean. Paris, 1967.
4. Leontiades, James, "The European Challenge: A Response," 
Columbia Journal of World Business. July-August, 1970.
5. Franklin Root, International Trade and Investment,
South-Western Publishing Co., Cincinnati, OH, 1984, p. 274.
6. The present value of any asset (C) depends on the 
expected future income stream (y) discounted by the interest 
rate (1)
C = y/1
As Kindleberger has noted, one common distinctionn between 
direct annd portfolio investment is that the former occurs 
in response to international differences in y which derive, 
not from a firm's nationality but, from some firm specific 
imperfection (Kindleberger stresses the effect of firm size 
on cash flow and credit rating); while portfolio investment 
occurs in response to international differences in i. See
C. P. Kindleberger, American Business Abroad: Six Essays an
Direct Investment. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 
pp. 24-25.
7. Franklin Root, International Trade and Investment, p.
456.
8. See for instance: R. Z. Aliber, "A Theory of Direct 
Foreign Investment", in C. P. Kindleberger (Ed.), The 
International Corporation. Cambridge, MA: 1970, 17-34; R.
Z. Aliber, "The Multinational Enterprise in a Multiple 
Currency World", in J. H. Dunning (Ed.), The Multinational 
Enterprlsef London, 1971, 49-56; M. Adler, Comment on
Niehan's "Benefits of Multinational Firms...", in T. Agman 
and C. P. Kindleberger (Ed), Multinationals from Small
149
Countries. Cambridge, MA: 1977, 40-48.
9. See, for instance: Alan Rugman, "Motives for Foreign
Investment: The Market Imperfections and Risk
Diversification Hypothesis," Journal of World Trade Law.
September-October, 1975; and Alan Rugman, "International 
Diversification by Financial and Direct Investment", Journal
ai Economics and Business, vol. 20, no.l, Fall 1977,
pp.31-37.
In his 1975 article, Rugman makes the following point:
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Innovator is threatened with losing its 
monopoly position. In the usual case, rival 
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with the loss of its business in a given 
foreign market. At that point, the areas to 
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some of the advantages that were created by 
its original monopoly. (See Vernon, 1985, 
p.410)
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multinationals Vernon reports that,
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number of prior transfers to their foreign 
producing subsidiaries were quite consistently 
quicker off the mark with any new product than 
were firms with fewer prior transfers. 
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154
29. S. Hymer, "The internationalization of Capital", 
Journal of Economic Issues, vol. 6, no. 1, March, 1972.
30. S. Hymer and R. Rowthorn, "Multinational Corporations 
and International Oligopoly: The Non-American Challenge",
p . 81.
31. S. Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of 
Uneven Development", p. 114.
32. J. E. Roemer, United States-Japanese Competition in
International Markets. Research Series, no. 22, Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 
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emphasizes the competitive battle for third markets as 
opposed to competitive thrusts in each other's markets. 
Most likely this is due to the influence of the monopoly 
capital theorists in the U.S. and the early stage of the 
reverse flow of direct investments to the U.S. at the time 
of Roemer's investigation.
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International Markets, p. 159-63.
39. Ibid., Roemer portrays the transition in the form of 
capital exports as follows:
Under Great Britain's hegemony, portfolio
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investment was the predominant form of capital 
export, and it is generally agreed that direct 
investment— the form into which capital 
penetration "evolved" under U.S.
hegemony— provides more control to the 
Investor (home) country or firm. However/ 
"portfolio Investment" is a narrow definition 
of the form of capital export predominant
under British hegemony. Rather than being 
simply portfolio investment, it is better 
characterized as "colonialism." That is, the 
economic penetration by the British was much 
deeper than the purely financial form of
investment suggested; it comprised, rather,
total political and economic control by the 
"mother country." Viewed in this way, the 
instrument of direct foreign investment as 
used by the U.S. constituted an unravelling of 
the British type of capital package: total
political control was reduced to control of
discrete economic enteprises. The unravelling
was nominal, at least, whether the U.S.
succeeded in maintaining political control 
through forms of neo-colonialism, tied aid, 
deleterious terms of trade against the hosts, 
and so on, is another question.
....Indeed the process may be somewhat more 
evolutionary, employing natural
selection— i.e., the country which succeeds in
establishing a new hegemony may be the one 
whcih offers capital to the host countries in 
its most unravelled form. Although in the 
present transition period it appears that the 
hosts are taking considerable initiative
(Bergsten's documentation Is convincing), in 
the Great Britaln-U.S. transition this may not 
have been the case. The U.S. may have 
succeeded in establshlng hegemony with 
relative ease because it adopted an
"advanced"form of capital export, while
Britain stuck to its old ways....Similarly, 
some combination of Japan, the EEC, and the 
Soviet Union may forge ahead of the U.S. in 
capital exports if they adopt new, more
advanced forms which further unravel the
capital package, while the U.S.--out of
inertia and because of vested
interests— continues to rely on direct 
investment. As previously noted, such new 
forms could be production-sharing agreements, 
multilateral aid, or other types of relatively 
untied technological assistance.
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avoided.
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CHAPTER IV
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LONG RUN DYNAMIC 
OF CAPITALIST ACCUMULATION
DFI AND THE LONG WAVE OF STAGNATION 
Chapter III reviewed the many factors, both at the 
level of the firm and the national economy, that have been 
advanced to explain the growth of direct foreign investment 
(DFI) in the United States since the late 1960s. The main 
deficiency of almost all of these explanations, however, is 
that DFI is seen as an alternative to exporting or 
licensing, which is only undertaken when such investment is 
the cheapest form of market penetration. This commonly held 
view leads the investigation into an attempt to expose both 
the firm-specific and macroeconomic factors that allow the 
firm to overcome the (supposedly) inherent disadvantages of 
conducting operations in a distant and unfamiliar 
environment. As was shown in the last chapter, the result 
of this approach is most often the selective presentation of 
a laundry list of variables which are then uniquely blended 
into an explanation of DFI in the United States. The major 
debates end up centered around whether it is micro or macro 
factors which are most important in the explanation.
This chapter will investigate the possibility of a 
connection between DFI in the U.S. and long-run fluctuations
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in the pace of world capitalist accumulation. Specifically, 
it is argued that the growth of DFI in the U.S. in the last 
15 years has been caused by (related to) a transition to a 
long wave of relative stagnation in the world capitalist 
system. The analysis is based on a world system view that 
sees DFI as one of many methods available for market 
penetration and the expansion of accumulation. In this 
context one does not see DFI as naturally disadvantageous 
compared to the export option. Recognizing the evolutionary 
nature of capitalist production and accumulation on a global 
scale, it stresses the necessity of using DFI as the 
dominant method for penetrating foreign markets at this 
particular historical juncture of the world capitalist 
system.
(T)he stage which the world capitalist system 
has now reached contains a tendency which is 
forcing companies, regardless of their size, 
to undertake a global reorganization of their 
manufacturing processes on pain of 
extlnction..,.It is the historically unique 
combination of innovations in site, products 
and processes in a phase of world economic 
stagnation which constitutes the substance of 
the reorganization of the world economy over 
the last ten years.
Thus, the decline in the pace of world accumulation has 
produced a necessity to restructure the capitalist system in 
order to redevelop the criteria necessary for a further 
advance of capitalist production and accumulation. DFI in 
the U.S. is one aspect of this global reorganization. As 
the current phase of stagnation deepens, the international
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cross-penetration of capital, in general, and DFI in the 
U.S., in particular, is likely to continue. Furthermore, 
the progressive internationalization of productive capital 
is producing a heightening of competitive forces for world 
markets that is an important variable in explaining the 
direction and operational processes of the current 
reorganization, as well as the potential for renewed and 
expanded capitalist accumulation in the long-run.
The present chapter will present a brief historical
review of the early literature on long-run alterations in 
the rate of capitalist production and accumulation. This
will be followed by an expanded discussion of modern long 
wave theorists, focusing on the time frames discerned, the 
explanatory (causal) variables advanced, and the major areas 
of criticism and debate. The final part of the chapter will 
summarize and illustrate the proposed relationship between 
the long wave of stagnation and DFI in the U.S. in 
succession, Chapter V will present firm-level sample data to 
support this position. Chapter VI will conclude the
investigation by providing a formal statement of the 
relationships between stages of capitalist accumulation, 
long waves of capitalist development and the 
internationalization of productive capital as it applies to 
direct investment in the United States.
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EARLY LONG WAVE THEORISTS
In the first two decades of the 1900s a number of
economists in Europe explored the possible existence of
long-run swings in the pace of capitalist production and
a c c u m u l a t i o n . ^  The  m o s t  c o m m o n l y  c i t e d  o f  t h e s e  t h e o r i s t s
was the Russian economist, Nikolai Dmitrievich Kondratieff.^
His early work stressed the structural aspects of the long
wave of capitalist accumulation, holding that the economic
data, reflecting the long wave pattern of alternating
expansion and crisis, were the economic expression of
capitalism's continual movement between phases of
equilibrium and phases of disequilibrium.
In its most general form the essence of an
economic crisis lies in the fact that the
national economies of separate countries and 
the world economy as a whole, taken as a
moving system of elements, loses its 
equilibrium and experiences an acute, painful 
process of transition to the condition of a
new moving equilibrium. From the economic 
point of view a crisis is always only an acute 
and painful process of liquidating the 
disparities which have arisen in the structure 
of a national economy, and which destroy the 
equilibrium of its elements. [A crisis] is 
the process of establishing a new equilibrium 
among these elements in place of the one which 
has broken down.^
For Kondratleff, the reorganization in the structure of 
the national economies of the world capitalist system during 
periods of crisis, set the stage for a renewed period of 
expansion (within capitalist limits), just as the 
progressive growth of contradictions during periods of
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expansion created the conditions for renewed crisis. 
Recognizing that the investigation of long waves posed 
problems due to the very extended period of observation and 
the limitations of available data, in his later work, 
Kondratieff chose data relating (primarily) to England and 
France as the basis for his inquiry. It is interesting to 
note that the time series he analyzed comprised both 
monetary variables (prices, interest rates, savings, wages) 
as well as real variables (imports, exports and various 
production series). In his work he made no attempt to 
explain the relation between movements of prices and those 
of production. A summary of the long waves Kondratieff 
discerned is presented in Table 4-1 below. ^
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Table 4-1: Kondratleff's Long faves li icononlc Life 






Scarce: I. Kondratieff, 'Long fives in Icoooaic Life*
In his 1926 paper, Kondratieff advanced the Idea that
there are three types of cyclical activity which influence
economic aggregates. He surmised that the short waves (3-4
years), the intermediate business cycles (7-11 years), and
the long waves of an average length of 50 years, interacted
with each other giving the capitalist system of production a
complex dynamic.
The idea that the dynamics of economic life in 
the capitalist social order is not of a simple 
and linear but rather complex and cyclical 
character is nowadays generally recognized. 
Science, however, has fallen far short of 
clarifying the nature and the types of these 
cyclical, wave-like movements.
While he did not develop a complete theory about the 
relationship between these three time frames, Kondratieff 
did believe that the long waves influenced the shorter 
cycles.
(T)hese intermediate cycles, however, secure a 
certain stamp from the very existence of the 
long waves. Our investigation demonstrates 
that during the rise of the long waves, years 
of prosperity are more numerous whereas years 
of depression predominate during the 
downswing. 7
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This relationship, which Kondratieff identified as an 
empirical characteristic of dynamic capitalism, is
illustrated in Figure 4-1 below.
Figure M :  Olaarai of the laaa ware
0 25 50 Tears
Kondratieff identified four other empirical 
characteristics of the secular movement of the capitalist 
economy. During long wave downturns, (1) agriculture 
suffers severe depression and (2 ) many new technological 
discoveries occur but are only applied on a large scale in 
the next long wave upswing. In addition, at the beginning 
of a long upswing, (3) gold production generally increases 
and new markets are created by the assimilation of new 
territory into the system. Finally, Kondratieff noted that
(4) the most severe wars and revolutions tended to occur
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during the rising phase of the long wave. He emphasized, 
however, that these factors did not constitute an 
explanation of the long wave pattern.
In 1928, before the abrupt end of his career, 
Kondratieff did attempt to outline a theoretical explanation 
of long waves. This presentation, which he emphasized was 
a rough and incomplete sketch, combined a theory of 
reinvestment of structurally-oriented capital with a 
loanable funds theory to explain the cyclical nature of the 
long wave.
(I)t can be suggested that the material basis 
of long cycles is the wearing out, replacement 
and expansion of fixed capital goods which 
require a long period of time and enormous 
expenditures to produce. The replacement and 
expansion of these goods does not proceed 
smoothly, but in spurts, another expression of 
which are the long waves of the 
conjuncture....Thus the long cycles of the 
conjuncture constitute the processes of the 
deviation of the real level of the elements of 
the capitalist system from the equilibrium 
level of this system; processes, in the course 
of which the level of equilbrium itself 
changes.®
The bunching of these structurally-oriented capital 
investments (railways, canals, land improvement projects, 
large plants, etc.) was related to the financial markets 
through the supply and demand for loanable funds. During 
the long wave downswing, a growing pool of loanable funds, a 
rising propensity to save and a low (or declining) price 
level acted to (eventually) trigger an expansion of 
investment in basic capital goods. As this long-run
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expansion proceeded, prices rose, the loanable funds 
available become depleted and interest rates rose acting to 
(eventually) produce a cut-off of these investments and a 
long wave of decline. Thus, Kondratieff1s explanation has 
been characterized as a 'periodic reinvestment cycle of 
long-lived capital' or as a 'monetary over-investment 
theory', (by Eklund and vanDuijn, respectively).
During the 1920s, Kondratieff's long wave thesis was 
strongly criticized in the Soviet Union by Leon Trotsky and 
others.9 . While they agreed that the pace of capitalist 
accumulation and growth was not constant, they did not 
believe that these long-run fluctuations were periodic. 
From their perspective, factors such as wars, revolutions, 
new territories, and gold discoveries were seen as 
external/exogenous variables. And, if they were exogenous 
and random, then there was no reason to see the fluctuations 
in accumulation that they produce as a cycle. While these 
critics agreed with Marx that the Intermediate (business) 
cycles resulted from the internal operation of the 
capitalist system, they foresaw the long-run trend as being 
determined by external (random) events that could not be 
explained by the system's internal dynamic. Kondratieff was 
thus accused of mistakenly identifying distinct epochs or 
stages of capitalism's development as long-run cycles.^-®
Kondratieff responded that these considerations were 
important but, nevertheless, invalid objections. He
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regarded the aforementioned factors as internally dependent
ones instead of externally conditioned, independent,
extra-economic ones. Events such as technological change,
wars and revolutions, international expansion and gold
discoveries were generated by the operation of forces
inherent to the capitalist system. As such, they required
an explanation that encapsulated this aspect of the
capitalist system.
Their (the critics) weakness lies in the fact 
that they reverse the causal connections and 
take the consequence to be the cause, or see 
an accident where we have really to deal with 
a law governing the events. ^
Kondratieff was further criticized for the statistical 
methods he employed, the apparently arbitrary manner by 
which the turning points of the long wave were identified 
and his characterization of the capitalist dynamic as a 
smoothly evolving process of equilibrium adjustment. This 
characterization was particularly unacceptable to the 
critics because it implied that periods of capitalist crises 
were transitory and that the system was able to create the 
conditions for a renewed expansion of accumulation. This 
contradicted the official Soviet view that the capitalist 
system had entered a crisis phase which would culminate in 
the eventual overthrow of a decadent system. It is not 
suprising, then, under these conditions, that the discussion 
of long waves of capitalist development came to an end in 
the Soviet Union.
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In the United States, however, the idea of the long
wave was incorporated into Joseph Schumpeter's work on
business cycle theory during the 1930s.12 Schumpeter
believed that the evolution of economic history revealed the
operation of three distinct types of cycles which he named
after their primary originators: the Kondratieff (40 to 60
years); the Jugular (7 to 10 years); and the Kitchin (3 to
4 years). He argued that these cycles were interrelated.
Thus, he stated that
barring very few cases in which difficulties 
arise, it is possible to count off,
historically as well as statistically, six 
Juglars to a Kondratieff and three Kitchins to 
a Jugular - not as an average, but in every 
individual case . 1 3
Starting with the long price cycles derived by 
Kondratieff, Schumpeter attempted to forge a theoretical 
link between these price movements and technological 
innovation in the dynamic leading sectors of the economy. A 
chronological summary of these long price cycles in
accordance with Schumpeter's four-phase business cycle has 
been provided by Kuznets with Shumpeter's approval. This 
summary is shown in Table 4-2 along with Schumpeter's scheme 
for the designation of these waves. The dates for the first
and second Kondratieff were for Great Britain while the
third was for the U.S .1 4
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Table 4-2: Schaipeter'a L o w  Cycles (Prices)
Prosperity it cess ion Depression B e t l w l
(1) Industrial Revolution Kondratieff, 11(7-1142: Cotton, Textiles, Iron 
1787-110# 1(01-1(13 1(14-1(21 1(2(-1(42
(2) Boirqeois Kondratieff, 1142 - 1 0 7 :  lailroaditatlon, Steaa Power 
1(43-1(57 1 ( 5 1 - 1 ( 0  1 1 7 0 - 1 0 4 / 5  1 ( 0 - 1 0 7
(3) leo-Merchantilist Kondratieff, 1 0 7  to 113): Electricity, lotoaobile 
1 ( 0 - 1 ) 1 1  1)12-1)24/25 1)25/6-1)3)
Soorce: SI non K u i e t s ,  Ectnoaic Cianae: (elected Essays ie 
easiness Cycles, lational Iicoae and Econoiic.GtDMti
Schumpeter hypothesized that technological innovation 
in the leading sectors of the economy occurred in a bunched 
fashion, as opposed to a continuously smooth sequence. 
Though invention may be viewed as a continuous process, the 
actual incorporation of new technologies into the production 
function through innovation by entrepreneurs occurs in a 
"herd-like" manner. The connection between the cyclical 
variations of price and the bunching of innovations was 
established through Schumpeter’s assumption that the early 
phases of experimental innovation would be financed by an 
expansion of credit for the necessary investment. In the 
early stages of the transformation, however, the expansion 
of credit would outstrip any cost reductions achieved 
through innovation, thus bringing about inflation of prices. 
Once a new leading sector was firmly established and its 
technology generalized, the resultant cost reductions would
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lead to a deflation of prices which also coincided with a 
reduction in credit financing. This is followed by 
depression and an eventual revival.
In Schumpeter's system, then, all three cycles were
related to the same fundamental causes: the herd-like
movement of entrepreneurial innovation; the initial
expansion of credit-financed investment; and the subsequent
cost reductions achieved as the innovating sector matured.
According to Schumpeter, this sequence of events led to
cyclical fluctuations in prices in reference to both the
Kondratieffs and the shorter cycles. Throughout this
analysis he placed primary importance on the role of
fundamental technological change. Schumpeter's work after
the Second World War continued to emphasize this position.
These revolutions periodically reshape the 
existing structure of industry by introducing 
new methods of production - the mechanized
factory, the electrified factory, chemical 
synthesis and the like; new commodities, such 
as railroad service, motorcars, electrical
appliances; new forms of organization - the 
merger movement; new sources of routes and 
markets to sell in and so on. This process of 
industrial change gives the general tone to 
business: while these things are being
initiated we have brisk expenditure and 
predominating "prosperity” - interrupted, no
doubt, by the negative phases of the shorter
cycles that are superimposed on that ground
swell - and while those things are being
completed and their results pour forth we have 
elimination of antiquated elements of the 
industrial structure and predominating 
"depression". Thus there are prolonged
periods of rising and of falling prices, 
interest rates, employment and so on, which
phenomena constitute parts of the mechanism of 
this process of recurrent rejuvenation of the
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productive apparatus.*®
THE LONG SWING BACKLASH IN THE UNITED STATES
Following the Second World War, Schumpeter's analysis
of the long wave came under severe criticism from a group of
economists, headed by Simon Kuznets, who could loosely be
called "long swing theorists." These economists criticized
Schumpeter's statistical methods, his inability to
adequately explain the factors that caused a long run
periodic bunching of innovation and investment, and the
rigid nature of his three cycle schema. In his 1953
analysis of business cycles Kuznets concluded that:
The prevalence of such fifty-year cycles in 
volumes of production, either total or for
important branches of activity, in employment, 
in physical volume of trade, has not been 
demonstrated, nor has the presumed existence 
of these cycles been reconciled with those of 
a duration from 18 to 25 years established for 
a number of production series in this and 
other countries. Nor has a satisfactory 
theory been advanced as to why these 50-year
swings should recur: the explanations tend to
emphasize external factors (inventions, wars, 
etc.) without demonstrating their cyclical 
character in their tendency to recur as a 
result of an underlying mechanism or as 
effects of another group of external factors 
of proven "cyclicity"....The core of the 
difficulty seems to lie in the failure to 
forge the necessary links between the primary 
factors and concepts (entrepreneur,
innovation, equilibrium line) and the 
observable cyclical fluctuations in economic 
activity.1 6
Kuznets thus questioned the existence of long waves,
primarily due to the lack of statistical evidence and "the
1 7absence of factors that would explain their periodicity."
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In this way, he was repeating the arguments made by the 
Russian critics of Kondratieff regarding his dependence on 
external causes to explain the operation of the long wave. 
And, if the cause of the long wave was external random
shocks, then obviously there was no reason to view them as 
cycles.
In place of the long wave, Kuznets advanced the concept 
of long swings (which he called secondary secular variation) 
in the rate of economic activity. Basing his analysis on
his 1930 publication, Secular Movements LD Production and
Pricesf in which he subjected some 65 production and 35 
price series from five countries (U.S., U.K., Belgium,
Germany and Prance) to trend analysis, Kuznets concluded 
that the data revealed long-run cycles that lasted 18 to 25 
years. Further statistical analysis appeared to confirm
Kuznets' results.1® In the U.S., the end result of this
theoretical assault was that the Kondratieff cycle fell into 
disfavor as American mainstream economists concerned with 
the long-term trend shifted their focus to explaining
Kuznets' cycle (the long swing) while non-traditional 
American economists emphasized how the development of
monopoly capitalism was creating the conditions of permanent 
stagnation.
A thorough review of the long swing literature, as it 
developed in the three decades after World War II, is beyond 
the scope of this chapter.1 9 A brief summary of these
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investigations would highlight both the on-going debate over 
the ability of econometric techniques to separate long-run 
variations from short-run fluctuations2®, as well as the 
controversy over the factors causing the (supposedly) 
observed long swing movements. Regarding the latter point, 
most of these economists gradually accepted the notion that 
international movements of labor and/or capital were related 
to the long swing phenomena. The major debate centered on 
whether the waves of migrating capital and labor caused the 
long swings in the U.S. (via a 20 year building cycle that 
also produced inverse long swing movements in the nations 
supplying the capital and labor - in this case Europe), or 
did the long swings in the U.S. cause the waves of
p 1
immigrating labor and imported (portfolio) capital. -*■ While
it doesn't appear that this question was ever decided, the
interest in the long swing has waned among some economists
due to the general recognition of the historically specific
conditions (waves of labor and capital migration from Europe
to North America, South America and Australia) that produced
these lengthy patterns.
The Kuznets1 cycle in America lived, it 
flourished, it had its day, but its day is 
past. Departed, it leaves to us who survive 
to study its works, many insights into the 
kinds of connections and responses which go 
together to make for spurts and retardations 
in development. 2
Thus, in the prolonged post-World War II expansion, 
which saw a relative decline in the prestige of business
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cycle theorists in general, the long swing was relegated to 
a previous (and no longer relevant) period of the system's 
development while the long wave was (by most all economists) 
simply dismissed,
THE MODERN LONG WAVE THEORISTS 
The return of economic stagnation and crisis periods 
since the late 1960s, and the rising tide of economic 
insecurity, tension and conflict in the 1970s and 1980s have 
rekindled an interest in long waves among some academic
economists which has been mirrored in the popular press23. 
These economists span the spectrum from the far right 
(Rostow) to the far left (Mandel), so it should not be 
suprising that a good deal of disagreement has surfaced.
The major areas of contention center on: (1) the variables
that illustrate the long wave movement; (2 ) the historical 
time-dimension of the long wave; and (3) the theoretical 
framework and explanation of the variables that produce the 
long wave pattern (especially the turning points). These 
questions will be addressed in this section.
Many of the authors discussed below build eclectic 
(multi-causal) models/conceptions of the long wave by 
selectively combining various factors into their 
explanations. To facilitate this review, the authors have 
been placed in the following classification scheme, based on 
the major area of emphasis in their work:
(1) Disequilibrium in agriculture and raw materials
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markets;
(2) Monetary and credit cycles;
(3) Technology, innovation and investment;
(4) Human psychology and demographic trends;
(5) Global politics, international hegemony and 
conflict;
(6 ) The social structure of accumulation.
In addition, it should be noted that the majority of 
economists on both the left and the right continue to deny
the existence of long waves in economic activity. While
both sides question the statistical verifiability of the 
long wave, the mainstream economists emphasize that there is 
no reason why a prolonged period of expansion must be
followed by a long wave of (relative) contraction. On the
other hand, most radical economists stress that, once the 
long wave of contraction has started, there is nothing in 
capitalism's internal logic that can explain a transition to 
a phase of expansion.^
Disequilibrium in Agriculture and Raw Materials Production
One of the few authors who continued to use the concept 
of the Kondratieff long wave in the 1950s and 1960s was the 
eminent, eclectic economic historian, W. W. Rostow. Over an 
extended period he had sought to develop a synthesis between 
the work of the economic theorist and the economic 
historian. His interest in developing a model for the 
analysis of long-run trends developed out of his rejection
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of Marx's analysis of the laws governing relations among the 
sectors of society as harsh and simplistic. 2 5 On the other 
hand, Rostow felt that the theoretical growth models 
(advanced by the likes of R. F. Harrod, J. Robinson, N. 
Kaldor, E. D. Domar and others) were too restricted in their 
approach to the long-run dynamic problem. Rostow's early 
analysis took particular offense in the assumptions built 
into Harrod's dynamic model of the advanced countries which 
took popultion growth, the flow of innovations and the
institutional framework of these countries as exogenously 
determined. Rostow concluded that it is precisely these 
factors which must be endogenously included in an analysis 
of the process of growth.2**
Having thus rejected both Marx's formulation of the
laws of motion of capitalist development as well as the
approach of the modern mainstream growth theorists, Rostow 
set out to develop an analysis which could answer the
question: what determines the rate of economic growth? To
answer this question, Rostow claimed that the appropriate 
model must endogenously include the determinants of (1 ) the 
size and quality of the work force, (2 ) the productivity of 
investment outlays, and (3) the character and scale of 
innovations and their degree of diffusion through the
economy. In his system the process of innovation was viewed 
as a continuous (even) flow of possibilities for investment. 
Investment took various forms which were directly related to
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the pressure of growth against productive resouces.
The course of investment emerges as a race 
between diminishing returns, the flow of 
innovational possibilities and two
fundamentally sociological characteristics of 
society - namely, its response to 
opportunities for profit (including profit to 
be derived from fundamental and applied 
science) and the extent to which it is 
prepared to accept and apply the innovational 
possibilities offered. 7
Rostow did not believe, however, that a boom in the
business cycle came to an end because investment had
exhausted all of its objective possibilties. Instead of
general over-investment, the end of the boom was
characterized by an overshooting of investment in particular
directions or sectors. The boom took a downturn because
....in the leading lines of new investment the 
market has come to appreciate that expansion 
in certain sectors has proceeded beyond the 
optimum level, or that the decisions already 
taken would lead to such disproportionate 
expansion in terms of the optimum sectoral 
levels of capacity and output. ®
Thus, he rejected outright the possibility of the 
occurrence of a realization crisis due to generalized 
over-investment and, hence, overproduction. For Rostow,
over-investment occurred only in particular sectors which 
created disproporttonalities but not generalized
over-investment. In this view of the business cycle there
was no necessity for the boom to end; the full employment 
volume of investment could be sustained if the composition 
of investment were appropriate. In addition, Rostow claimed 
that this view of the cycle allowed for the possibility that
1 8 3
....business cycles of different length are 
essentially of the same nature, but are to be 
distinguished mainly with respect to the 
period of gestation of the leading forms of 
investment which dominated their course. *
It is not surprising, then, that when Rostow proceeded 
to an analysis of Kuznets' secondary secular variations and 
Kondratieff's long waves, the same methodology and variables 
were employed.
In his investigations in the early 1950s, Rostow sought 
to blend long swings and long waves, yet his analysis 
focused on the Kuznets cycle. Rostow accepted and supported
the existence of these secular variations but he did not
believe that they constituted a cyclical phenomenon. He
claimed that these trend periods, defined in terms of 
fluctuations in prices not output, were caused by a
prolonged overshooting of investment and production in 
particular sectors of the economy, and "by the reaction from 
such excessive distortions in the sectoral pattern of 
growth." The two possible forces responsible for this 
overshooting were viewed to be wars and the "lumpy forms" of 
investment in agriculture and raw materials which possessed 
long periods of gestation. His explanation tied these
factors to the opening and exploitation of new regions in 
the world. The dating of Rostow's trend periods (in regard 
to agricultural prices) is given in Table 4-3 below.
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Table 4-3: goatee1a Trend Prices









Rostow believed that his conception o£ these trends was
distinct from Schumpeter's since the analysis did not
require the 50 year period to be cyclical. In addition,
Rostow claimed that it:
is also to be distinguished with repect to its 
judgment on the causes of the periods of 
rising prices. Schumpeter would associate
these with major industrial innovations, the 
present argument with periods of war and 
extensive expansion, of long gestation
period....Historical evidence does not appear 
to support the view that the periods of rising 
trends in general prices were caused primarily 
by the coming of major new industries . ...The 
aim of this dangerously stylized rendering of 
modern economic history is to underline the 
existence in history of powerful distortions 
in agricultural and raw material capacity,
away from realistic optimum levels which gave 
a special character in both expansion annd 
contraction phases to relative price
movements, to income distribution, and to the 
type of investment expected to be profitable.
The great phases of large international and 
inter-regional capital movements were
essentially a consequence of this process. ^
Rostow concluded his early analysis of trends by noting 
that it was similar to Schumpeter's in the importance given 
to the gestation period and in the association of a trend 
upswing with an abundance of investment opportunities 
offering high yield. This work represented a generalized 
extension of earlier work he had done on the British economy
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from 1790-1914, focused this time on the world economy as a
whole, rather than on a national economy. 3 2 He concluded 
that.,
in general, the author would emphasize his 
belief that the character and causes of trend 
period, both when they are related to the 
development of new resources in response to 
the pressures of growth against existing 
capacity and when they are judged to have been 
initiated by distortions in capacity and 
requirements caused by wars, are significantly 
clarified by placing them against the 
background of a systematic conception of the 
process of growth in relation to sectors of 
the economy. 3 3
In his early post-war work, Rostow applied his analysis
of sectoral growth to the "stages of economic growth" as a
way of "generalizing the sweep of modern economic history."
As is well known, Rostow designated these stages as follows:
(1 ) traditional society; (2 ) the preconditions for take-off;
(3) the take-off; (4) the drive to maturity; (5) the age of
high mass consumption; (6 ) the age beyond mass consumption.
Rostow believed that it was useful to characterize an
economy according to the roles played by its leading sectors
with these stages viewed as efforts by societies to reach
their optimum sectoral paths. By using what he claimed to
be a dynamic "disaggregated theory" of production, Rostow
asserted that
we are examining, then, not merely the 
sectoral structure of economies, as they 
transformed themselves for growth, and grew; 
we are also examining a succession of 
strategic choices made by various societies 
concerning the disposition of their resources 
which include but transcend the income
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elasticities of demand. 3 4
Rostov returned to this disaggregated theory of
sectoral production and its relation to trends and overall 
economic growth some twenty years later in a series of
further publications during the 1 9 7 0 s . ^5 In these writings, 
Rostov maintained that it was now advantageous to move away 
from Kuznets' conception of secondary secular movements
(long swings) towards the Kondratieff conception of long
waves. It was time to return to the questions first posed by 
Kondratieff which were not dealt with either by the growth 
theorists or by Kuznets and his disciples. "I conclude,
then, that the phenomena identified but not explained by 
Kondratieff have still not been brought within the framework 
of 'an appropriate theory of long waves ' . " 0 0
In setting aside the 20 year Kuznets cycle in favor of 
the analysis of long waves, Rostov advocated the use of a 
tripartite mechanism which focused on the forces set in 
motion by: (1 ) the changing sequence of leading growth
sectors; (2 ) changes in the supply of and demand for
foodstuffs and raw materials, which, due to shifts in
profitability, induce an altered pattern of investment; and
(3) internal and external migration and their echo effects 
which affect the rate of family formation, housing demand 
and the relative size of the working force. In using this 
mechanism Rostov placed particular emphasis on the 
profitability of foodstuff and raw materials production
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which he believed provided the missing link required to 
return to the Kondratieff approach.
....the flow of capital to Argentina and 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and (I would 
add) pre-1860 United States cannot be 
understood outside the context of the changing 
profitability of foodstuff and raw material 
production as decreed, on the one hand, by 
price movements of their export products, on 
the other, by major developments in 
transportation and other technology related to 
agriculture. 37
Rostow stated that there are three factors which could 
set in motion an expansion of raw material or foodstuff 
production, all of which were related to profitability. 
First, if demand grew more swiftly than supply (which may be 
stable), prices and profits would rise causing an expansion 
of production in response. Second, a new technique may 
become available (such as breakthroughs in transportation or 
refrigeration) which could lead to higher profits. Last, 
new resources may be discovered that could be profitably 
extracted. In Rostow's schema, the expansion of foodstuff 
and raw materials production after the American Civil War, 
in response to prices and profit potential, led to a 
downward trend in prices after 1881. After 1899 raw 
materials and foodstuff prices slackened their rate of 
descent and between 1906 and 1913 again began to rise. By 
surveying the historical experiences of a few of the less 
advanced countries (Canada, Australia, Argentina, and the 
USSR) Rostow surmized that these fluctuations in foodstuff 
and raw materials prices (using wheat prices as a proxy)
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were related to international capital flows to Australia,
Argentina and Canada, respectively, between 1883 and 1913.
He claimed that these international capital movements
....helped prepare the way for and, in some 
cases, mightily reinforced but did not cause 
the process (price fluctuations) to take 
place. The scale of capital exports did, of 
course, have consequences for the character 
and pace of evolution in the capital-exporting 
nations...In a rough-and-ready way the world 
economy was responding in these years to 
profit possibilities created by price 
movements and technological developments: a
dynamic stock adjustment principle was at work 
on a grand scale. This balancing process, 
however, including the capital flows it 
induced, reinforced the effect of industrial 
deceleration on real wages in the more 
advanced Industrial nations of the Western 
world. 3 8
Rostow's third factor, immigration, was viewed as a
response to different levels of expansion in various states.
In the case of the new countries, he argued that,
The combination of railroad technology, the 
lowering of shipping freight rates, and price 
movements made profitable the opening of new 
fertile, hitherto unexploited acreage; 
immigrants flowed to these regions; the whole 
process, erratically reinforced by
international capital movements, set in motion 
a rapid generalized expansion, transcending 
agriculture, permitting the large-scale flow 
of immigrants to be productively absorbed in 
the new economies. 3 8
In his work during the 1970s Rostow applied this 
tripartite mechanism to an analysis of long run trends since 
the First World War. In dating these trend periods (placing 
primary emphasis on the prices of foodstuffs and raw 
materials) Rostow arrived at the following schedule:
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1973- ? : Upward trend
Using the United States as an example, Rostow saw the 
period from 1920 to 1937 as marked by falling agricultural 
prices due to the expansion of production, coinciding with 
high rates of immigration (at least until 1925 when the 
enactment of new legislaton in the U.S. restricted the 
amount of immigration). The downward trend in the prices 
of foodstuffs and raw materials was reversed in the later 
1930s due to cutbacks in acreage and the expansion of 
incomes at the close of the Great Depression. From 1938 
until 1951 there was thus an upward trend followed again by 
its opposite from 1952 until 1972.
Rostow claimed that during this latter downtrend the 
U.S. was in the midst of a transition from one stage to 
another of economic growth. In the United States, after 
1951,
a shift began towards a new set of leading 
sectors, as high mass-consumption no longer 
had the power to drive the economy 
forward....Operating through political as well 
as economic markets, the income elasticity of 
demand asserted itself towards the end of the 
1950s, in the form of rapid increases in 
outlays for education, health services, 
travel, recreation and welfare.... While 
Western Europe and Japan enjoyed a last 
decade's fling at high mass-consumption in 
the 1960s, the United States was experimenting
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with the complexities of what I have called 
the search for quality.40
A turning point was reached in 1972-73 that Rostow
believed was as sharp as those of the 1790s, 1840s, 1890s
and 1930s. He attributed the latest turning point to the ad
hoc events of bad harvests and a growth in the perception of
power by the OPEC members. Given Rostow's emphasis on the
prices of foodstuffs and raw materials, it is not surprising
that he concluded that the world had entered a new period
with an upward trend.
....the global pace of population increase and 
industrialization suggest that the pressure of 
demand on the supply of foodstuffs and raw 
materials will not prove to be a short-term 
phenomenon. I am inclined to believe that the 
fifth Kondratieff upswing is upon us. In 
different ways each of the previous 
Kondratieff upswings generated anxieties about 
the long-run balance between population, land 
and natural resources - from Malthus to the 
Paley commission report.... Much is, of course, 
unique about the world economy of the 1970s.
But the counterpoint between leading sector 
complexes and the constraining forces set in 
motion by relative shortages of foodstuffs and 
raw materials - and the investment 
requirements for their connection - is an old 
story in economic history, as old, in fact, as 
the British take-off of 1783-1802.4^
Immanuel Wallerstein has noted that it is somewhat 
ironic that Rostow's assertion of a downward trend from 1952 
to 1972 corresponded to a period of unprecedented growth of 
output and incomes in the U.S. and the world economy.42 
Equally surprising was Rostow's characterization of the 
period from 1973 to 1980 as the beginning of an upward 
trend, since this period has generally been recognized as
191
one o£ world-wide stagnation. The irony of thi3 situation
can be understood by realizing Rostow's misplaced emphasis
on changes in the general price level and shifts in the
terms of trade (relative price fluctuations between
manufactured goods and primary goods - foodstuffs and raw
materials) as the discriminating elements of the long wave.
Rostow maintained that the current (1970s) stagnation in
production and trade occurred within the context of a
general inflation of prices and a radical shift in prices in
favor of foodstuffs and raw materials. Fundamentally,
Rostow believed (as he did some thirty years ago) that these
price trends, as well as business cycles themselves, were
the result of errors in the proper level and composition of
investment spending (particularly in the primary goods and
leading industrial sectors).
In the case of both trends and cycles, 
however, irregularity in the pattern of growth 
derives from lags and from distortions in the 
process of investment away from optimal 
sectoral paths .... These distortions rise from 
three factors: investment decisions tend to
be determined by current indicators of
profitability rather than by rational 
long-range assessments; these indicators tend 
to make many investors act in the same 
direction, without taking into account the
total volume of investment in particular 
sectors that is being induced by current 
profit expectations; and, beyond these 
technical characteristics of the Investment 
process, there is, psychologically, a 
follow-the-leader tendency, as waves of
optimism and pessimism about the profits to be 
earned in particular sectors sweep the capital 
market and industries where profits are (or 
are not) being plowed back into the expansion 
of plant. In both trend periods and business
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cycles the result is phases where capacity 
exceeds current requirements or falls short of 
them.
Rostow felt that secular trends in production and
prices could be explained by the use of a disaggregated
sector model (focused on leading sector complexes,
agriculture, inputs into the industrial system, housing and
infrastructure), as long as four assumptions were made.
These conditions were: (1) total capital formation is
limited by savings (Kuznets' competition for funds between
population-sensitive and insensitive investment); (2) the
dynamic system of adjustment is not instantaneous, but
subject to variable lags (Schumpeter's periods of gestation
of investment); (3) investment decisions are made on a
microbasis under the Influence of a follow-the-leader
strategy (Keynes' conception of over-optimism and
over-pessimism resulting in successive periods of excessive
and deficient capacity); and, finally, (4) the system is
international allowing for migration and capital flows
between nations. Rostow concluded that:
What Kondratieff, Schumpeter, and the early 
and late Kuznets were getting at were the 
forces set in motion by the Imperfect efforts 
of the world economy to approximate under 
these four conditions, an optimal pattern of 
investment and output in these four kinds of 
sectors. Thus, we are not examining different 
theories of secular movements in prices and 
production, but aspects of the dynamic 
adjustment process in particular national 
economies within a more or less interconnected 
world economic system, 5
Another economist, who also places heavy emphasis on
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agriculture and raw materials disequilibrium in explaining 
the relationship between long-run growth and cyclical 
economic activity is Angus Maddison. He, however, reaches 
very different conclusions about the long-run trend since 
the Second World War. In his studies, he did not refer to 
Kondratieff or the long wave literature and, hence, avoided 
questions concerning the cyclical nature of long-run trends 
and their periodicity. Instead, Maddison's analysis of 
growth was expressed in terms of phases (stages) of 
capitalist development.
In two articles published in the late 1970s, Maddison 
attempted to establish the historical existence of distinct 
phases in the development of the capitalist world economy.^ 
His analysis was limited to the period from 1870-1970 due to 
data limitations prior to 1870. The data were taken from 16 
"capitalist" countries and analyzed both as a whole and 
individually.47 The data analyzed included eight 
macroeconomic indicators, five "system characteristics" and 
three "intangible" conditions. These are explained in Table 
4-4 below.
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Table 1-4: Vatibles Used bv A. Maddison to Identify 
Phases of Capitalist Development”
A. QnantifiableJfacroeconomic Iidicators
1. Bate of growth of ootpst
2. Output per head
3. Capital stock volume
4. Export volume
5. Cyclical variations In oatpot 
S. Cyclical variations in exports 
7. Levels of oneaployient
1. Bate of price increase
B. lon-qnantlfiable Systen Characteristics
1. Government approach to deaand management
2. Bargaining pover and expectations of labor
3. Degree of freedom for international trade
4. Degree of freedom for international factor movements
5. Character of international payments mechanism
C. Fundamental Intangible forces Determining Bconomic Performance
1. Incentive to invest
2. Degree of technological dynamism
3. Factors affecting resource allocation
Source: Angus Maddison, 'Phases of Capitalist Development1 
Maddison used these variables in an attempt to show the 
existence of separate phases of capitalist development, each 
with its own "distinct momentum." His analysis identified 
four separate phases. These periods are shown by the seven
variables in Table 4-5.
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Table 4-5: S a u r y  Coinarlson of Growth Bates (Ised bv A. laddlaon
(Annual avcroe connonnd growth rates-iveraac IS countries!4’
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV
Yiliiblt! 11111-1)13 131U15I 1458-1970 mo-1977
1. GDP 2.6 1.9 4.9 3.2
2. GDP per Han Boar 1.7 l.S 4.4 3.S
1. GDP per Head 1.5 1.1 3.1 2.4
4. Tangible Capital
Stock 2.1 1.6 5.6 6.3
5. nonresidential
Fixed Capital
Stock 2.4 l.S 5.5 5.1
(. lonresidential
Fixed Capital
Stock per Kan Boat 1.) 1.8 4.7 5.7
7. Volant of Ixports 3.3 l.D 1.6 6.0
In Maddison's view the major factor determining the 
rate of economic growth was the pace of productivity 
advance. Productivity growth is, in turn, mainly influenced 
by: (1) the conditions of demand; (2) the rate of capital 
formation; (3) conditions (efficiency) of resource 
utilization; (4) technological change and international 
diffusion of technology; and (5) structural changes.
Maddison contended that the post-war acceleration in
productivity growth developed in the context of high and
stable rates of demand growth.
The impact of demand conditions on employment 
was at the heart of prewar 'Keynesian'
business cycle analysis. In the post-war
period, it has become clear that the buoyancy
and stability of demand can also be a major
factor determining productivity growth. There 
was a backlog of opportunity on the 'supply1
side which enabled productivity in these
economies to respond very favorably once the 
right climate of demand and expectations of 
future demand had been created.50
This condition of bouyant demand induced an
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acceleration of growth in the capital stock which, for
Maddison, was the dominant variable influencing the post-war
growth in productivity.
The main instrument by which high demand 
created high productivity growth was by 
raising the rate of investment and the growth 
of the capital stock.... High demand (also) 
flushed surplus labor out of low productivity 
occupations, both within countries and by 
promoting international migration, it improved 
efficiency, and induced economies of 
scale ...(But) the fundamental instrument (on 
the supply side) for faster postwar
producivity growth, has been the acceleration 
in growth of the capital stock per hour
worked.51
Thus, the conditions of demand in the 16 capitalist 
countries led to an acceleration of capital formation within 
these countries, which in turn, was the main cause of higher 
productivity and, hence, growth. Secondary importance was 
given to improvement in resource use (also induced by
demand) which occurred through the elimination of
underemployment in agriculture and other structural shifts 
in the employment of labor.52
Additionally, Maddison stated that there was no
evidence to support the contention that the post-war 
acceleration was due to a greater pace of technological 
innovation.
I assume that the pace of technical progress 
is closely related to the rate of advance of 
best practice productivity. This is not
measurable directly, but as a rough proxy, I 
use the rate of growth of the average
productivity level in the lead country - the 
U.S.A. In fact, U.S. productivity growth has 
been much steadier than that in other
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countries. Most Importantly, the U.S.A. has 
not had the post-war acceleration in 
productivity growth which has occurred in all
other countries. I conclude from this that
the technical frontier has moved forward 
rather steadily. The productivity
acceleration in most countries in the post-war 
period has, however, brought them much closer 
to the frontier.53
Maddison concluded that the decline of productivity
growth in the 1970s and, hence, the decline in the rate of
economic growth, was due to the following reasons: (1) the
European countries and Japan were operating closer to the
best practice technology, which made productivity gains
somewhat more difficult to obtain; (2) the importance of the
structural shift from agriculture and gains from trade waned
in Importance; (3) various types of regulation and the
increase in energy prices imposed structural constraints of
a temporary character; and (4) cyclical slack constrained
productivity growth in two main ways - it reduced the growth
of the capital stock somewhat and it reduced efficiency of
resource allocation. It seemed likely, to that analysts,
that most of the productivity slowdown in the seventies was
due to the first three causes, and that the influence of the
cyclical factors was rather modest.5^
Philip Ehrensaft tried to reconcile the apparent
contradiction between Rostow and Maddison (and just about
everybody else) over the characterization of the 1970s as
either a period of long wave expansion or one of long wave
stagnation.55 He pointed out that before World War I, the
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agricultural and industrial sectors of the economy moved in
unison due to the high proportion of society engaged In
agricultural endeavors. Citing, however, the changing
nature of society (growth of industry and secular decline of
farm population), Ehrensaft asserted that, in the current
long wave, agriculture entered a phase of stagnation
(B-phase) while the economy as a whole has entered a phase
of relative expansion (A-phase). While he does not present
a complete explanation of this separation, he indicated that
the growth of oligopolistic industries in the period since
World War II, in conjunction with a competitive and rapidly
expanding (due to increasing productivity from techniques of
production based on petroleum and hybridization) agriculture
sector, produced a long period of relative decline in
agricultural prices (1951-early 1970s). Since the early
1970s, agriculture has entered an A-phase of expansion and
rising prices brought about by diminishing returns from the
further application of petroleum and hybridization
techniques which produced a flattening out of productivity
increases. Thus, in the face of declining productivity
advances, the growth in demand for foodstuffs, induced by
rising world population and rising incomes in Europe and
Japan, has produced an A-phase of expansion for agriculture.
These forces have raised agricultural prices 
to the extent that, for at least some years, 
farmers receive real increases for production 
despite the capacity of agribusiness 
oligopolies to capture much of the generated 
surplus. Furthermore, some groups of farmers
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in North America, especially in the dairy 
sector, have been able to organize themselves 
politically such that their prices are indexed 
to input costs, i.e., these farmers can 
collectively behave like other oligopolies. °
While Ehrensaft made no attempt to explain the B-phase
of stagnation for the economy as a whole in the 1970s, or
its relation to the agriculture expansion phase, he did
predict that the transition to an A-phase will produce a
clustering of new technological innovations in the
agricultural sector.
If the long wave conception holds up, then we 
ought to observe another set of innovations 
which was searched for and brought to fruition 
during the last B-phase in response to 
squeezed profits, and we should also be 
observing their initial adoption by "top 
farmers" at the present time. It seems that 
there is such a new cluster of innovations.®'
And, if past patterns held, Ehrensaft predicted that a 
new B-phase of stagnation in agriculture would begin in the 
late 1990s which would further reduce the farm population 
and harden the dualistic nature of the agricultural sector.
Monetary and Credit Factors
Another long wave theorist of long standing is Leon H.
Dupriez, who conducted a statistical and theoretical
analysis of that phenomenon in his book, Des movements
economlaues aeneraux. published in 1947.®® His approach was
vey similar to that of Schumpeter's. Dupriez recognized the
contribution of Kondratieff, but he felt that:
....Kondratieff's analysis was too simplified, 
mechanistic and deterministic....(R)eference
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to the long wave in English literature 
pertains largely to the original Kondratieff 
theory relating long waves to gold production 
or to the concurring Cassel-Kitchin 
explanation relating long waves to gold 
stocks. It is largely due to the reference to 
such simplistic and circumstantial models that 
English and American economists looked askance 
at the long wave itself and dismissed it.
Dupriez claimed that it was a mistake to "throw away the
baby with the bath."
Writing in 1978, Dupriez set out to reexamine the long 
wave. In the article, "1974: A Downturn of the Long Wave?", 
he asserted that there were two possible intellectual 
attitudes concerning long waves. The first accepted their 
existence as being embedded in monetary and real economic 
conditions, and tried to incorporate these waves into the 
analysis of growth and current economic trends. The second 
was that long waves were historically specific phenomena 
that ceased to exit with the rise of Keynesian policies that 
provided an autonomous and new form of economic development, 
and, therefore, their analysis should be abandoned. Dupriez 
had always been "suspicious" of this latter attitude, and 
the course of economic events after the Second World War 
(especially in the 1970s) have served to reinforce his 
suspicions.
It is obvious from the title that Dupriez felt 1974 
marked the turning point of the long wave from a phase of 
expansion into a phase of stagnation. Thus, in direct 
opposition to Rostow, Dupriez saw the period from the Second
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World War to 1974 as an upward sustained movement and the
period since 1974 as one with a downward trend. Dupriez
believed that an explanation of the "severe conjunctural
crisis" in 1974 should rely on the traditional tools of
business cycle analysis. For him, the timing of the current
long wave downturn (as well as the previous ones of 1818,
1872, and 1920), was associated with severe and abrupt
declines in economic activity and prices. These declines
were due to the synchronization of a downward thrust in the
business cycle with a similar thrust in the long wave of
development, producing a severe crisis.
The long wave is an underlying complex of 
trends working through ordinary business 
cycles. This means that the upward movement 
breaks precisely with and through an ordinary 
conjunctural crisis, while the lower turning 
point is associated with a severe and 
protracted depression. We must reject any 
temptation to search for a mechanistic and 
special explanation of the downturn of the 
long wave: everything is in underlying
trends.
According to Dupriez, the common characteristics that 
marked the onset of a downward trend in 1974 could be 
summarized as follows: (1) overproduction; (2) increasing
excess capacity; (3) declining investment spending; (4) 
increasing rationalizations in business organization; (5) 
increasing worries over raw material scarcity; (6) 
increasing technology aimed at higher rates of labor 
productivity; (7) the destruction of the international 
dollar standard; and (8) high interest rates due to the
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overextension of credit. In his analysis a primary role was
assigned to the importance of money, credit and prices in
the transition to a downward long wave. He maintained that
historically these severe slumps have corresponded to
changes in the international monetary system.
Money has always been involved in the 
downturns of the long waves, very seriously 
indeed: whereas the monetary system as it 
stood worked smoothly in the upswings up to a 
point where tensions developed, the downturn 
stood in the center of monetary crises and 
reforms. Indeed, the institutional set up of 
the monetary system was transformed at these 
very moments: but every time, the process
spanned a few years, before and after the 
crucial dates of the downturn in the pricing 
system. The gold standard system was 
introduced In England in 1818; the gold-silver 
bimetallism crashed in 1874; a general
upheaval of currency parities was introduced 
after 1920. 61
Dupriez went on to point out that a unique feature of 
the current long wave downturn was the continued persistence 
of rising prices in the 1970s. He believed that, in the 
downturn, a general fall in prices was prevented by
persistent monetary stimulation which has reinforced an
overexpansion of credit despite relatively high nominal 
rates of interest. He connected this to the particular type 
of international monetary reform adopted after 1974; i.e., a 
system of unstable floating exchange rates. In his view, 
high interest rates have hurt the business sector more than 
the public sector and households who may anticipate an
easing of their debts through monetary depreciation.
But the rates are definitely restrictive for
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business concerns, whose interest rates must 
match a marginal efficiency of capital from 
the very first year.
All commercial business, generally conducted 
on the basis of short-term bank indebtedness, 
must also meet the cost of such high rates.
This reacts, of course, on capital 
development: for, as diminishing and low rates 
of return on short capital show, borrowing 
rates should be lower to match the marginal 
efficiency of capital in new developments. ^
In terms of real developments, Dupriez saw the long 
wave downturn as a period where depressions were protracted, 
while phases of prosperity spent themselves rapidly. Thus, 
Dupriez foresaw a lower rate of growth in the future than 
had been experienced in the past. In addition, the 
maintenance of high wages due to union action would force 
firms to "press for rationalization" as they attempted to 
combat lower rates of profit. As a result, he believed that 
unemployment would prove rather untractable, thereby 
remaining a major social concern.
Dupriez concluded that it was too early to tell the
future course of the downward long wave due to the
uncertainty caused by inflation and the instability of the
international monetary system.
The causes and consequences of melting money 
should be analyzed very urgently. Previously, 
the monetary institution was in askance: 
nowadays the very concept of a standard of 
value is involved, in all its numerous 
consequences. It is not yet possible to 
predict what the outcome will be; a breaking 
away of the standard in accelerated Inflation 
or efficient measures to restore it. Sheer 
extrapolation of existing price trends is the 
most unlikely hypothesis.®'*
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Technology. Innovation and the Bunching of Investment 
The Schumpeterian view of the relationship between the 
bunching of investments in new technologies and the rate of 
growth for the economy as a whole has been further 
investigated by another group of economists. Most of this 
literature stands in distinction to the perspective of 
traditional (neo-classical) economics which postulates the 
rate of innovation to be autonomously determined. The 
latter theorists have not, generally, incorporated the rate 
of technological Innovation into their models of the economy 
as an endogenous variable, preferring instead to treat it as 
exogenously determined (the residual of productivity 
advances) by the pace of scientific development (which for 
exposition is generally assumed to be constant over time). 
In contrast, all of the innovation long wave theories, 
emphasizing the discontinuous nature of technological change 
and product development, hypothesize that long-run cycles of 
growth are related to the bunching of Innovation. The major 
disagreements between these theorists center on three 
questions: (1) Does the bunching of technological investment
produce the long wave pattern of growth or does the 
causation run in reverse?; (2) Which factors produce the 
bunching of investment?; and (3) What determines the 
periodicity of the bunching of investment?
Most of these theorists utilize the concept of growth 
as an S-shaped (logistic curve) phenomenon, whereby an
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initially Increasing rate of growth is followed by a phase 
of a declining rate which is then proceeded by an end of
growth (and frequently, eventual decline). This view of
growth, illustrated in Figure 4-2, below, was first advanced 
by the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde in the 1890s 
(published in English in 1903) to explain the process of
innovation.64 During the 1930s both Simon Kuznets and
Arthur F. Burns applied this concept to the analysis of 
industrial trends. 6  ^ In the 1950s this pattern of growth 
was adapted to the field of marketing which yielded the 
model of the product life cycle that hypothesized separate 
stages in the development of new products.66 In the 1960s 
and 1970s the product life cycle model was applied by 
economists to an explanation of the pattern of a country's 
international trade and investment flows.6^ Figure 4-2 also 
illustrates the three possible courses of an industry's (or 
product's) growth after the initial S-shaped phase of 
accelerating and then decelerating expansion.
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The innovation long wave theorists/ beginning from this 
framework of industry and product life cycles, hypothesize 
that if a large number of (or the major) industries were to 
undertake this process at the same time (a possibility 
specifically doubted by the traditional analysis), a 
bunching of investments and a wave of growth would be 
generated. One economist, G. Mensch, has argued that the 
economy's transition from expansion to stagnation is caused
by a lack of basic innovation. 68 The reason for this is
that the old technologies are still profitable in the early
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stages of depression while the risk (uncertainty) of the new 
technologies is too great for them to be embraced. In 
Mensch's words, "Only in the trough of the cycle, when
profits of used-up technologies are unbearably low, will 
capital overcome its aversion to risk-taking and throw 
Itself upon the possibilities of available innovations."®^
To support this view, Mensch presented time series data 
on the number of basic innovations from 1740 to 1850. His 
analysis indicated that the frequency of such innovations 
reached four peaks which corresponded to the depression 
periods of the 1760s, 1830s, 1880s and the 1930s. The
search for innovations ends the depression and brings about
a recovery based on these new engines of growth. The cycle
is repeated as these industries eventually reach a point of 
saturation and a new "stalement in technology" is 
encountered which produces the transition to stagnation and 
eventual depression.
Three British long wave economists, C. Clark, C. 
Freeman, and L. Soete, accept Mensch's framework, but 
criticize his data regarding the choice of what constituted 
basic innovations (as opposed to improvements or 
pseudo-innovations), as well as his time-dimension or dating 
for a number of agreed-upon critical technological 
changes.^ In their view the corrected data revealed that 
the bunching of innovations occurred in the early stages of 
the long wave upswing when the economic outlook was
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favorable, not during the depression. In addition, they 
believed that Mensch's view of innovation swarms, whereby a 
set of basic innovations find increasing applications in
many field, was too limited. They emphasized that the push 
to innovation occurred in many sets of fundamental changes 
that were all picked up at once.
Further work by Luc Soete in the 1980s has attempted to 
clarify the timeframe of the bunching of innovations in the 
early stages of the long wave e x p a n s i o n . H e  proposed what 
he called a "probit or threshold level diffusion model" 
which hypothesized that new technological discoveries will, 
at first, experience resistance to their adoption. The
causes of this retardation in the acceptance and diffusion 
(through innovations) of these new technology systems 
related to the firm's behavior under conditions of
uncertainty. The factors that were deemed to be decisive
were the firm's aversion to risky unproven technologies; its
possible lack of size and/or financial resources to embrace 
the new technologies; and the firm's sizeable investment in 
the existing (older) technology system. Soete placed 
particular emphasis on inter-technology competition between 
the existing system and the new innovation cluster, arguing 
that the older technologies would counterattack by embarking 
on a series of improvements Intended to retard, if not 
defeat, the new system. (Soete cited the Hankel engine, the 
electric car, and the Concorde as examples of defeated
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technologies.)
Thus, while the innovation cluster might 
provide a radical improvement as compared to 
existing technology, past investment outlays 
in the latter - both in terms of capital and 
skills, and one could add in terms of
research and development oriented towards
incremental improvements to existing
technologies - will provide ■ a powerful 
retardation factor in the diffusion of the 
innovation both from the supply and the demand 
point of view.
In Soete's view, a set of closely related clusters of
innovation is accumulated through time due to the
retardation hypothesis. At some critical point, however,
the growth in the firm's size and income produces an
increasing receptiveness to the new technology system which
leads the largest firms to undertake its adoption. As
information spreads and imitators develop, the new system is
gradually embraced, across the board, by firms of all sizes.
In our diffusion terminology, this could be 
viewed as an envelope of diffusion curves of a 
set of closely inter-related clusters of
innovations, which occurring within a limited 
time span, might tilt the economy in the early 
diffusion phase to a higher rate of economic 
growth, and thus provide an explanation for 
both the overall long-term S-shaped 
development pattern of new industries and 
overall long-term growth accelerations and 
decelerations.
Soete expanded his analysis to the international level 
through a discussion of the less developed countries' (LDCs) 
current ability to compete during the latest phase of 
inter-technology competition. He utilized Rostow's concept 
of stages of economic growth to conclude that the present
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long wave of stagnation was creating the conditions for 
LDCs, who are at or near the stage of take-off, to import 
the most sophisticated system of technologies, thereby 
leapfrogging over older technology systems. 7^
Research by F. M. Smith, in 1982, supported Mensch's
view in this debate.76 Smith, basing his study on
Schumpeter, Kuznets, and Mensch, argued that,
The fourth cycle derived from a cluster of 
basic innovations in the 1930s, namely 
television, color films, communications, jet 
engines, radar and modern transport, plastics 
and artificial fibres. We are, of course, 
still in the fourth Kondratieff cycle and 
looking for the basic Innovations to pull us 
out of the depression. 77
Choosing 1954 as the beginning of the prosperity phase 
of the fourth Kondratieff, Smith claimed that the recession 
phase began in 1965, followed by depression in 1979 with the 
revival scheduled for 1994. The revival will usher in a
renewed phase of prosperity in 2009. Smith predicted that 
this new period of prosperity will be founded on
technological advances in such areas as electronics,
biochemistry, alternative energy sources, and deep seabed 
mining.
Raphael Kaplinsky used this same methodology to argue 
that the post-World War II wave of expansion produced a 
narrowing of the technological gap between the developed 
countries (DCs) and the less developed countries (LDCs)76. 
Kaplinsky contended that each long wave cycle was
characterized by the initiation, development, and eventual
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diffusion of what he termed, 'a heartland technology', in 
his view the role of heartland technology in the current 
long wave is played by microelectronics. He predicted that 
"as the world economy becomes engulfed in the downswing, so 
LDC export-led growth is threatened with the diffusion of 
microelectronics to DC industry reopening the gap in 
technology.
Kaplinsky believed that by the 1920s (sic) three 
different spheres of production began to emerge as separate 
(yet still connected) operations. One sphere was devoted to 
research and design while another focused on production and 
distribution. The function of the third sphere was control 
and its activities included such items as purchasing, 
production planning, sales planning, and financial 
budgeting. This sphere was, therefore, mainly involved in 
the gathering, processing, evaluation, storage,
transmission, manipulation and/or presentation of 
information.
From the perspective of these three spheres of 
production, Kaplinsky identified three major forms of 
automation as: (1) intra-activity automation; (2)
intra-sphere automation; and (3) inter-sphere automation. 
The intra-activity type would occur if some activity, such 
as purchasing, was automated. The intra-sphere kind would 
involve the linking in automated processes of activities 
within a given sphere, while inter-sphere would automate
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linkage of separate spheres. Kaplinsky claimed that
previous eras of automation were largely of an
intra-industry nature.
The introduction of electronics into each of 
the individual spheres has really been a 
phenomenon of the 1970s and it provides the 
potential for a quantum leap in the degree of 
intra-sphere and inter-sphere automation.
This is largely because of the fact that the 
control algorithm in all of these various, 
individual activities is reduced by the same 
binary building blocks that are the currency 
of electronics-based devices....(T)he real
potential of the equipment will emerge.... when 
the downstream synergies with other sets of 
electronic equipment could be realized. These 
include parts-1isting, inventory controls, 
estimating, billing, machine-setting and 
mechanical control...(W)hen word-processors 
are linked to electronic filing systems,
intelligent copiers and other word processors, 
then productivity gains realized will increase 
s igni f icantly.
Kaplinsky saw the stagnation since the early 1970s as a 
period of using up the old information processing automation 
and rationalizing its operations, while the individual
components of the new 'electronic jigsaw' are being set in
place.
(T)o be implemented, intra-sphere and 
inter-sphere automation necessitates two major 
preconditions: the first is the wide-spread 
existence of individual components of this 
electronic jigsaw; the second is the ability 
to reorganize enterprises in such a way as to 
take advantage of these system gains."®*
He concluded his analysis by pointing out two
developments in the current long wave of stagnation that
will have a negative impact on the continued technological 
development in the LDCs. First, growing protectionism is
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making many companies from LDCs and developing countries 
undertake direct investment as an option for servicing and 
expanding their foreign markets. Second, the changes in
technology will significantly reduce the demand for labor, 
thereby undermining the lower wage costs in LDC export 
processing zones.
Another perspective that has been advanced placed less 
emphasis on the role of innovation bunching and focused on 
infrastructural reinvestment cycles as the cause of the long 
wave. This view which can be traced to Kondratieff (and, 
before him, DeWolff) related the long wave to the useful 
life of basic capital goods. In the 1940s, Colin Clark 
adopted this conception, arguing that the long wave was
characterized by the alternating passage from phases of
capital shortage (hunger) to capital-satiated (excess) 
phases. More recently, a similar framework has been
applied to an explanation of the long wave by Jay
Forrester .
At the Massachusetts Intitute of Technology in the 
1970s, Forrester constructed a computer model - 'The System 
Dynamics National Model' - to illustrate the operation of 
the consumer durables and capital goods sectors and, to his 
surprise, found that it exhibited strong fluctuating growth 
and collapse of capital goods, with about 50 years between 
the peaks of capital output and expansion. Forrester 
believed that this model provided a "theory" with which it
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was possible to explain how these 45 to 60 year long waves 
in the rate of economic activity were generated.®4
The process involves an overbuildng of the 
capital sectors in which they grow beyond the 
capital output rate needed for long-term 
equilibrium. In the process, capital plant 
throughout the economy is overbuilt beyond the 
level justified by the marginal productivity 
of capital. Finally, the overexpansion is 
ended by the hiatus of a great depression 
during which excess capital plant is 
physically worn out and financially 
depreciated on the account books until the 
stage has kfen cleared for a new era of 
rebuilding.
Technology and innovation are related to this process 
since they are Incorporated Into the products of these 
sectors, and, therefore, the long wave "strongly influences 
the climate for innovation." He even agreed that each long 
wave upswing began with a new set of technologies. 
Forrester, however, proposed to reverse the relationship, 
advanced by Schumpeter and others, that the process of 
innovaton is a determinant factor in the generation of the 
long waves. For Forrester, the long waves determined 
innovation and technical change as they did in Ehrensaft's 
model.
Forrester stated that every new expansion grew around a 
highly integrated and mutually supporting combination of 
technologies. Each long wave established an integrated 
pattern of economic development (Forrester gave examples in 
energy, transportation and communication) which rejected 
innovations that were incompatible with this pattern. Thus,
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no major changes in technology occurred. Instead, during 
the expansion innovation was limited to the "step-by-step" 
routine improvements of ideas that had been around for a 
number of years.
Having dismissed innovation and technological change as
a cause of long waves, Forrested concluded that business
policies and institutional structures were the determinant
factors in their generation.
People often question the idea that a long 
wave economic mode could persist for nearly 
200 years, in spite of the major changes that 
have occurred in society and technology. But 
the policies and structures that generate the 
long wave have changed very little. The long 
wave depends on production methods that use 
capital equipment, on the life of capital 
equipment and buildings, and on the sluggish 
pace with which people move between sectors of 
an economy.
The long wave is accentuated by how far ahead 
people plan and the length of their memories 
of past economic disasters - both of which are 
substantially determined by the length of a 
human lifetime. None of these
factors.... depends significantly on faster 
communications or details of technological 
change. The policies and industrial structure 
that generate the long wave capital 
construction cycle have changed very little 
since 1800.86
At the end of the long wave expansion the industrial 
structure was mature and management shifted its attention 
from technical to legal and financial aspects of the 
business as research remained geared to past technology. 
The transition to a downturn of the long wave led to an 
increase in bankruptcies, mergers, consolidations, and 
takeovers, all of which Forrester viewed as forms of
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"managerial Innovation." In addition, unemployment grew as 
jobs dependent on the old technology were eliminated more 
rapidly than new ones were created.
The long wave o£ depression lasted a decade or more 
during which time the climate for innovation and investment 
remained unfavorable. Corporate profits were low and "the 
social structure is in disarray." Fundamentally new 
inventions occurred, but they were left dormant and unused. 
The stage was set for a renewal of expanion when the 
"process of using up and wearing out of the old technology 
runs its course." This new expansion would not incorporate 
the old technology but instead would draw on a reservoir of 
innovations stored up during the previous 30 years. These 
accumulated new ideas would be explored and developed during 
the ensuing expansion.
Forrester alleged that there had been three long waves 
since 1800, with severe depressions In the 1830s, 1890s, and 
1930s. He further believed that the United States was 
currently at a "late-stage in the long-wave expansion" and 
thus faced a transition period which would be characterized 
by: a decrease in new capital investment; an increase in
unemployment; a leveling out of growth in labor 
productivity; high interest rates; rising prices; a falling 
return on investment; an increase in the amplitude of the 
business cycle; and reduced technical innovation. Forrester 
declared that it was time for business to liquidate in an
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attempt to recover investment on existing product lines. 
Business firms should look beyond the "20-year gap" and 
begin to rebuild investment along new patterns that will 
become the technological wave of the year 2000.
Forrester concluded that the biggest threat to a smooth
transition is the "possibility of social and economic
breakdown." Since massive investments in new technology are
ruled out, he maintained that business should focus on
managerial, economic, social and political innovations to
counter this threat.
Corporate executives who confine their 
attention to technical Innovation are exposing 
themselves to disaster arising from the social 
and economic environment. There is little 
competence in government for seeking better 
understanding of social and economic affairs.
That better understanding must come from the 
pr ivate sector.
The next ten years will be a time for 
managerial innovation, economic innovation, 
social innovation and political innovation. I 
believe growing stresses will, whether we like 
it or not, lead to new social experiments.
Without successful innovation, the risks may 
be greater than in the 1930s. 7
While Forrester's analysis of the bunching of 
investment focused on the role of the capital goods sector 
in general, some economists have argued that the long wave 
is produced by a simultaniety of investments in certain key 
leading sectors of the economy. Robert Cherry, for 
instance, related long waves to reinvestment cycles in the 
transportation sector.88 In this view, focused on the U.S., 
four long waves of expansion have been founded on massive
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Investments In transportation Infrastructure. In the period 
after 1812, these investments occurred in harbor and canal 
development. The second wave of investment, after the Civil 
War, was centered on the building of the national railroad 
system. After the First World War a third extensive wave of 
investment was state road systems for automobiles. The most 
recent expansion after the Second World War focused on 
suburbanization investments and the interstate highway 
system. While Cherry presented no data to support these 
contentions, he concluded that "(n)ow with the completion of 
the new highway system and the great expansion of per capita 
automobile ownership ended, a strong decline in 
transportation industry investment can be predicted 
according to the Kondratieff theory."88 Cherry's analysis
recognized the importance of technological change in each
wave of expansion but, emphasizing a Marxist perspective, 
argued that the long waves were caused by the sustained 
competitive movement of capital in response to the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall in the face of a rising 
organic composition of capital. Such a position, which sees 
the pace of technological change as one effect of the long 
wave, stands in sharp contrast to that of theorists such as 
Mensch and Kaplinsky who focus on the succession of
technological innovations as the cause of the secular 
economic movements. (This distinction will be further
addressed in the discussion of Ernest Mandel and the social
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structure of accumulation (SSA)).
Finally, it should be pointed out that some theorists,
Van Duijn for example (as well as some of the authors
discussed above) regard the Innovation theory and the
infrastructure reinvestment theory as complementary.
Indeed, in his work, Van Duijn proposed an explanation of
the long waves which sought to unite these two aspects. His
analysis, which consisted of chronological lists of
innovations as well as growth rates of industrial production
for the major Industrial countries, argued that long wave
upswings would be characterized by rapid growth of
investment in both leading Industrial sectors as well as in
transportation and communication infrastructure. The growth
and generalization of these investments would, eventually,
lead to a situation of market saturation and overproduction.
"As far as the role of infrastructural investment is
concerned, therefore, the seeds of depression are sown
during p r o s p e r i t y . V a n  Duijn did not believe that this
gradual process of market saturation was sufficient to
explain the timing of the collapse.
The immediate cause of the long-wave downturn 
should be sought in the volatility of
investment behavior rather than in the
saturation of markets. Saturation is a
gradual process. It explains why economies, 
once in depression, do not recover quickly.
But it cannot by itself explain a downturn. A 
complete explanation of the long wave 
therefore has to rely on the interplay of 
innovation life cycles and infrastructural
investment....The ensuing depression will tend 
to prolong itself. Initially, it may seem
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that the economy will be able to work itself 
out of it very quickly, but gradually it will 
become evident that time is necessary in which 
to dispose of excess capacity. It will also 
become obvious that the former bunch of growth 
industries has too limited a potential for the 
future. In such an unfavorable economic 
environment the propensity t'o innovate will be 
low.92
During the long wave recession, excess capacity is
eliminated, new growth industries pile up and the old
infrastructure begins to be run down. Eventually a point
will be reached when the infrastructure needs to be rebuilt
and new capacity is desired. He concluded that:
The basic industries may then take the lead, 
giving rise to what might be called a 
"technical" recovery. In itself, this cannot 
sustain prolonged macroeconomic growth, but 
the important function of the investment surge 
is that It will change the overall economic 
outlook, thus removing hindrances to 
innovation, and paving the way for a new 
cluster of growth industries.
A full explanation of the long wave therefore 
has to include an assessment of the important 
role of infrastructural Investment, but it 
must also include recognition of the role of 
major innovations. The long-lasting
prosperity of the past would not have been 
possible without leading sectors to carry the 
expansion; depression would have been less 
drastic and severe if the traditional large 
falls in investment had not occurred.93
Psychology and Demographic Trends 
A very different interpretation of the bunching of 
investment was provided by R. W. Kaiser, who saw the 
dominant causes as human psychology and demographic 
trends.9  ^ Kaiser hypothesized a four phase long wave cycle 
based on his analysis of U.S. wholesale prices from
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1880-1976. His research indicated a pattern o£ a prolonged 
growth phase (lasting an average of 25-27 years), followed 
by a brief primary depression (1-2 years), which was quickly 
replaced by a plateau stage (4-8 years), and then an 
eventual secondary depression or extended period of 
stagnation (lasting 19-25 years), Illustrated in Figure 4-3 
below:














According to Kaiser, this pattern is reflected in both 
price (wholesale, consumer, stocks, bonds) and production 
(GNP) data through the course of three complete long waves - 
from the 1780s to 1843, 1843 to 1896, and 1896 to 1940. The 
last complete cycle, broken down into its phases, yields 
the following schedule: growth from 1896-1920; primary
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depression from 1921-1922; plateau from 1922-1929; and 
secondary depression from 1929-1940.
Since World War II, the U.S. has entered a fourth long 
wave where growth lasted from 1940 to 1973. The primary 
depression of 1974-75 was followed by the plateau phase from 
1975 until the time of his publication in 1979. Kaiser 
predicted that the plateau would give way to the stagnation 
phase sometime in the mid-1980s and that this depression 
would continue until the late 1990s.
Kaiser proceeded to note that a number of sociopolitical 
events and factors appeared to be related to a particular 
phase of the long wave. He argued, that during the growth 
phase, the political mood of the nation is passive as 
efforts are focused on the creation of wealth. As the peak 
is approached, the growing unequal division of wealth leads 
to an increase in political activity by the have-nots (civil 
and women's rights movements, etc.) as well as a massive 
real estate boom and a greater tendency for political 
scandals and the outbreak of war. During the plateau, 
political quiet is again the norm since "people have become 
frustrated and disillusioned with the preceding ten years of 
reform and return to looking out for themselves. In the 
ensuing secondary depression political activism again 
increases as people cry for the government to do something 
to end the stagnation, restore profits and move the economy 
forward. The actions undertaken by the government during
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this phase usually entail either legislation (to stimulate 
the economy, to save the "little man", to punish the 
perceived "bad" guys), or war.
After noting Forrester's capital goods reinvestment
model of the long wave, Kaiser presented an alternative
explanation based on psychological conditioning during
adolescence and demographic trends. Specifically, he
asserted that:
(E)ach individual is deeply affected by the 
state of the economy during his adolescence 
and early working years. Thus a person's 
influence on the economy, whether as 
businessman, laborer, consumer, banker, voter 
or elected representative, is a lifelong 
reflection of his early experience. ®
Thus, Kaiser hypothesized the development of general
attitudes whereby people raised during depressions develop
conservative traits while people brought up during growth
phases acquire an aggressive growth mentality. He further
surmised that demographic trends reinforced the impact of
generational trends as the declining births during
depressions and the expansion baby booms interact to produce
a psychological framework for the population that is
oriented toward expansion until the reality of the next
depression catches up. He concluded that
....it seems possible that the cycles' 50-55 
year periodicity corresponds to a two 
generation cycle in which each generation, in 
reacting to the economic conditions created by 
its fathers, repeats the mistakes of its 
grandfathers...The current cycle may also turn 
out to be longer than earlier ones, because of 
our greatly increased life expectancy. ^
224
Global Politics and International Hegemony 
A3 was seen in our earlier discussion, Kondratieff 
believed that the worst wars and revolutions occurred during 
long wave expansions when the strains of rapid expansion 
(and possibly the growing recognition of an impending 
transition) produced increased tension, uncertainty and 
friction. Thus, for him, wars were seen as a result of the 
long wave, not a cause.
An American economist, E. M. Bernstein, in 1940, held a
similar p o s i t i o n . I n  this non-empirical article, he
argued that three factors were the source of the long waves
pattern which he felt were most apparent in the movement of
prices, interest rates and other monetary series. These
factors were gold production, innovation and investment, and
war. He believed that increased gold production and a
period of rapid innovation leading to enlarged investment
were the causes of the long wave upswing. In addition, the
upswing was characterized by more frequent outbreaks of war.
He rejected the idea that the increased frequency of wars
was caused by an intensified search for foreign markets.
Rather, wars occurred more often due to the greater ability
to conduct war campaigns during the (prosperous) long wave
of expansion.
Gold production and innovations are consistent 
and mutually reinforcing causes of a long 
wave. Thus innovations in technique or in the 
development of new countries may facilitate 
Increased gold production by proving superior 
methods of production or by opening new ore
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fields. Similarly, enlarged gold production, 
through rising prices and easier credit, makes 
investment more profitable and facilitates the 
undertaking of new enterprises. On the other 
hand, great wars are not favorable to enlarged 
production of gold or to new types of
investment. The conclusion must be that it is 
not the war that causes the upswing. Rather 
it is the long wave upswing that produced 
favorable conditions for the waging of war.
Although war cannot be regarded as the cause 
of the long wave, it may contribute to the
termination of the upswing....(I )t cannot be 
denied that war intensifies the rise in prices 
and in interest rates during the upswing. To 
this extent, the monetary problems and 
readjustments in the downswing of the long 
wave are made more difficult. No doubt, even 
without war there would still be severe 
depressions in the downswing of the long wave; 
but it is reasonable to believe that the
severity of these deep depressions is
intensified by the difficult monetary problems 
growing out of war.
Some modern writers have continued this tradition of 
incorporating International political, economic and military 
conflict into their analysis. They have, however, shifted 
the focus from the role of wars to either changes in the 
global political perspective, or cycles of international 
competition and hegemony. An example of the former is R. P. 
Weber's article on the cyclical nature of crises.10:2 
Published in 1983, he contended that the inclusion of both 
endogenous and exogenous factors made the long wave 
(K-cycle) "more satisfactory than purely endogenous 
theor ies. "103 In or<jer to provide an adequate explanation 
of K-cycles, one had to take into account the structure and 
dynamics of the evolving world system. He believed that the 
existing theories (especially innovational investment
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theory) of K~cycles lacked an explanation of how the process 
of structural change occurred. Weber reasoned that the
innovation theory was able to explain the expansion and
eventual decline (the S-curve), once expansion was underway; 
it was unable to explain the transition from a declining 
phase to an expansionary phase of the long wave.104
To rectify this situation/ Weber advanced what he called
a "cybernetic-dialectical" model. "The explanation is
cybernetic in that the processing of information concerning
the crisis is a central component of the model. It is
dialectical in that the structural reorganization that
resolves a given crisis eventually generates the next
crisis."105 This model was based on previous work by J. Z.
Namenwirth whose historical study (1844-1964) of US
government party platforms led him to identify a four phase
1 0 fipolitical theme cycle lasting, on average, 48 years.
The first phase, at the low point of the depression,
corresponded to the Parochial phase where the nation's sole 
occupation was the creation of wealth. As the expansion 
began a Progressive phase ensued which focused on social
reform. The Cosmopolitan phase occurred at the height of
the upswing as the country's attentions shift to the 
international arena. During the Conservative phase, as the 
economy began to decline, conservative values were 
resurrected.
Weber applied this framework to a content analysis of
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British "Speeches From the Throne" for the period from 
1795-1972. His rresearch of this material led him to 
conclude that the K-cycles were related to specific changes 
in political economy that are developed in response to the 
growing constraints placed on the accumulation of capital. 
The constraints and the changes in political economy that 
allowed the process of accumulation to be renewed are listed 
for the four upswings identified in Table 4-6 below, which 
is reproduced directly from Weber's article.
aachinery
11)4-1)11 Generalization of UndetconsuaptIon
aonopoly capital
1932-1966 Governaeot u n a g e -  Unproductive state
aent of the econoay expenditures
Source: Robert P. feber, 'Cyclical Theories of Crisis in the Vorld-Systea*
While this chronology recognized the importance of 
technological change in the restructuring process, Weber 
argued that the choice of which technologies would serve as 
the new engines for expansion was a political question that 
"allowed a good deal of flexibility in how each crisis is 
r e s o l v e d .  " ^ 8  He concluded that, from the perspective of
Ta“     *
Restructurings of Political Bconoav Since 17)DX
Period of Change in
Upswing Political Iconoay
Constraint on Capital 
Accoaulation
1790-1*25 Introduction of lov level of productivity 
hand-aade aachlnery
1141-1873 Transition to 
aachine-aade
Rising organic coapo- 
sition of capital
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restructuring of political economy,
The 50-year cycle constitutes a series of 
debates within society about specific
problems. The debate and its outcome are 
weighted according to the unequal distribution 
of power and wealth...During each depression 
the debate addresses alternative courses of 
action for restoring profitability and 
economic growth. The Parochial theme reflects 
this discussion. First, the realization
occurs that the present situation differs from 
normal business cycles and thus requires 
strong action. Second, some action is chosen.
Third, the decision must be justified...As the 
economy begins to expand, a part of the ills 
are ameliorated. This occurs in such a way 
that inequities in the distribution of power 
and wealth are not seriously jeopardized.
These actions are discussed in the Progressive 
theme.
Following two decades of increasing output 
and, real but, limited gains for workers, the 
Cosmopolitan theme reflects increased 
attention to relations between the political 
center and periphery. This is a period of 
increasing concern with foreign affairs.
There are calls for greater political and 
economic activity in the international arena, 
partly justified by the promise of additional 
benefits to workers and capitalists alike.
However, as new contradictions build and 
profits decline, the restoration of profits 
and capital accumulation is the central issue 
of the conservative period. Believing that 
the current economic problems can be resolved 
within the present economic structure, there 
is an emphasis within society on tradition and 
fiscal austerity,...Nevertheless, faced with a 
major depression and ineffectual solutions 
within the old framework, it is soon realized 
that nothing short of structural change will 
resolve the crisis. Hence the cycle begins 
again with the next Parochial theme. 109
While Weber claims to be writing from a Marxist 
perspective, the emphasis appears to be totally misplaced. 
He ends up mistaking a consequence of the long wave for its 
cause. Surely, the onset of economic depression leads to a
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restructuring of the processes of capital accumultion. 
Indeed, the choices of which technologies are embraced offer 
some degree of latitude (flexibility). However, the actual
course of the restructuring and the actual choices over 
alternative technologies do not depend on "a series of 
debates within society about specific problems. it is,
instead, the competitive movement of capital and intensified 
class struggle that determines the direction of change. The 
reorganization of trucking and airline travel in the early 
1980s, the ongoing restructuring of the banking sector
(interstate banking, uniting of commercial banking and 
investment banking, the elimination of restrictions on
thrifts, etc.) and the consolidation of capital through
mergers, acquisitions, and hostile takeovers in a number of 
industries have been propelled by the movement of capital as 
it attempts to transcend the constraints which increasingly 
act to retard the process of continued accumulation, (When 
one descends to the level of abstraction of many capitals 
operating in a world system, it becomes clear that this 
movement of capital is necessarily a competitive one. See 
Chapter I.)
Weber, therefore, by focusing his analysis at the level 
of the nation-state (and political ideas) falls to see that 
the political debates, which reflect the changing conditions 
of accumulation, do not determine the transition from one 
long wave phase to another. The reflection (the debates)
2 3 0
does not explain the reality of the accumulation waves or 
the process of restructuring during stagnation. Thus, 
despite his intention to supplement the technology theories 
with a theory that explains the process of restructuring, he 
remains, not suprisingly, unable to do so. This is seen in 
his conclusion that "although the general process of 
resolution can be specified, the particular resolution of 
future crises cannot be predicted.
Other authors, such as Nicole Bousquet, have argued that
long waves are related to alternating cycles of hegemony and
international competition at the center of the
world-economy. jn her 1980 article, she hypothesized
that, at a certain time, within one particular national
economic area (the future hegemonic power), further growth
from continued emulation of the current hegemonic power
becomes increasingly difficult, producing a crisis of
capitalist accumulation. The crisis brings about a radical
transformation of production in the future hegemonic power.
Thanks to these major innovations, the entity 
wherein they occur first finds itself in a 
position of production supremacy within the 
world economy, and eventually obtains other 
dimensions characteristic of authentic 
hegemony, namely, commercial and financial 
supremacy, and political leadership coupled 
with military supremacy.313
During the expansion phase of the long wave, the rapid 
growth and increasing strength of the rising hegemonic power 
creates increasingly uneven development within the center 
(core or developed) countries. This can be measured by the
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widening gap, between the hegemonic power and the other
center countries, in the areas of technological change,
productivity advances and demand growth. Two factors,
however, operate eventually to stop this growing disparity,
and usher in a period of competition where the
"non-hegemonic core powers strive to regain or increase
their share of the world market. In the first place,
the latter countries embark on a course of emulation which
eventually helps them to catch up with the leader's
technological advantages. (One of these emulators Is also
about to embark on the course of the future hegemonic
power.) Even more important is a second factor, operating
in the hegemonic power that causes it increasingly to
protect what has worked in the past while rejecting the
rising alternative technologies.
(T)he hypothesis we find most attractive from 
our world-system perspective is that of
overspecialization of the hegemonic power. 
Precisely that which made It so successful at 
first in the world-economy acts as a deterrent 
to drastic innovative changes later. It is as 
though the hegemony carries the seeds of its 
own destruction. In our view, the very 
success of the hegemonic power's advanced 
sectors within the world-economy contributes, 
at some half-way stage in its hegemonic life, 
to shifting the innovative process away from 
major changes in the methods of production, 
and toward merely repeating and improving what 
had been so successful.
These processes lead to a long wave phase of stagnation
during which the trend toward growing unequal development is
reversed. "We are here confronted with what some would call
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a law: at the core of the world-economy, uneven development
does not last forever; the tendency toward inequality always
comes to an end; and eventually inequalities themselves will
always disappear. "*16
T. K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein have also argued
that long waves of expansion correspond to periods of
political hegemony where a single state attains commercial,
financial, productive and military supremacy. **^ These
authors utilized a world system view that saw the drive for
capital accumulation producing a cyclical pattern of
expansion and contraction. Expansion contains the seeds of
stagnation and stagnation lays the foundation for renewed
expansion (within capitalist limits).
The self-expansion of capital has built-in
contradictions which cause it to be
self-limiting, so that a phase of stagnation
theorectically must follow expansion. They
derive in part from the non-coordination of
production decisions (the "anarchy" of
production), combined with the relative
stability of social distribution in times of 
prosperity (creating a relatively "fixed" 
world effective demand) leading to socially 
defined over-production.
Stagnation must theoretically precede 
expansion, in that it provides the occasion 
for centralization of capital (one factor in 
expansion), class struggles leading to the 
redistribution of income that in turn
increases demand (a second factor in
expansion), compensated for by the creation of 
new groups of low-wage workers in peripheral 
zones (a third factor),*
Hopkins and Wallerstein suggested that the development 
of hegemony was founded on the appearance of technological 
advantage which gradually disappeared as the original
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advantage was diffused and new innovations occurred. They 
further argued that the long waves arose in pairs. During 
the first expansionary long wave (A^), a battle between 
rivals for succession as the new hegemonic power takes 
place. In the ensuing long wave of stagnation (B^) one of 
the rising nations achieves hegemonic victory. This is then 
followed by another long wave of expansion (A2 ) during which 
this nation achieves hegemonic maturity (true hegemony). In 
the ensuing phase of stagnation (B 2 ) the declining hegemonic 
power battles the rising successors to its throne. Hopkins 
and Wallerstein presented the following chronology to 
support this view.
Table 4-7: Hopkins and Ballerstein's Paired
Kondiatleffs and Bcgeiony/Bivalry1 1*
Hegeionic I: Dorse! spine II: Netherlands III: Great
pover (Rapsborgs) (United Provinces) Britain
Al
(ascending






■atarity) -1559 1620-1(50 1050-1(73
B 2
(declining
hegeiony) 1559-1575 1650-1(72 1(73-1(97
Sonrce: T.l. Hopkiis and I. Vallerstein, 'Cyclical Ihythas 
and Secnlar Trends of the Capitalist Vorld-Bconoiy1







hegemony: The Hapsburgs (1450-1559), the Netherlands
(1620-1650), Great Britain (1850-1873), and the United States
( 1945-1967) .
Social S-tructux£_Q-f_ Accumulation (SSA)
Two authors, David Gordon and Ernest Mandel, attempting to 
base their analysis of long waves on Marxian value theory, have 
argued that long cycles of expansion and stagnation are 
"fundamentally caused by the logic of capital accumulation and 
its movement through stages of accumulation."^® This view
differs from those who stress the importance of hegemony-rivalry
cycles, in that the examination of the structural requirement of 
capital accumultion is not limited to the question of national 
political hegemony.
Gordon and Mandel claimed that industrial capitalism has 
passed through various stages in the course of its development. 
Each stage is centered around a particular accumulation model or 
SSA, while the transition from one stage to another is caused by 
a structural crisis (and its eventual resolution). Each stage 
also corresponds to a long wave, in which a period of expansion 
is followed by a period of stagnation. Basing his analysis on 
industrial output and world trade, Mandel suggested that there 
have been four stages of capitalism since 1800. His results are 
presented in Table 4-8.
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Scarce: Broest Handel, Late Capitalism
In order to accumulate, capitalists need a certain 
amount of structural stability. Thus, structures, which set 
the rules, define the limits, enforce punishment on 
violators, and create the necessary institutions must be 
erected. Each stage begins with a structure which allows 
profitable accumulation to proceed. The very process of 
accumulation, however, creates growing contradictions and 
conflicts which begin to suppress profitability and 
increasingly undermine the legitimacy of the previous 
accumulation model.
Gordon, in turn, proposed that the individual 
institutions, categorized in Table 4-9, are interdependent 
and this composite creates a unified internal structure of 
its own. "(W)e can further hypothesize that the social 
composite of these individual structures must exist and 
function reliably in order for capital accumulation to 
proceed smoothly.... I call this composite the social 
structure of accumulation." ^ 2
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Table <-9: Gordon's Social Structure af Accumulation O e q o l r m n t s ^
A. A?e»ts of A c c m l a t l o n
1. Corporate structure
B. Hotors of Accumulation
1. Strsctire of coipetltlon
2. Strnctore of class relations
C. Systemic lequirements for Accnmnlation
1. Strnctore of international and national monetary s y s t e m
2. Stroctire of the state
d. Rmiitttata of lBtiiMHl-S»itaLlmaiilitlan
1. Access to m a n s  of prodnction
a. Strnctore of national resource supply.
b. Strnctore of interiediate goods supply
c. Social fanily stroctire
d. Labor narket strnctore
2. The prodnction of surplus value
a. Strnctore of labor nanagenent
lb.) Strnctore of technological reproduction (SL8)
3. The realization of surplus valoe
a. Strnctore of final c o n s o M r  denand 
(b.) Strnctore of narket competition (SLV)
4. Turnover of capital
a. Financial structure
b. Structure of adiinistrative nanagenent
Source: David Gordon, 'Stages of Accumulation and Long Economic Cycles'
In analyzing the relationship between economic crisis 
and changes in the SSA, Gordon argued that the crisis,
defined as a reduction in the pace of accumulation, 
threatens the integrity and viability of the current SSA
which creates corresponding crisis tendencies in the 
structure. The growing instability in the SSA leads to a
rising possibility of a further breakdown of the old modes 
of capital accumulation. "When either the economy begins to 
stagnate or institutional contradictions within the social 
structure of accumulation begin to "erupt", accumulation in 
general and the social structure of accumulation are both
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likely to begin to dissolve."124
Gordon believed that these concepts allowed him to
derive a formal Marxian definition of economic crisis, or
what Marx termed, "universal crisis".
If a stable social structure of accumulation 
is necessary for rapid accumulation and if 
tendencies toward economic stagnation tend to 
erode the stability of a social structure of 
accumulation, then an economic crisis can be 
defined as a period of economic instability in 
capitalist economies whose resolution depends 
upon the reconstruction of a social structure 
of accumulation. This permits a formal 
definition of the difference between an 
economic crisis and a periodic business cycle.
While the capitalist economy tends 
endogenously to generate both business cycles 
and economic crises, normal economic activity, 
within the context of prevailing social 
relationships, is sufficient to restore 
prosperity during a business cycle recession.
Normal economic activity is not sufficient, on 
the other hand, to generate a resolution of an 
economic crisis and a restoration of a rapid 
rate of accumulation: changes in the
prevailing social relationships with the
ultimate effect of reconstituting the 
environmental stability necessary for rapid 
and sustained accumulation, are necessary for 
crisis to come to an end.
The resolution of the crisis, then, requires the
development of a new SSA. During the crisis the capitalist
class increasingly directs policies toward accomplishing
structural change as a power struggle ensues within the
class structure to determine the course of the
restructur ing.
It seems fairly clear, therefore, the
trajectory of the class struggle during an 
economic crisis will play a fundamentally 
determinate role in shaping the internal 
content of the new social structure of
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accumulation. The content of a new social 
structure of accumulation/ in short, will not 
fall from the sky but will be generated, to a 
substantial degree, by forces endogenous to 
the general process of capital
accumulation.126
Thus, endogenous forces will determine such factors as the
altered forms of competition, the organization of corporate
and class structures and the other features of the SSA.
Gordon proceeded to outline a theory of stages in which
each stage goes through five phases. The establishent of a
SSA is followed by the phase in which capitalist
accumulation takes off in a process of expanded
reproduction. In the third phase, the rate of accumulation
begins to decelerate, which leads to a fourth phase of
growing instability in the SSA. In the final phase, the
economic crisis unfolds which sets the stage for the
development of a new SSA. This process leads to a
succession of stages of accumulation.
As long as the capitalist mode of production 
continues to dominate a society and as long as 
tendencies toward economic crisis constitute 
an intrinsic contradiction of the general 
process of capital accumulation, then we can 
hypothesize that the alternating rhythm of 
rapid accumulation and economic stagnation 
will require a succession of qualitatively 
differentiable social structures of
accumulation....The succession of stages of 
accumulation is a logically necessary feature 
of capitalist development because of the 
fundamental contradiction in capitalist 
societies between the social character of 
accumulation and its dependence upon 
essentially "private” activities. When this 
contradiction erupts and crisis results, 
individual accumulation cannot resume until 
the social basis for accumulation is
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reconstituted. I27
He concluded that this succession of stages of accumulation
produced a bunching of infrastructural Investment which
caused the long waves.
These hypotheses jointly suggest that the 
dynamics of accumulation in general, mediated 
by successive stages of accumulation, "cause” 
long economic cycles and that the particular 
character of the infrastructural investment 
required at the beginning of a new stage of 
accumulation influences the specific length of 
the periods of expansion and contraction 
associated with that long economic cycle. *28
In his view, the cycle was likely to last roughly 50
years due to the relationship between the scale of
investment required at the beginning of the long wave and 
the limited supply of potentially investable funds available 
to finance that investment.*^9 Gordon further pointed out 
that this theory of long waves was compatible with the 
world-market control dynamic of Hopkins, Wallerstein and 
others discussed previously. He predicted that as the
crisis developed the power of the hegemonic nation would
decline. This produced, in the hegemonic contenders, toward 
the end of the crisis, a period of Intense national 
investment in the infrastructure necessary for increases in 
relative world-market control. This would, of course, be 
part of a broader restructuring of the SSA occurring in all 
countr ies.
Ernest Mandel, who has long held a world capitalist 
system perspective, has made many contributions to the
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modern long wave debate. In his analysis, he applied 
Marxian value and crisis theory to the study of long cycles 
in order to explain their operation. He has frequently been 
classified as a technology theorist since his early work in 
this area (Late Capitalism) stressed the process of
technological revolution. A thorough review of his research, 
however, reveals this to be a misrepresentation and he has
been placed with Gordon {who also recognized the similarity 
between their views) in the SSA group.
In Mandel's view, Marx's conceptions of the rising 
organic composition of capital and the tendency of the rate
nr
of profit to fall, are more appropriately applied to the
long run development of capitalism than they are to the
normal industrial (Juglar) cycle. This has become
particularly true since the Second World War as the
capitalist nation states have increasingly reverted to the
use of credit to compensate for the normal downturns in the
industrial cycle.
The principal technique for curbing the scope 
of periodic over-production crises during the 
past 25 years, then, has been to extend credit 
and the money supply....Thus, from the 
standpoint of the functioning of the 
international capitalist economy as a whole, 
the major characteristic of the long phase of 
post-war expansion was the emergence of credit 
cycles partially independent of the industrial 
cycle, the former attempting to 'compensate 
for' the latter.130
Yet, despite these attempts, capitalist governments have 
only succeeded in reducing the scope of the crises; they
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remain incapable of preventing their outbreak. This is 
because the Inherent logic of the expansion provokes a trend 
towards a declining rate of profit, creating the conditions 
for a crisis. “The objective function of the crisis is to 
constitute a mechanism though (sic) which the law of value 
asserts itself."131
Mandel insisted that the relationship between the 
decline in the rate of profit, overproduction and the 
outbreak of crises was not one of a mechanistic "linear 
causal chain of the type: fall in the rate of profit 
reduction of investment - reduction of employment 
reduction of incomes - overproduction crisis,"132 Instead, 
an explanation of crisis required the incorporation of a 
series of "mediating factors which are located both in the 
sphere of production and In the sphere of circulation of 
commodities, both in the sphere of competition and in that 
of class struggle."133
For Mandel, the long wave of expansion, which is fueled 
by technological progress and the creation of surplus 
profits (technological rents) Is the "honeymoon" phase of 
capitalist development where the rising organic composition 
of capital is accompanied by an even stronger rise in the 
rate of surplus-value. "But the very logic of the expansion 
undermines the conditions of this honeymoon."134 As the 
expansion accelerates, the industrial reserve army shrinks 
which shifts power in the labor markets to the wage earners;
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the declining trend o£ raw material prices Is reversed due
to the less elastic nature of production in this sector;
and, the capitalists experience a growing inability to find 
sectors (countries) where the organic composition of capital 
is lower than in the leading industrial sectors of the 
advanced countries due to the general diffusion of the 
technological revolution.
The ensuing fall in the rate of profit accentuates
competition as the largest, most technologically advanced
firms "seek to hold off the "moment of truth" as long as
possible - in other words - to maintain the old rate of
profit, and even the superprofits they enjoyed at the peak
of the boom, for as long as possible."135 But, eventually
these large industrial firms find that an increasing
fraction of the newly accumulated capital cannot find
productive investments at the old rate of profit. This
leads the firms to turn to speculation and other less
profitable investments. During this period of
over-expans ion and increasing speculation, the downward
pressure on the rate of profit leads to both growing excess
production capacity (potential over-production) and
constantly greater recourse to credit.
Schematically, then, it may be said that
"over-investment" provokes "over-accumulation" 
which in turn brings on "under-investment" and 
a massive devalorization of capital. Only if 
this devalorization of capital is sufficiently 
ample and if unemployment and the many
measures of rationalization vigorously boost
the rate of exploitation of the working class
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can the fall in the rate of profit be checked 
and a new cycle of increased accumulation of 
capital be touched off. 136
Supplementing this perspective with Gordon's view of the 
declining SSA (which was erected to accommodate the now 
increasingly less profitable channels of accumulation) 
strengthens the contention that for a prolonged period of 
time capitalism will be unable to check the fall in the rate 
of profit. Gradually pieces of a new social SSA will be
assembled and put into place as the process of
devalorization and rationalization progresses. The
interaction of these processes, then, create the conditions 
for a long-run renewal of capital accumulation within the 
new social structure.
This is where Mandel assigned a significant role to
technological revolutions and innovational change. During
the phase of stagnation, scientific advance continues, but,
due to the conditions of valorization, the new technologies
(which frequently are incompatible with the 'old' system of
machines) pile up as untested or experimental ideas. Once
the new SSA is erected and the process of capital
devalorization has run its course, then the stockpile of
accumulated ideas will be embraced and a new set of
interrelated technologies will condition/determine the new
channels of capital accumulation. Mandel concluded that his
own contributions
to a solution of the problem of long waves has 
been to relate the diverse combinations of
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factors that may influence the rate of profit 
(such as a radical fall in the cost of raw 
materials; a sudden expansion of the world
market or of new fields for investment for 
capital; a rapid increase or decline in the 
rate of surplus-value; wars and revolutions) 
to the inner logic of the process of long-term 
accumulation and valorization of capital, 
based upon spurts of radical renewal or
reproduction of fundamental productive
technology. It explains these movements by 
the inner logic of the process of accumulation 
and self-expansion of capital itself. Even if 
we assume that the activity of invention and 
discovery is continuous, the long-term 
development of capital accumulation must still 
remain discontinuous, for conditions promoting 
the valorization of capital (and resulting in 
a rise or stabilization at a high level of the 
rate of profit) must in time turn into 
conditions determining a deterioration in this 
valorization (in other words, a fall in the 
average rate of profit). The concrete 
mechanisms of this conversion must be analyzed 
by reference to the concrete historical 
conditions of the development of the 
capitalist mode of production at the time of 
these major turning points.*37
Perhaps more than other long wave theorists, Mandel and 
Gordon have attempted to explain the concrete mechanisms for 
the conversion from capital valorization, to deterioration 
of that valorization, and back to renewed valorization in 
particular (evolving) concrete historical conditions. Both 
authors take the social context of capital accumulation as 
the starting point of their analysis and incorporate both 
endogenoous and (supposedly) exogenous factors into their 
explanations of the long wave's operation. Mandel's 
analysis focused on the factors that produce changes in the 
long-run profitability trend, while Gordon emphasized the 
intitutional framework required for profitable accumulation.
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Taken together both perspectives reinforce the argument that 
the prolonged period of expansion, must, by the very logic 
of the accumulation process, give way to a long wave with an 
undertone of stagnation. And, during this phase of 
stagnation, the processes of capital devalorization, 
rationalization, and structural (institutional) change, 
create the conditions for renewed (within capitalist limits) 
expansion.
In the specific historical conditions after the Second 
World War, the long-run phase of expansion was based on the 
hegemony of the United States which allowed it to create the 
institutional framework (both domestic and international) of 
the post-war SSA. *^9 Mandel's research emphasized that 
this accumulation model was founded on factors that lead to 
an increase in the mass and rate of surplus value such as: 
the international defeat of the working class in the 1930s 
and 1940s; a dramatic fall in the cost of raw materials 
produced by a growth in capital exports to the resource rich 
LDCs; an extension of the market through the incorporation 
of new territories and the innovational opportunities of new 
technologies; and the reduction in the turnover time of 
fixed capital due to the acceleration of technological 
innovation.
The late capitalist phase began when fascism 
and the Second World War generated a 
significant increase in the rate of 
surplus-value, which was prolonged by a 
substantial reduction in the price of 
important elements of constant capital. This
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allowed "capital In general" to overcome the 
long-term decline or stagnation o£ the average 
rate o£ profit. The result was an acceleration 
in the accumulation of capital (further 
favoured by the permanent arms economy) which 
now seized on the discoveries and Innovations 
that had been maturing over the previous 
decade, and thereby unleashed a third 
technological revolution. 40
He further related the development of new technologies
to the changes in corporate organization which have made the
multinational company "the determinant organizational firm
of big capital". The growth of the that organizational
form coupled with the search for technological
surplus-profits (technological rents) and the growing
centralization of capital on a national scale worked to
promote a movement toward direct Investment abroad.
In the past there was only marginal 
internationalization of the production of 
surplus-value in actual manufacturing 
industry, outside the domain of raw materials.
Today it constitutes the really new and 
specific aspect of the internationalization of 
capital in the late capitalist epoch...This 
development started immediately after the 
Second World War, especially in the U.S. oil, 
automobile and electrical apparatus
industries, and has today become a world-wide 
phenomenon which for the first time actually 
provides an immediately international 
framework for the competition of capital.
As the long wave phase of expansion gave way to a phase 
of stagnation, the growing difficulty in maintaining the old 
rate of accumulation produced a heightening of conflict 
between capital and labor (intensified class struggle), an 
expansion of capitalist competition (especially
international imperialist rivalry), and growing crisis in
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the SSA. Within this theoretical framework,, the "cause"
and significance of growing direct investment in the U.S.
during the 1970s and 1980s can be understood.
The law of uneven development has continued to 
prevail, shifting the international
relationship of forces in inter-imperialist 
competition. American imperialism is slowly 
losing its productivity lead over its European 
and Japanese rivals. Its share in the world 
market is falling. It is currently attempting
to reverse this secular development by
stepping up capital exports to Its imperialist
rivals and increasing the international 
centralization of capital by acquiring 
substantial capital ownership within the 
economies of is competitors. But the long-run 
faster accumulation of capital in Western 
Europe and Japan inevitably means - in
conditions of accelerated dollar devaluation - 
greater opportunities for West European and 
Japanese capital exports to the U.S. than for 
American capital exports in the opposite 
direction. American imperialism has tried to 
rescue Itself from its dilemmas by hitherto 
successful pressure on its rivals to revalue 
their currencies, but this in the end can only 
lead to a further acceleration of European and 
Japanese capital exports as compared with 
American.
This prediction, expressed by Mandel in the early 1970s, 
has proven relevant today. As Figure 4-4 illustrates, U.S. 
direct foreign investment pentration of Europe (for example) 
reached its peak in the early 1970s and has since declined.
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Source: See Chapter II, Table 2*10 
As we saw in Chapter II, the relative decline of the 
U.S. foreign investment position has occurred despite a 
continued expansion of U.S. direct investment abroad. 
The true cause of the relative U.S. decline has been the 
explosive growth of direct investment in the U.S. by, 
primarily, European, Canadian, and Japanese corporations. 
The concrete historical dimensions of this penetration 
will be explored in Chapter five.
CONCLUSION
A world system view of long waves as cycles in the 
SSA provides an explanation of the growth of direct 
investment in the U.S. which focuses on the development 
of a generalized crisis of overproduction, a falling rate
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of profit, and a spreading threat of structural 
breakdown. The development of these factors in
conjunction with a transition to a phase of stagnation 
has produced a heightening of the forces of capitalist 
competition which increasingly takes the form of the
direct investment or the internationalization of
productive capital.
The growth of direct investment in the U.S., in the 
1970s and 1980s, is thus a reflection of the transition 
to a phase of stagnation in the long wave. Additionally, 
the process and course of development of the 
internationalization of capital has a significant bearing 
on the future development of the capitalist world system. 
A complete statement of the relation between the 
internationalization of productive capital and the 
factors operating to restore a basis for profitable
accumulation, however, is beyond the scope of this 
thes is.
The analysis of long waves, presented in this 
chapter, would not be complete without a few concluding 
remarks regarding some of the frequently cited criticisms 
of that presumed phenomenon. These comments will focus 
on: (1) the data problem and statistical verification of 
long waves; (2) the scope or universality of the long 
waves; (3) the question of whether the process of capital 
accumulation is continuous or discontinuous; and (4) the
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question o£ whether exogenous or endogenous forces
produce the phases of transition.
Many economists have criticized long wave theorists
concerning the quality and handling of the data series
presented. The quality of the data is obviously hampered
by the lengthy time span of each long wave cycle {50 to
60 years) which means that any attempt to track the
historical record prior to the early 1800s is likely to
be open to debate. Vet, while the ability to "prove" the
existence of these cycles (as one goes farther back in
history), will never materialize, a recognition that
these long waves are cycles of accumulation serves to
shift the analysis away from price cycles (such as
Rostow's) towards an investigation of value and surplus
value creation (output and investment cycles). This
position is similar to that of Mandel's who argued that
the real problem of long waves is not one of empirical
proof, but their theoretical justification.
We, on the contrary, regard the main problem 
not as one of statistical verification, but of
theoretical explanation, although it goes
without saying that, if the theory of "long
waves" could not be confirmed empirically, it 
would be an unfounded working hypothesis, and 
ultimately a mystification. Methods of 
empirical vertification must themselves,
however, be appropriate to the specific
problem to be explained. Price movements, 
which may be provoked by inflationary 
development - including, in the context of a 
gold standard, a greater reduction in the 
commodity value of precious metals than in the 
average value of other commodities - are 
definitely not a reliable indicator. Output
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figures for individual commodities, which may 
be heavily influenced in certain periods by 
the role of particular branches of production 
as 'growth sectors' should likewise be treated 
with caution. Income curves, which may also 
be co-determined by inflationary price 
movements, are also derivative indices and can 
only be used after fundamental historical 
analysis. The most convincing indicators 
consequently appear to be those of industrial 
output as a whole and the development of the 
volume of world trade (or of per capita world 
trade); the former will express the long-term 
tendency of capitalist production and the 
latter the rhythm of expansion of the world 
market. Precisely where these two indicators 
are concerned, it is quite possible to provide 
empirical verification for "J^Dg waves" after 
the crisis of the year 1847.145
Mandel's view, which firmly etablishes the scope of the 
long wave patterns at the world level fails, however, to 
include foreign investment as an indicator of them along 
with total industrial production and the volume of world 
trade. This thesis argues that, particularly since the 
Second World War, the exclusion of direct foreign investment 
data as an indicator is not warranted. Indeed, in the 
current stage of growing internationalization of productive 
capital, the inclusion of the volume of such investment, as 
well as measurements of relative penetration, may be more 
sigificant indications of the long wave than the volume of 
world trade. Regardless, direct investment can no longer be 
justifiably ignored.
In turning to the question of endogenous versus 
exogenous theories of long waves, this thesis agrees with 
Gordon's perspective that the evolution of the SSA during
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the phase o£ stagnation Is not an external determination. 
During the extended phase o£ stagnation the disruption and 
potential breakdowm of the old channels of accumulation 
produce a heightening of competition and conflict whose 
objective function is to bring about a restructuring of the 
channels of accumulation. But, the resulting SSA erected, 
as well as the technological basis of renewed accumulation, 
is the consequence of many determinations, and the direction 
of this restructuring is not pre-ordained. It is dependent 
on the respective power of the combatants both within and 
between classes. What remains certain is that the 
resolution of the crisis conditions requires a massive 
devalorization of capital that, through competition, will 
produce an increase in the concentration and centralization 
of capital at the international level.
The major criticism of long waves by modern economists
continues to be, as it was for Trotsky, that these
fluctuations
are not manifestations of some kind of long 
wave or long cycle, but that they are specific 
historical occurrences, different, separate 
segments of the capitalist curve of 
development, each one characterized by its own 
specific features.
Thus, Eklund argued that the goal of modern social 
science should be to explain the specific, unique 
combination of factors operating at different periods to 
produce different succeeding stages of capitalist evolution, 
"without trying to squeeze it into a general pattern of
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secular cyclical swings." In a similar vein, J. Krieger and
J. Lewis have criticized Mandel for exclusive reliance on
concepts of the rising organic composition of capital and
the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. They
believed that Mandel's singular focus led him to
misinterpret the changes that made the current stage of
capitalism distinctive. In their view, Mandel
overemphasized the role of Industrial capital, failing to
address the implications of the expansion of service sector
employment. In addition, he consistently presented a
reactive and unified state which systematically (and
successfully) engaged in simple crisis prevention. Krieger
and Lewis concluded that
Mandel's failure to examine new areas of 
struggle - particularly in the state and
service sectors which are particular to
post-war capitalism - highlights the strategic 
emptiness of Late Capitalism. Confining his
analysis to the traditional features of
capitalist development, Mandel effectively 
depoliticizes a Marxist method that he had 
hoped to revitalize as a tool for
revolutionary practice. Mandel remains bound 
to a tradition that asserts that with the
right organization all crises become part of a 
chain reaction leading to the breakdown of 
capitalist relations.148
This view, that Mandel's interpretation of the long wave 
led him to conclude that the world capitalist system was on 
the verge of an irreparable breakdown (and, therefore, a 
transition to socialism), was previously expressed by Athar 
H u s s a i n . H e  stated that, for Mandel,
Once the possibility of the breakdown of
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capitalism acquires political significance, 
the tendencies attributed to capitalism are 
put beyond the range of question. And then It 
becomes necessary to show that the observed 
events are realizations of the laws of motion 
of capitalism. The point, however, is that 
the primary interest is not the analysis of 
events and episodes but in repeating the 
thesis that capitalism will break down one day 
and give way to socialism.
Mandel has responded to his critics by claiming that it
is they who possess the misunderstanding. The relevance of
long wave theory, in general, and the SSA, in particular, is
that they provide a framework to explain how the possibility
of a breakdown of capitalist relations can be avoided
through a structural transformation of those relations as
well as the channels of accumulation. Thus, it is precisely
within the long wave framework that the factors operating to
create the necessary preconditions for renewed expansion are
highlighted, not denied. Mandel concluded that
The "rationalization" function of the long 
wave of slower growth which we are witnessing 
since the late sixties and the early seventies 
would have to create the necessary economic 
preconditions for such a long-term sharp
increase in the average rate of profit. This 
would essentially require: chronic mass
unemployment tending in the long run both to 
erode real wages, workers' self-confidence, 
militancy and level of organization and to 
significantly increase the intensity of labor, 
leading towards a sharp upwards shift of the 
rate of surplus-value; massive devalorization
of capital through an increasing elimination
of inefficient firms (not only small and 
medium-sized ones but also large ones,
including many "multinationals"), i.e., 
through a new leap forward not only of 
national but especially of international 
concentration and centralization of capital; 
new radical ways to cheapen, at least
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relatively, the costs of equipment, raw
material and energy; massive applications of 
new innovations; a new revolutionary 
acceleration in the rate of turnover of
capital, etc.
It is sufficient to enumerate these technical 
conditions to understand that they cannot be 
fulfilled by technical means alone. They will 
not come about as automatic products of
certain economic changes, of current economic 
developments. Their realization, at least on 
a scale sufficient to unleaash a new process 
of long-term accelerated growth of the 
international capitalist economy, would 
require momentuous changes in the
socio-political relationship of class forces, 
both within a whole series of key capitalist 
countries themselves, as well as on an 
international scale.
Finally, it should be noted that while a renewed long 
wave of expansion is not gauranteed, intelligent discourse 
requires that it be established as a possibility. The 
monopoly theory of perpetual stagnation and increasing 
system irrationality must be challenged and reintegrated 
into a generally competitive world capitalist system 
framework. A framework that recognizes the dualistic and 
contradictory nature of the competition-monopoly dialectic 
as well as the ebb and flow of capitalist production and 
accumulation in the long run.
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meet the requirements of historial analysis) 
that the present structure is more classical 
than Harrod's, seeking to raise explicitly and 
to organize formally the old questions of the 
determination of population and the working 
force and the productivity of capital (pp. 
89-91).
27. Ibid., p- 95.
28 . Ibid., p- 122 .
29 . Ibid.. p- 125.
30 . Ibi<3 • / pp., 128-37.
31. Ibid.
32. See W. W. Rostow's essays on The British Economy of the 
Nineteenth Century. Oxford University Press, 1948.
33. W. W. Rostow, The Process of Economic Growth. I960, p. 
143-33 .
34. Ibid., p. 311.
35. Rostow has supported his beliefs with the following 
publications since 1975: "The Developing World in the Fifth 
Kondratieff Upswing", Annals. AAPS. no. 420, July 1975, pp. 
111-24; "Kondratieff,.Schumpeter, ad Kuznets: Trend Periods 
Revisited.", Journal of Economic History. XXV, Dec. 1975,
pp. 719-53; Getting From Here to There:__ AmexiC.a ’.S Future In
the World Economy. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1978, and The 
World Economy: History and Prospect. Austin, University of 
Texas Press, 1978.
264
36. W. W. Rostow, "Kondratieff, Schumpeter and Kuznets: 
Trend Periods Revisited", p. 729. By the 1970s Rostow had 
reached the commonly held view (see #22 above) that Kuznets' 
long swing turned out to be more restricted in time and 
limited in meaning than first thought, (p. 729)
37. Ibid., p. 727. An example of Rostow's vision of the way 
in which these factors historically operate and Interrelate
to one another could be given for the long wave from
approximately 1886 to 1914, focusing, as Rostow does, 
primarily on the United States. Rostow claimed that this 
period could be subdivided into two phases with the period 
1865 to 1895 being a period of expansion (rising prices) 
followed by a period (trend) of stagnation (falling prices) 
from 1896 to 1914. These trends were influenced in part 
(but were not caused) by a "shift in the leading sectors of 
the more advanced economies of the time (U.K., Germany, 
U.S., France)". The shift Rostow referred to encompassed 
the transition from railroads and steel to electricity,
chemical and automobile production. The predominance of 
railroads and steel as the leading sector of growth was 
increasingly usurped by the emergence of the strong growth 
after 1895 (1899-1914 in the U.S.) of the "automobile
sectoral complex (embracing automobiles, petroleum, rubber 
production and so on); canned foods and ice; cigarettes,
chemicals, (including notably fertilizers, paints and 
varnishes); phonographs and electrical machinery" in the 
advanced countries. Rostow claimed that Great Britian fell 
behind in this process of transition, especially in 
industrial chemmistry and the manufacture of electrical 
equipment due to the greater pace of deceleration of the old 
industries in the U.K. coinciding with a rise in British 
capital exports and a consequently lowered level of domestic 
investment. This growth of capital exports was related to 
Rostow's second factor, foodstuff and raw material 
product ion.
38. Ibid.. p. 739-41.
39. Ibid.. p. 743. Thus, Rostow supported Kuznets' analysis 
of the period from 1865 to the First World War. Capital and 
labor flowed on an international scale to the "new 
economies" in response to the "pull" of the opening of new 
territories, the discovery of new sources of raw materials 
and the generally higher rate of industrial expansion. This 
conclusion runs counter to Thomas' analysis which stressed 
the push factors responsible in Europe for the international 
flow of labor and capital to the new world. Rostow did, 
however, possess a more world-wide view than Kuznets in his 
analysis of dynamic change and its relation to international 
migration and investment. Though Rostow's analysis led him
265
to the conclusion that the "Kuznets1 cycle is less of a 
uniform cycle" then previously thought, Rostow claimed that 
the hard core of Kuznets1
proposition...stands: large flows of
immigration did set in motion demands for 
housing and infrastructure which yielded 
powerful business expansions which transcended 
in their scope the sectors whose expansion 
made immigration attractive in the first 
place... there is thus a significnt place in 
the mechanism of growth and cyclical analysis 
for migration and all its secondary and 
tertiary consequences, so long as they are 
linked to the dynamics of leading sector 
analysis and the underlying forces that made 
attractive the opening of new areas, (p. 745)
40. Ibid.. p. 749.
41. Ibid. . p. 750.
42. Emmanual Wallerstein, "Kondratieff Up or Kondratieff 
Down?", Review. Vol. II, no. 4, Spring, 1979, pp. 663-73.
43. Wallerstein contended that Rostow employed a "gimmick" 
in order to produce a consistent appraisal of these trend 
periods. Wallerstein believed that the period from 1938 to 
1951, which Rostow classifies as an upward trend due to the 
relative price increases of foodstuffs and raw materials, 
should not properly be regarded as a turning point in the 
long wave/swing/trend. He argued that this shift
...occurred to be sure, although an inspection 
of his (Rostow's) tables... show the shift was 
not all that great. But this shift was the 
temporary result of wartime transport 
difficulties for raw materials. In fact, as a 
whole litererature attests, there has been a 
steady decline in the terms of trade of 
primary goods from 1920 to 1973.
See E. Wallerstein, op. cit.f p. 668
44. W. W. Rostow, The World Economy: History annd Prospect.,
Austin, University of Texas Press, 1978, p. 307-8.
45. W. W. Rostow, "Kondratieff, Schumpeter and Kuznets: 
Trend Periods Revisited", p. 752.
46. Angus Maddison, "Phases of Capitalist Development", 
Banca Nationale del Lavoro. Quarterly Review, no. 121, June 
1977, pp. 103-137; and A. Maddison, "Long Run Dynamics of
Productivity Growth", Banca Nationale del__La_voro. Quarterly
Review, no. 128, March, 1979, pp. 3-44.
266
47. Maddison claimed that by 1870 these sixteen developed 
capitalist economies, (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, 
Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland) had already 
"embarked on what Kuznets calls 'modern economic growth' (in 
which per capita income moves in a sustained upward 
direction with only temporary interruptions)." (See "Phases 
of Capitalist Development", pp. 114-15.) In addition, 
Maddison believed that it is more important to focus on the 
group's performance rather than individual country 
deviations since,
the aggregate stability in the collective 
output of the group in peacetime has been 
quite impressive....individual countries have 
been much more unstable than the group as a 
whole....The cyclical experience of individual 
countries has not normally been synchronized 
but compensatory.... cyclical experience has 
been sychronized only when these economies 
have been subjected to system-shock. (See pp.
109-10).
48 . Ibid., p . 113.
49. A. Maddison, "Long-Run Dynamics of Productivity Growth". 
Summarized from various tables presented by Maddison.
50. Ibdd., p. 7.
51. Ibid.. p. 8 and p.18.
52. Maddison surmised that:
The acceleration of productivity growth within 
sectors and the switch of employment between 
sectors are interrelated phenomena, which 
reflect the operation of deeper causal factors 
which have accelerated productivity growth, 
i.e., higher and more stable demand, an 
increase in the pace of capital formation, and 
the impact of accelerated world trade on 
industrialization. The main respect in which 
structural change of the type discussed above 
has had an independent causal role in growth 
is the degree to which countries were able to 
exploit a reserve of labor underutilized in 
agriculture. (Ibid . , p. 11.)
53 . Ibid., p . 10.
54. Ibid.. p. 39.
2 6 7
55. Philip Ehrensa£t/ "Long Waves in the Transformation of 
North American Agriculture: A First Statement", Cornel1 
Journal of Social Relations. Vol. 15, no. 1, Summer, 1980, 
pp. 65-83.
56. Ibid., p. 77.
57. Ibid. . pp. 77-78.
58. Leon H. Dupriez, Des mouvements economiaues aeneraux, I 
- II. Institut des recherches economiques et sociales, 1947.
59. Leon H. Dupriez "1974: Downturn of the Long Wave?",
Banca Nazionale <j£i Lavoro. Quarterly Review. No. 126,
September, 1978, pp. 199-210. (See p. 200).
60. Ibid.-, p. 204.
61. Ibid.., p. 206.
62. Lb. id.-, p. 208.
63. Ibid., p. 209 .
64. Gabriel Tarde, The Laws of Imitation, Henry Holt, 1903.
A slow advance in the beginning, followed by 
rapid and uniformly accelerated progress, 
followed again by progress that continues to 
slacken until it finally stops: These, then,
are the three ages of those real social beings 
which I call inventions or discoveries. (p.
127)
65. Simon Kuznets, Secular Movements in Production and
Prices; Their Nature and Their Bearing LLpcn Cyclical
Fluctuations, Houghton Mifflin, 1930; and A.F. Burns, 
Producti_on trends in the U.S. since 1870. National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 1934. See also the discussion of long 
swings (Kuznets cycles) presented earlier in this chapter.
66. See, for instance: Joel Dean, "Pricing policies for new 
products", Harvard Business Review, no. 28, November, 1950, 
pp. 45-53, (who, apparently, coined the phrase "product life 
cycle"); A. Patton, "Stretch your product's earning years: 
top management's stake in the product life cycle". The 
Management Review, no. 48, September, 1959, pp. 67-79; T. 
Levitt, "Exploit the product life cycle", Harvard Business 
Review, no. 43, Nov.-Dec., 196. pp. 81-94.
67. This perspective was previously discussed under the 
heading of firm specific market imperfections in chapter
III. Further development of this application of the life
268
cycle concept can be found In: Raymond Vernon,
"International Investment and International Trade in the
Product Life Cycle", Quarterly Journal af Economics, May,
1966, pp. 190-207; L. T. Wells (Ed.), The Product Life Cvcle 
and International Trade. Harvard Business School, 1972; 
Stephan P. Magee, "Multinational Corporations, The Industry
Technology Cycle and Development", Journal of World Trade
Law, vol. 2, no. 4, July-August, 1977, pp. 297-321; and 
Raymond Vernon, "The Product Cycle Hypothesis in A New 
International Environment", in J. Adams (Ed.), The 
Contemporary Internaional Economy,. St. Martins Press, 1985, 
pp. 408-22.
An interesting forerunner of this literature can be 
found in Kaname Akamtsu's, "A Historical Pattern of Economic 
Growth in Developing Countries", The Developing Economies. 
Institute of Asian Economic Affairs, March, 1962, pp. 3-25. 
Akamatsu advanced an S-shaped growth model that he called 
the "wild geese flying pattern". He argued that this model 
could be used to explain the pattern of growth of 
manufactured consumer goods in developing countries (India 
and Japan) that would pas through four stages of: (1)
imports, (2) domestic production, (3) exports, (4) foreign 
(direct) investment.
A characteristic phenomenon of this (fourth) 
stage is that the export of consumer goods 
begins to decline. This is attributable to 
the fact that consumer goods are put into
production in other less-advanced countries
and development in a wild-geese flying pattern 
is under way. Another feature is that in this
stage, capital goods domestically produced in
the third stage begin to be exported, (p. 15).
68. G. Mensch, Stalemate in Technology, Ballinger, 1979. 
Original German edition published in 1975.
69. Ibid. This passage is from the original German edition. 
It was dropped in the English edition. The quote and its 
translation is taken from J. J. van Duljn, The Long Wave in 
Economic Life. George Allen & Unwin, 1983, p. 108.
70. C. Clark, C. Freeman and L. Soete, "Long waves, 
inventions, and innovations", Futures, vol. 13, 1981, pp. 
308-22. See also, by the same authors, Unemployment and 
Technological .Innovation: A Study of Long Waves and Economic 
Development. Francis Pinter, London, 1982.
71. Luc Soete, "International Diffusion of Technology, 
Industrial Development and Technological Leapfrogging", 
World Development, vol. 13, no. 3, 1985, pp. 409-22.
72. Ibid., p. 411.
269
7 3 . Ibid., p. 413.
74. Ibid.. p. 411.
75. Soete wrote:
Far from developing factor-proportions 
appropriate (to) industries and technologies 
both for the domestic and export world market, 
the opportunities offered by the international 
diffusion of technology to jump particular 
technological paradigms and import the more, 
if not most, sophisticated technologies that 
will neither displace the capital invested nor 
the skilled labor of the previous 
technological paradigm, constitute one of the 
most crucial advantages of newly
industrializing countries in their bid for 
rapid industrialization. Ibid.. p. 416.
76. F. M. Smith, "Innovation: The Way Out of the 
Recession?", Long Range Planning. Vol. 15, No. 1, 1982, pp. 
19-29 .
77. Ibid.. p. 24.
78. Raphael Kaplinsky, "Trade In Technology - Who, What, 
Where and When", in M. Fransman and K. King, (Eds.), 
Technological Compablllty in t?he_Third woc.lti, st. Martin's 
Press, NY, 1984, pp. 139-160.
79. Ibid., p. 141.
80. Ibid., p. 148-49.
81. Ibid.. p. 149.
82. Colin Clark, The■■Economics of 1960. Macmillan, NY., 
1944 .
83. See, for instance, the following articles by J. W. 
Forrester: "Business Structure, Economic Cycles and National 
Policy", Cycles, vol. 27, no. 2, Feb./March, 1976, pp. 
29-46; "We're Headed for Another Depression", Fortune f 
January 16, 1978, pp. 145-48; "Innovation and the Economic 
Long Wave", Management Review. June, 1979, pp. 16-24.
84. According to Forrester, MIT's System Dynamics Model is,
a computer simulation model of industrial 
economies ....a simulation model.... constructed 
from policies, organizational structure, and 
physical processes that would be familiar to
270
any person in business....The National Model 
is built up from the operating structure 
within corporations, rather than macroeconomic 
theory. It is derived from management 
policies as observed in the detailed, 
practical, working world rather than from 
statistical correlations derived from broad 
time series representing aggregate economic 
behavior. ("Innovation and the Economic Long 
Wave", p. 19.)
85. Ibid., p . 18.
86. Ibid.. p. 20.
87. Ibid., p . 24.
88. Robert Cherry, Macroeconomics. Addison-Wesley, Boston, 
1980, pp. 253-58.
89. Ibid., p. 258.
90. J. J. Van Duijn, The Long Wave in Economic Life. George 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1983. See Chapter VIII, pp. 129-44.
91. Ifri-fl. / p. 139.
92. Ibid., p. 139.
93. Ibid.. p. 140.
94. R.W. Kaiser, "The Kondrateiff Cycle: Investment Strategy 
Tool or Fascinating Coincidence", Financial Analysts 
Journal. May-June, 1979, pp. 57-66.
95. Ibid.. reproduced from p. 58.
96. Ibid.. p. 59
97. Ibid.. pp. 62-63.
98. Ifrifl-, pp. 63-64.
99. Ibid.. pp. 64-66.
100. E. M. Bernstein, "War and the
Cycles", American Economic Re.Yi.aM/ Vol.




n o . 3,
101. XMd.., p. 535.
102. Robert P. Weber, "Cyclical Theories of Crisis in the
271
World-System", in Albert Bergesen, (Ed.), Crisis in the 
WorId-System. Sage, CA, 1983, pp. 37-55.
103. Ibid.., p. 38.
104. "(M)any explanations fail to specify the process by 
which change comes about. For example, if there is a 
structural reorganization of the economy, who or what
determines or guides the reorganization? What are the
limits of reorganizaion and what are the countervailing 
forces? How are reorganizations legitimated?" Ibid.. p. 39.
105. Ibid., p. 48.
106. See J. Z. Namenwirth, "The Wheels and the
interdependence of Value Change", Journal______of
Interdisciplinary History. vol. 3, Spring, 1973, pp.
649-683. Apparently, Weber first developed the 
'cybernetic-dialectical' model in a 1981 article; "Economy
and Society in the Western World System", Social Forces, 
vol. 59. 1981, pp. 1130-1148. In addition, it should be 
pointed out that both Namewirth and Weber support the 
existence of even longer (148-152 year) trend seculaires.
107. Robert P. Weber, "Cyclical Theories of Crisis in the 
World-System", p. 47.
108 . Ibid.. p. 49 .
109 . Ibid.. pp. 48-49.
110. Ibid., p. 48.
111. ibid., p. 49.
112. Nicole Bousquet, "From Hegemony to Competition: Cycles
of the Core?", in T. K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein (Eds.), 
Processes of the World-Svstem. Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 
1980, pp. 46-83.
113. Ibid., p. 79.
114. Ibid.. p. 50.
115. Ibid.. p. 68
116. Ibid.. p. 69.
117. T. K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, "Cyclical Rhythms and 
Secular Trends of the Capitalist World-Economy", in T. K. 
Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, (Eds.), World^Svstem Analysis: 
Theory and Methodology. Sage Publications, CA, 1982, pp.
272
104-120.
118. IhlA., p. 112.
119. m ,  P. 118.
120. David M. Gordon, "Stages of Accumulation and Long 
Economic Cycles", in T. K. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, 
Processes of the World-System. Sage, CA, 1980, pp. 9-45. 
(Reference taken from endnote 49 on p. 40).
121. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism. Verso edition, The 
Gresham Press, Old Woking, Surrey, 1978. (See pages 130-32).
122. D .  M. Gordon, op. c it.. Table 4-10 represents a 
summary of the structural requirements discussed by Gordon 
on pages 12-17. The author has taken the liberty to add two 
additional structural requirements to the fourth category in 
the table. These are 2(b) and 3(b), which, I believe, 
Gordon has overlooked. The requirements for an individual 
capital to produce surplus value include both norms and 
methods of labor management and technical conditions of 
production (and reproduction, i.e., expanded production) 
determined by the level of development of technology. In 
addition, the methods and norms of surplus value's 
realization require both a final consumer demand structure 
(sets limits of the market) and a structure of market
the limits on an individual capital's 
self-valorization.




123. ibid-, P- 17 .
124. P- 20.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid., P* 2 1.
127 . Ibid./ P- 22 .
128 . ibid., P- 31.
129 . Gordon stated that
The assumption of the inelasticity of 
available funds is obviously critical to this 
model. A dynamic version would obviously 
incorporate the growth of savings with the 
growth of the economy (fueled by growing 
investment), but the basic premise that there 
are determinate limits to the flow of funds 
available for investment would not be 
affected. In this sense, a Marxian approach
2 7 3
to theories of investment would begin to
depart dramatically from theories in the
Keynesian tradition which view effective 
demand as the ultimate determinant of the rate 
of growth and investment demand as an
exogenous determinant of the level of economic 
activity. Within the Marxian pespective, the
funds available for investment are ultimately 
limited by total (produced and realized) 
aggregate surplus value (and its
distribution): the process which determines 
the limits to that aggregate magnitude cannot 
easily be reduced to an "exogenous" process 
and we cannot easily assume that sufficient 
funds will be available to finance any
warranted or desired level of investment 
demand. (See endnote #63, pp. 41-42).
While Gordon is not wrong in claiming that this 
approach, therefore, rejects an "effective demand" theory of
long waves, he apparently fails to see the real financial
(liquid capital) problem during the crisis phase. The
capitalist is confronted with a dialectical dilemma. He 
possesses both too much and too little available funds for 
investment. In the trough, the individual capitalist 
increasingly finds that he has too much liquid capital for 
it to be absorbed in his old activities within the declining 
social structure of accumulation. Yet, when considered
individually the capitalist possesses too little funds to 
create new paths of accumulaton due to the lack of a
(completely erected) new social structure of accumulaton. 
It is precisely this "dilemma" which leads to the 
proliferation of new financial instruments and the exotic 
financial maneuverings so commonly associated with the 
crisis phase.
(A) fraction of newlv accumulated capital can 
no longer be invested productively at the
"normally anticipated" conditions of
profitability. This capital is then 
increasingly directd to speculation, risky 
activity which is less
profitable...."super-abundance" of capital and 
"shortage" of profits coexist and determine 
each other.
See Ernest Mandel, The Second Slump; A Marxist Analysis__
Recession in the Seventies, first published Berlin, 1977, 
revised edition, New Left Books, London, 1978, pp. 173-75.
130. Ernest Mandel, The Second Slump, p. 12.
131. Ibid.r p. 170. Mandel argued that it was important to 
"distinguish the phenomena of appearance of the crisis, the 
detonators of the crisis, their deeper cause r and their
274
function in the framework of the Intrinsic logic of the
capitalist mode of production.” (p. 168). In Mandel's view, 
the crisis is always one of overproduction of commodities 
(exchange values) which can assume such forms as the
overaccumultion of capital, under-consumption of the masses, 
disproportionalities among the various branches of
production, and a falling rate of profit.
132. Ibid., p. 168.
133. Ibid. r p. 171-72. For a further discussion of the role 
of competition, see Chapter I, especially, pp. 8-10.
134. Ibid.r p. 172.
135. Ibid. . p. 173. Mandel has argued that during the long 
wave of expansion there is a temporary increase in the size 
and opportunities in the non-monopolized sectors of the
economy.
In the closing phase of such a wave, and 
especially in the long wave with an undertone 
of stagnation which succeeds it, there is by 
contrast an increase in the tempo of 
concentraion and centralization of capital.
The sphere of activity of the non-monopolized 
sectors contracts. There is hence a
reduction in the mass of surplus-value 
produced in these sectors and a corresponding 
decline in the source of surplus-profits. The 
monopoly profit thus comes nearer the average.
See Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism., p. 545.
136. Ernest Mandel, Second Slump., pp. 175-76.
137. Ernest Mandel, Late Capital ism.. p. 145.
138. Apparently Mandel is more reluctant than Gordon to
claim that the period of stagnation must give way to renewed 
expansion. In his Marshall lectures, given in the U.K., 
Mandel wrote that:
There Is no symmetry between the unavoidable 
long-term results of accelerated capitalist 
economic growth - which is precisely a long 
term decline in the average rate of profit! 
and the sudden long-term upturn of the average 
rate of profit after a consistent decline for 
a quarter of a century. This upturn cannot be 
deduced from the laws of motion of the 
capitalist mode of production in and by 
themselves. It cannot be deduced from the
operations of "capital in general". It can
275
only be understood if all the concrete forms 
of capitalist development in a given 
environment - all the concrete forms and 
contradictions of "many capitals" - are 
brought into play. And these imply a whole 
series of non-economic factors like wars of 
conquest, extension or contraction of the area 
of capitalist operation, inter-capital 1st 
competition, class struggle, revolutions and 
counter-revolutions, etc. These radical 
changes in the overall environment in which 
the capitalist mode of producton operates, in 
turn, detonate so to speak radical upheavals 
in the basic variable of capitalist growth, 
i.e., lead to upheavals in the average rate of 
prof it.
See Ernest Mandel Marshall Lecture Series. Cambridge
Universiy, U.K., 1974, p. 11
Gordon, however, felt that Mandel, like Schumpeter, Baran 
and Sweezy, overstressed the
exogeneity of the sources of stimuli to 
restored capital accumulation; all emphasize, 
in one way or another, the critical importance 
of exogenous technical innovations. I think 
that stress derives from a common failure to 
appreciate the critical importance of the 
increasingly structural orlentatlon of 
economic struggles as economic crisis deepens.
Because the stages of accumulation framework 
emphasizes the endogenous process through 
which capitalists, workers, and others begin 
to contest the terms of resolution of crisis,
I am also led to emphasize the endogenous 
determinants of the specific "innovations" 
which seem to permit the restoration of the 
rate of accumulation. Just as I do not 
believe that new social structures of
accumulation fall from the sky, my analysis of 
the dynamics of economic crisis leads me to 
doubt the celestial origins of technical 
innovation as well. I think that others'
emphasis on exogenous technical innovation 
derives in part from technological 
determinism. (See, D. Gordon, "Stages of
Accumulation and Long Economic Cycles", p.
34. )
139. A partial listing of the institutional structures would 
include: active government manipulation of aggregate demand; 
the "cold war" and the U.S. as free-world defender; the 
Bretton Woods agreement and the dollar-gold exchange 
standard; the reorganization of international credit
2 7 6
mechanisms through the creation of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank; the reconstruction of a 
'common' European market and a strong Japanese economy; the 
surburbanization movement; and the labor-management 
bargaining relationship. This listing does not purport to 
exhaust the requisite institutional structures and is 
presented only by way of example.
140. Ernest Mandel, Late Capltalism.f p. 557.
141. Ibid.. p. 316.
142. Ibid.. p. 324.
143. Ibid.. p. 457. Mandel places too much emphasis on 
exchange rates in explaining direct investment flows. The 
growing direct investment penetration of the U.S. continued 
in the period from 1983-1987 despite the temporary return of 
the dollar's rates of exchange to post-World War II highs.
144. Calculated from Table 2-10 in Chapter II. See also
Table 2-11 for a country breakdown of the penetration index.
145. Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism., pp. 140-41.
146. Klas Eklund, "Long Waves in the Development of
Capita 1 ism?", p. 413.
147. Joel Krieger and Jim Lewis, "The Highest Stage at
Last?", Socialist Review.. January-February, 1979, pp. 
157-171.
148. Ibid. . p. 170.
149. Athar Hussain, "Crises and Tendencies of Capitalism", 
Economy a nd Society.. Vol. 6, No. 4, November, 1977, pp.
436-460.
150. I b i d . . p. 459.
151. Ernest Mandel, Marshall Lecture Series, p. 39-40.
277
CHAPTER V
A SAMPLE OF 135 FOREIGN MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
AND THEIR INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
THE ANALYSIS OF THE FIRM AND THE INVESTMENT DECISION
This chapter summarizes the results of a microeconomic
investigation of direct foreign investment (DFI) in the
United States by non-U.S. enterprises. The analysis assumes
that a firm's effort to penetrate the U.S. is seldom
whimsical or opportunistic (though such cases do indeed
exist). Instead, the firm's decision to invest in the U.S.
revolves around a cohesive global strategy for survival
(continued long-run accumulation) in an increasingly
competitive world. Paul R. Sullivan, a senior vice
president of Harbridge House Inc., has claimed that
The strategy required to gain a global
perspective starts with executive vision and 
commitment for long-term strategic
positioning. It entails risk taking. It
requires perseverance while subordinating 
short-term profits for a long-term global 
position. It is this longer perspective that 
has enabled European and Asian companies to 
penetrate global markets so rapidly.
And yet, while the development of a global outlook is a
necessary prerequiste of the investment decision, successful
penetration is not guaranteed. Even the largest, most
278
successful foreign firms have experienced set-backs in their
DFI strategy.
In its corporate autobiography, Unilever Group 
concedes that it "has certainly found North 
American success elusive, sometimes grasped 
only to be snatched away."
History, unfortunately for Unilever, seems to 
repeat itself.
The company's boldest move ever in the U.S.-a 
hostile takeover offer for Rlchardson-Vicks 
Inc.-was thwarted last week when Procter &
Gamble Co. stepped in with a higher bid. It 
was the same P&G that, back in the 1940s, 
introduced Tide and clobbered Unilever's 
dominant laundry detergents.
The fact the Unilever took the offensive this 
time and started the takeover battle shows 
that it finally is flexing its muscles.... The 
fact that it lost is a reminder that it still 
needs to try harder.2
Thus, the interpenetration of capital through DFI can be
seen as an inherently competitive process that produces both
winners and losers. In addition, the movement of capital
encapsulated in the progressive internationalization of the
circuit of productive capital requires (in fact, is
frequently accomplished by) a further advance in the
concentration and centralization of capital.
The development of this firm-level analysis was founded 
on five hypotheses:
(1) The sample data would reflect a similar country 
breakdown to that exemplified by the aggregate data 
presented in Chapter II.
(2) The sample data would reflect a similar industry 
pattern to that suggested by the aggregate data presented in 
Chapter II.
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(3) The sample data would show that acquisitions
predominate as the form of entry into the U.S. As Buslnesa 
Week has pointed out,
[Foreigners that come to the U.S. are usually 
taking on a bigger, more competitive market 
than anything they have tackled before. So 
they gain access, most often by acquiring 
existing U.S. companies even though they may 
bring in advanced technology of their own.^
Surely this is to be expected from the perspective that sees
the progressive internationalization of the circuits of
capital as an evolving competitive process of concentration
and centralization of capital. It is a dialectical irony
completely missed by the monopoly capital theorists, (see
Chapter I) that this movement entails both an expansion and
a reduction of monopoly. At the level of the nation-state
this movement is seen as a growth in the forces of
competition and a retreat of the elements of monopoly, while
at the level of the world economy, the progressive
internationalization of capital must produce (through
competitive consolidation) a reduction in the number of
participants and, hence, an advance of the monopoly element.
(4) The sample data would illustrate a tendency for
the firm to prefer 100% control of its investments in the
U.S. A corrolary of this hypothesis is that joint-ventures, 
tending to be unstable due to the conflicting interests of 
the partners involved, would tend to be avoided (being used 
only as a last resort, and even then, only for a limited 
period of time). Such findings would confirm research of
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European firms, conducted in the 1970s, by L.G. Franko using
Harvard's Multinational Enterprise Data Bank. (See Chapter
III). In his view,
Competition In America not only obliged 
Continental firms to allow their U.S.
subsidiaries to undertake R&D, but also pushed
Continental enterprises to own 100% of their 
U.S. operations. In 1971, a much greater 
proportion of Continental companies' American 
manufacturing subsidiaries were wholly owned 
than the proportion typical for Continental 
subsidiaries elsewhere in the world. 
Two-thirds of the Continentals' U.S.
subidiarles were wholly owned, compared to 46% 
of all Continental foreign manufacturing 
operations. Moreover, moves by Continentals
to buy out their joint-venture partners 
following entry Into the U.S. were common.^
(5) Finally, it is hypothesized that the sample firms 
will exhibit a marked increase in its investment activity 
since the late 1960s. This corresponds to the argument, 
presented in Chapter IV, that the transition to a long wave 
of stagnation after 1965 produced a deterioration of former 
monopoly advantages through a declining rate of profit and 
growing competition. And, at this particular historical 
juncture, the progressive internationalization of the 
circuit of productive capital is one expression of this 
intensified competition.
THE -SAMELE DEFINED 
Since the focus of this thesis is manufacturing firms, 
the sample excluded, from the outset, firms engaged in 
banking and finance, wholesale and retail, and the service 
sector. A listing of the largest 200 (in terms of sales)
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non-U.S. industrial firms was compiled from Fortune magazine
for the years 1966, 1976, and 1985.® Firms involved in the
oil industry were then deleted from this list,® From the 
resulting compilations, firms were picked for the sample 
population if they met either of the following two criteria:
(1) The firm ranked in the top 200 in at least two of 
the three years (1966, 1976, or 1985), or
(2) The firm ranked in the top 100 in any one of the
three years.
This selection process resulted in the establishment of an
original sample of 167 non-U.S. firms. The original sample
firms are presented in Appendix A.
Further research into the 167 firms led to the
elimination of twenty entries due to acguistions, mergers, 
name changes or the discovery that the firm was controlled 
by a U.S. parent.^ These changes reduced the sample
population from 167 to 147 non-U.S. manufacturing firms. Of 
these 147 firms, twelve were found to have no direct U.S. 
investments (past or present) and were subsequently excised 
from the sample.8 This left an updated sample of 135 
foreign manufacturing firms with investments in the U.S. 
The 135 firms include both private and state-run companies.
AGGREGATED RESULTS OF FIRMS IN SAMPLE
Table 5-1 presents a country breakdown of the 135 
sample firms. It subdivides them into three categories 
based on the size of the firm's direct investment stake in
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the United States. The 28 firms with the largest Investment 
stake (>$l/000mn) were designated as A-firms. The 44 firms 
with investments greater than $300mn but less than $l,000mn 
were classified as B-firms. Finally/ the 63 firms with the 
smallest investment committment (<$300mn) were placed in the 
C-£irm category.
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Table 5-1: Conatiy Breakdown of Saiple Him. Based on Site of
P H  Stale In the U.S. bf Investing P i n
Countries TOTAL A - f i n s  a l-firisb C - f i r M c
Britain 30 « It I
Japan 30 3 0 1J
Geriany 24 4 7 13
Prance 10 1 3 (
Canada t 3 3 2
Switzerland 7 2 3 2
Sweden ( 2 1 3
letherlands I 2 1 1
Italy 4 1 1 2
South Korea 3 3
Belgioi 2 1 1
Anstralia 1 1
Sooth Africa 1 1





135 20 44 S3
Soorce: lon-U.S, Haltiaatlooal Bnterprise Data Bank9
a. Saiple f i n s  with DPI In the U.S. >$l,000in.
b. Saiple H i m  with DPI In the U.S. between $300 and $l,000in.
c. Saiple Him wltb DPI In the U.S. <$300io.
Overall, the country pattern of the sample corresponds 
with the picture presented by the aggregate data in Chapter 
II (see Table 2-4 and Table 2-5). The leading investors are 
the British followed by the Japanese and the Germans. It 
should be recognized that while the Japanese tie the British 
for the greatest number, 63% of the Japanese sample firms 
were categorized as C-firms while only 10% have acquired 
A-firm status. One anomoly is the small number of firms 
(four) from the Netherlands, compared to the large aggregate
2 8 4
dollar value o£ their investments. This researcher believes 
that this can be explained (at least in part) by the large 
size o£ two entries, Philips and Akzo. If one adds Royal 
Dutch Shell, then it appears quite likely that the 
Netherland's share o£ DFI in the U.S. is accounted for by 
just a few extremely globally-minded firms.
Table 5-2 presents an industry breakdown of the sample 
firms according to the two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code. As in Table 5-1, the data are 
subdivided into large, mid-sized and small investors.
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Table 5-1; Industry Breakdown of Sainle F i r m .  liaed on Blxe of
D U  State la the U.S. by Investing T i n
SIC Industry TOTAL A-fixis B-flris C-flris
10 Metal 7 3 2 2
20 Pood i Kindred Pdts. 14 3 4 7
21 Tobacco 2 1 I 0
22 Textiles 3 0 1 2
23 Apparel t Other Pin. Pdts. 0 - - -
24 Luiber f Vood Pdts. 0 - - -
25 Poroiture I Fixtures 0 - - -
2( Paper t Allied Pdts. 3 0 3 0
27 Prntg./Pub. I Allied Indas. 0 - - -
21 Cheiicals (Except P h a u a . ) 17 7 6 4
-203 Pharnaceutlcals 4 2 2 0
30 Bubber t Misc. Plastic Pdts. 3 0 1 2
31 Leather t Leather Pdts. 0 - - -
33 Priiary Metal Industries - - - -
-331-2 Steel t Iron 19 1 3 15
-333-4 Siltg/lef. loa-Per. Htls. 4 1 1 2
-343-4 Building Materials 1 0 0 1
34 Fabricated Metal Pdts. 3 0 1 2
35 Machinery Except Electrical 13 1 S (
-357 Coiputers t Off. Hacb. 3 0 0 3
36 Electrical/Electronic Nach. 10 5 5 0
37 Transportation Egulpaent - - - -
-371 Mtr. Vehicles 0 Parts 14 3 8 3
-372/37S Aircraft ( Aerospace 2 0 0 2
-373 Shipbnllding 4 0 0 4
31 Hsrg./Analyz./ 0 Ctrl. Inst. 1 1 0 0
39 Misc. Manufacturing Indus. 0 - - -
Source: lou-U.S. Kultinational Enterprise Data Bank
2 8 6
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Table 5-2 conforms to the aggregate analysis presented 
in Chapter II, Table 2-8, with the exception of the primary 
metals industry (SIC-30). The sample firms showed the 
greatest representation in six broad categories:
£LL£ IfldilStEY__________________ * firms
33 Primary Metal Industries (24)
28 Chemicals & Drugs (21)
37 Transportation Equip. (20)
36 Electrical Machinery (18)
35 Non-Elec. Mach. & Computers (16)
20 Food & Kindred Products (14)
The apparently large representation of sample firms in the
primary metals classification is explained by the presence 
of 15 entries in the steel and iron industry (primarily 
specialty steels) that have relatively small commitments to 
manufacturing operations in the U.S. Thus, it is not
surprising that the aggregate data presented in Table 2-8
show the metals Industry accounting for only 4.1% of the
total direct investment in the United States in 1985. An
additional observation from Table 5-2 is that firms in the
chemical and drug industries tend to have the largest 
commitment to U.S. production (17 out of 21 possessed either 
an A-level or B-level status). Finally, it should be 
pointed out that only three sample companies in the 
automotive industry (Volvo, Toyota and Mitsubishi) have 
achieved A-firm status. This is likely to change since the 
sample includes eight automotive organizations that have 
catapaulted to B-firm status only in the past decade, four 
of whom made their first U.S. investment after 1978.
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Table 5-3 presents a breakdown of the methods used by 
the sample firms in their attempts to penetrate the U.S. 
market. The results confirm the expectation that
acquisitions would be the dominant method of entry.
Table 5-1: Type of Entry Psed for DPI la P.S. after 80rid far II.
Based op Site ef Investient Stale of S a m l e  U r n s
P i n  Acquisition lev Constriction Joint Teat w e  I ot 3 TYBC3 i l l  j T m s ____ TOTALS
A - f l n s  10 1 • 8 9 28
B-fIras 17 4 1 15 7 44
C - f l n s  1) 2 11 1( 5 il
TOTAL 47 7 12 18 21 135
Sontce: R01-U.S. Multinational Enterprise Data Bank
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It should be observed that, in listing any firm as using 
only the acquisition method, the researcher does not wish to 
imply that said firm has never entered into a joint-venture 
or constructed a new facility in the United States. Indeed, 
a number in the sample first entered the U.S. using the 
joint-venture approach for establishing a toe-hold. Most of 
these early partnerships were later dissolved or bought out 
by the foreign or U.S. parent. Also, some of the sample 
firms with large commitments have ongoing joint-ventures, 
but are classified under acquisitions only since the 
joint-ventures represent a miniscule portion of their total 
Investments in the United States.
Recognizing these deviations, the intent of the 
researcher was to catagorize the sample firms according to 
the dominant method used during their post-World War II 
period of penetration. For those who had no identifiable 
period of penetration, the time frame used was the period 
since their initial entry. If no single dominant method of 
penetration was discovered, the firm was classified as using 
either two of the three methods or all three methods 
simultaneously.
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A further observation that can be made from Table 5-3 
is that A-£irms showed the greatest tendency to use either 
acquisitions only or all three methods simultaneously, while 
B-firms tended to employ acquisitions only or two of the 
three methods. On the other hand, C-firms illustrated a 
much greater tendency (17.5%) to use only joint-venture 
arrangements. The logical explanation for this is that the 
C-firms are still in the early stages of their penetration 
strategy and have yet to reach a point where they can 
attempt to break new ground on their own. This conclusion 
is supported by Table 5-4 which shows a marked tendency for 
C-firms to be recent entrants into the United States 
economy.
Table 5-4: Tlnefraie of DFI Penetration of the U.S. since 1050 
Based on Slit of investient State of Sainle F i n s
E i U  P r e - W l I  Po.1950 H S O - 5 4  1355-50 H 6 0 - S 4  1 H 5 - H  im-74 1)75-7) H O O - O S
A-flr>s 
(penetration)
11 0 2 3 11 ( 3 3
B-firis 
(penetration)
11 2 2 2 J 17 14 4
C-firis
(entry)
11 IS 0 2 4 3 12 13 14
TOTAL 3f 2 2 10 IS 23 30 22
Soiree: (oi-U.S. Hiltinational Enterprise Data Bant
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Table 5-4 shows the temporal pace of the sample firms' 
penetration of the United States after the Second World War. 
For the C group, the timeframe was from their initial 
post-World War II entry until the present. Again, it should 
be stressed that designating an A-firm's period of 
penetration (for Instance) as 1963+ does not mean that It 
made no investments in the U.S. from 1950-1962. Instead, an 
attempt was made to identify the time period where the 
firm's investment activity appeared to illustrate a cohesive 
strategy for penetration. The date used to Identify the 
beginning of the period of penetration for such firms 
usually corresponded to the date of the first of a series of 
investment actions; or to a corporate restructuring of the 
U.S. operations by the foreign parent which frequently 
preceded an escalated commitment of investments in the 
United States.
While 36 of the 135 sample firms had direct investments 
prior to the Second World War, it was possible to ascertain 
the timeframe of their commitments since the War for all but 
15 C-firms. (Research of these 15 C-firms did not reveal 
the timing of their Investments, hence, they are listed as 
post-1950. It is possible that some of these firms made 
their investments prior to 1940, but, most likely, they were 
simply unreported in the sources searched. It is 
anticipated that ongoing research will be able to resolve 
this question.) After factoring out these 15 firms, the
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data revealed three overlapping waves of investment activity 
in the United States. A-£lrm penetration was concentrated 
during the period from 1965-1974, followed by the B-firms in 
the 1970s and increasingly by the C-firms in years from 
1970-1985. These results support the expectation that the 
timeframe of this movement of capital corresponds with the 
transition to a long wave of stagnation discussed in Chapter 
rv.
DISAGGREGATED RESULTS OF FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE 
Table 5-5 provides a detailed description of the 
largest 28 investors and their major affiliates in the 
United States.
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Table 5-5: The l a t e s t  21 Foreign F i n s  It the Sanple
Conpany late ( Major Intl. Post-War
U.S. i f f H l a t e s  lation Industrv-SIC_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Itfiy_ _ E t B L _ _ iitt_ _ Aca. I.C. J/T





Alcan CA tetal refining-alut. p r .1940 1 ) 0 4  A  I
-Alcan Alntinnn Inc.
Anglo-Aterican/DeBeers 5A lining/heavy industry p r .1)19 1 ) 0 4  A  I
-Oppenheiier Industries
-Consolidated Gold Fields: Axcon Corp., l e n o n t  Mining, Anerlcan Aggragates Corp.
-Charter Consolidated
-Ninorco: tnglehard Minerals i Chemicals, Inc., Inspiration Copper Co.,
Indson Bay Mining ( Smelting, Terra Chemicals Co.
BASF Gl chemicals 1)21 1)154 A I I I
-Dow Badlsche Chen. Corp.
-Inmont Corporation
BAT Industries II tobacco,paper products 1927 19(74 A  I
-Broun a Williamson 
-Saks Fifth Avenue 
-J. B. Ivey ( Co.
-Appleton Papers Inc.
-Marshall Field ( Co.
-Itasco Ltd: Peoples Drug Stores, Hardees Inc., Burger Chef, Inc.





Beechnt Group IB phari., food products 1907 19(74 A  X




Brok. Bill Prop.(IIP) AA ttl. ref., steel 1914 19144 A X
•Utah International Co.
-Monsanto Oil Co.
-Energy lesources Group, Inc.
2 9 3
Coapany lase ( Major
U.S. Affiliates latifll Indastrv-SIC
Intl. Post-Var
iBilX Size Am . i.e. J/g
BTB BR industrial equip l)10t 1)70* A I
-Buyck Corp 
-Danlop Tire A Rubber 
-torchester Controls Co.
-Si Delaware Inc.
-Thoaas Tilling ltd.: Clarkson Industries Inc., Ranteck Industries Inc., Ashland-larren Inc., 
Alpha-Hetals Inc., Superior Supply Co.
Can. Pacific Invest. Cl ilning-lead,zinc 1)20 1)70* 1 I
■Canadian Pacific Ltd(USA)
-Soo Line Corp.
-Doalnlon Bridge (1NCA): Desa Industries Inc., Syracuse China Co., larner t Swasey Inc.,
Aatel Inc., Bethelea Copper Corp., Giddings 1 Levis Inc.
Clba-Gelgy SV phariaceutlcals 1)03 l)f)* A l l
-Ciba-Geigy Corp,




Blectrolon SE electron/appliances p r .1)31 1)75* A  I
-Rational Onion Electric Inc.
-Tappan Co.
-Bhite Consolidated Indus. Inc.
General Electric (6EC) BR electron/appliances 13(0 l)fl* A I
-Glbarco Inc.
-Scriptonatic, Inc.
-A. B. Dick Co.
-Lear Siegler Astronics Corp.
-Ohite Industrial Power Inc.
-English Electric Corp.
Grand Metropolitan BR beverages 1371 1)10* A I
-Heublln Inc.
-ALPO Pet Poods Inc.
-Quality Care Inc.
-People Bealth Services Inc.
-Intercontinental Hotels Corp.
Hoechst GR cbeaicals 1353 1)00* A l l
-Aaerica Hoechst Corporation 
-Poster Grant Co., Inc.
-Celenese Corp.
2 9 4
Company late ( Hajor
U.S. Affiliates Ration Udastrv-ilC
Intl. Post-lar
M u  EfiAfj S iu  M i  i .e . J/T
ICI (taperlal Chea. lad) Bl chealcals 1950 19714 A I I I
-Atlas Cbeaicals Iadastries Inc.
-Fiber Industries Inc.
-tnbicon Cbeaicals Inc.
-Corpos Christ! Chealcals Co.
-ICI Aaerlcas Inc.: C-I-L Chealcals Inc, Beatrice Chealcals Division, Glldden Paint Co.
-Xatalco Corp.
L*Air Liqnide PI chea. ( gases 1961 19614 A  X X 1
-Liquid Air Inc.
-Big Three Industries Inc.






















-Hills Brothers Coffee Co.
•MJB Coffee Co.
loranda Nines CA ang-cppr, atl/vood pdts. 1964 19664 A X X I




Coapaay laie ( Major
U.S. Affiliates lation Indastry-SIC
Intl. Post-far 
M U  EfiDL Silt ttfc L L  ill
Philips IB electron/appliances
-North Aierlcan Philips Co., Inc.
-Nagnavor Co., Inc.




-lestinghonse Lanp Co. (Division)
-Sylvanla t Phllco T7 (Dlv. of GTB)
Schlniberger II neas. I sclent, equip
-Dovell Schlniberger Cbeiical Co.
-Sangaio Electric Co.





-Sieians Medical Systeis Inc. 
-Sieians Coiioalcation Systeis Inc. 
-Siecor Optical Cables Inc. 
-Sieians-Allls Co.







-Llpton Tea Co., Inc.
-National Starch I Cheiical Corp. 
-Good Inior Corp.
-Norton Food Prodncts Inc.






















Source: lon-U.S. Nnltinational Enterprise Data Bank
296
While Table 5-4 illustrated the different timeframes of 
penetration for A-firms# B-firms and C-firms respectfully, 
it would be a total misconception to conclude that the 
largest investors have been idle since they began their 
assault. Indeed, while most of the C-firms were just 
beginning their penetration of the U.S. in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, the A-firms had entered into a new phase in 
their penetration strategies marked by an escalation in the 
size of their acquisitions. In fact, as seen in Table 5-6, 
the A-firms made the largest acquisitions in the 1980s (just 
as they did in the 1970s).
297
Table 5-(: The largest Acquisitions in the D.S. by A - f i n s  is the Saiple, 1977-1987
Dollars invested (ansi Icailred Co. Parent Date
3,101 Cheesbrongh Ponds Inc. Unilever 19((





1,200 lenblin Inc. Grand Met. 19(7
1,000 l e n o n t  Mining(4JI) Aiglo/DeBeers 19(1-7
1,000 Innoit Corp. HASP 1915
1,000 Big Three Indnstries I'Air Ligiide 1986
0(7 Sedco Isc. Schlniberger 1904
896 1 1 m .  operations Atlantic Richfield Alcan 19(5
715 Utah International Co. BMP 19(4
785 Monsanto Oil Co. HIP 19(5
715 Beatrice Chenicals Division ICI 19(5
742 Ihlte Consolidated Indnstries Inc. Electolui 198S
(30 Energy Resoarces Groip BHP 19(4
(25 Stauffer Chenical Co. Akio 19(7
(00 Glidden Paint Co. ICI 19((
500(est.) Thonas Tilling Ltd (U.S.) BTR 19(3
4(2 Rational Starch Co. Unilever 1977
386 People Health Services Inc. Grand Net. 19(5
320 B a a n t o n  Oil Co. Volvo 19(2-4
320 Peoples Drug Stores BAT (fiasco) 1914
310 Giddings t Levis Co. Canadiai Pacific (AMCA) 1912
300+ lorcliff Thayer B e e c h m 19(5
300(est.) Clart Michigan Corp. Volvo 19(5
200 Appleton Papers Inc. BAT 1970
250(est.) Sylvania 1 Philco TV (Dlv. GTS) Philips 19(0
250 lestlngbonse Laap Co. (Division) philips 19(3
25((est.) Tel Plus Cosaunicatlons Inc. Sieians 19(4-7
226 Spectra Physics Inc. Sieians 19(5-7
222 Applicon Inc. Schlniberger 19(2
220 Miles Laboratories Inc. Bayer 1977
Source: lon-U.S. Multinational enterprise Data Bait
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It should be noted that four A-firms (Mitsubishi, 
Mitsui, Toyota, and Noranda) have not made acquisitions of 
this magnitude in the last decade. For Mitsubishi and 
Mitsui, their attainment of the A-flrm status has been 
through numerous joint ventures and new constructions. 
Toyota achieved that status through two investments: its
joint venture with GM to produce Novas in California and its 
(still under construction) $800 mn. Camry plant in Kentucky. 
Meanwhile, Noranda spent $490 mn. expanding and adding new 
plants to its aluminum rolling and extruding complex in New 
Madrid Missouri.
Table 5-7 gives a detailed breakdown of the B-firms in 
the sample. Affiliates of these firms have been omitted due 
space limitations.
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Table 5-7: The 44 Mid-size Firns !■ the Sanple
Conpany lane a litl. Fost-Var
Major U.S. Afflts. .... Nation Indnstrv-SIC Intrv Pene. S i z e _ Acq. B.C.
Ahtiebolaget SIF SB industrlallfari equip. 1916 1957-(5 B I I
hilled Breweries BR beverages 19(9 1972* B I
Alusulsse SV ■etal refinery-alna. 194 V 1971t 1 I I
Assoc. British Foods II food prodncts 1939 1979» B I
BICC Bl industrial eqnipaent 1953 1971+ 1 I
Bell Canada Interprise Ch electron/appliances po.1956 1973+ B X I
BOC Group BR chenlcals,gases 19(7 1973+ B X I
Bosch Gl electron., appliance 190( 19(5 B X I
Bouater Paper BR paper products 1952 1952+ B X I
Cadbury Schweppes BR food prdts., bever. 1959 1973-47 B X X
Conrtaolds BR textiles 1910 19(3+ 1 X I
DSN K chens., fertilizers 19(4 19(4+ B I I
Flat IT notor vehicles p r .1914 1973+ B I
Filch Group GR paper pdts/vood pdts. 1975 1975-15 B I
Guest, teen 4 lettlefolds BR ■otor vehicle prts. p o . 1950 1970+ B I I
Hauler Siddeley Group BR Indus.equip. 19(1 1073+ B X
Henke] GR chenlcals 19(0 1973+ B I
Hoesch Gl iron, steel I coal p o .1953 1975+ B I
Hoffian-LaRoncbe SV pharnaceutlcals 1921 19((+ B X I
Honda Motors JP notor vehicles 1979 1979+ B I
Iiperial Group BR tobacco,foods pr.1914 1979+ B I
Inco CA nlninq-oickel, batteries 1921 1974+ B I
Is q z o  Motors JP notor vehicles 1970 1970+ B
IHD Gl Indus, farn equip. po.1950 1979+ B X I
Lucas Industries BR notor vehicle parts p o . 1950 1977+ B X
Massey Ferguson CA Indus, a farn equip. 1910 1941-65 B I
Matsushita Elec. Ind. JP electron/appliances 1959 1959+ 0 I I
Mazda Motors JP notor vehicles 1905 1915+ B X
Micbelin FR tires, rubber 1973 1973+ B I
Nippon Electric (NIC) JP electron/appliances 1973 1971+ B I X
Nippon lokan JP ntl. ref. steel 1904 1914+ B I
Nissan Motor JP notor vehicles 1976 1911+ B I
Heed Int'l BR paper/wood products 19(4 1973+ B X I
Renault FR notor vehicles 1979 1979+ B X
Rhone-Poolenc FR chenlcals po.1950 1971+ B I
Rlo-Tinto-Iinc II nnq-alun, cpr, iron 19(4 19(0+ B I
Sandoz SV pharnaceutlcals 1919 1974+ 8 I X
Solway BB chenlcals 1111 1974+ B I I
Suiltono Group JP chenlcals,netals 19(3 1910+ B I
Tate a Lyle BI food products 19(5 1915+ B I
Thorn llectrleal Inds. BR electron/appliances po.1950 1970+ B I
Thyssen Gl ntl. rf-steel, nach. po.1950 1971+ B X X
Tube Invsts. BR netal products po.1950 1977+ B X X
Volksvagenverk Gl ■otor vehicles 1976 197(+ B X
Source: Ion U.S. Haltliatiooal Rnterprise Data Bank
3 0 0
The investments by the B-£irms in the last decade {or
since they first entered into production in the U.S.) have 
been proportionately smaller than those made by the A-firms. 
While this (generally) applies to all forms of entry, Table 
5-8 illustrates the case for acquisitions. It should be 
pointed out that while Table 5-6 included some estimates of 
dollar magnitude, Table 5-8 presents only the acquisitions 
which had a reported dollar value. (Though, of course, 
depending on the source, there were frequently two or three 
reported values to choose from.) It is, consequently, quite 
likely that further research will produce significant 
changes in Table 5-8.
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Table 5-0: The Largest Acquisitions In the U.S. by B-firas In tke Saaple, 1)77-1)17
Dollars Invested (ansi A m i i s f l  CO._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Emit_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ M l
575 Agrl. Chea. Dlv. Union Carbide Rhone Ponlenc l)l(
572 AMC(((.(t) Renanlt 1)10-7
2)2 latloial Steel Corp(SOt) lippon lokan l)l(
210 londallle Indnstries Inc. TI Group 1)17
250 Technical Publishing Co. Reed Int'l l)l(
231 Indd Co. Thyssen 1)71
22( Reihaa Corp. lovater 1)17
200* Agri. Dlv. of Telslcol Chea. Co. Sandoz l)l(
1)0 Master Bollders Inc. Sandoz 1)15
I K Dayton Valther Corp Massey Pergnson l)l(
171 Data 100 Corp. Bell (lorthern Tele.) 1)71
1(5 General Mills Cheaical Inc. leakel 1)77
1(3 Bio Medical leference Labs lie. Boffaaa-LaRooche 1)02
I K inndy Corp. TI Group 1)07
1(0 Canada Dry Corp. (U.S. operations) Cadbury Schweppes i)l(
1(0 Porter Paint Co. Coortaulds 1)07
115 Mack Tracks(201) Renanlt 1)7)
107 Allis Cbalaers (fara equip./credit) KID 1)05
110 Pasco Indnstries Inc. Ranker-Siddely 1)10
3) R. B. lovaker Reed Int'l 1)05
)3 Martin Processing Co. Conrtanlds 1)07
)( Ex-Lax Pharaacentical Co. Sandoz 1)01
)0 festinghoose Irake A Signal Co. lavker-Siddely 137)
15 Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. Rio Tinto line 1)15
77 Sycor Inc Bell (lorthern Tele.) 1370
71 Sealectro Inc. BICC 1)01
71 Mostek Corp. Thoason 1)05
(5 Great Western Sngar Corp. Tate A Lyle 1)05
Source: Ion U.S. Maltinatlonal Interprise Data lank
3 0 2
Table 5-8 shows that the B-flrms were also very active 
in the last decade, though on a smaller scale. However, 
the two largest acquisitions need explanation. 
Rhone-Poulenc's $575 mn. purchase of the agricultural 
chemicals division of Union Carbide Included all plants 
worldwide, except Carbide's plant in Bhopal. Further 
research is underway to determine the share of these assets 
that are in the U.S. It is anticipated that this purchase, 
which made Rhone Poulenc the world's third largest 
agricultural chemicals manufacturer, will shift it into the 
C-firm category.
Renault's B-firm status is explained by the fact that 
only two investments (both listed in Table 5-8) account for 
the bulk of its presence in the U.S. Having entered the 
U.S. only recently, it seems most plausible that Renault is 
still in the initial stages of its planned penetration
strategy. The analysis presented in this chapter would
predict that it is quite likely that Renault will either 
aquire control (100%, or at least a majority) of their U.S. 
investments, or abandon them to strike out on its own. In 
Renault's case one anticipates the former to be most
probable.
SETBACKS ON THE_EENETRATIQN__TRAI-L
The competitive nature of the movement of capital 
through DFI is seen most clearly in the setbacks and defeats 
suffered by some of the firms in the sample population. The
3 0 3
Wall street Journalr in a 1984 article, claimed that there 
are £our main reasons why foreign firms fail or experience 
difficulty in their U.S. investments.^ These reasons 
include: (1) the failure to develop a cohesive strategy for 
penetration, often acquiring a series of unrelated 
companies, or simply extending domestic methods to the 
United States; (2) the failure to understand and adapt to 
the U.S. market; (3) the failure to adequately finance the 
investment strategy resulting in an inability to withstand a 
downturn; and (4) the failure to extablish strong management 
links between the subsidiary and the parent. While no
A-firms have lost the war, two of the firms have experienced 
severe setbacks in their attempts to expand their U.S. 
production base. Both cases were related to what could be
seen as a fifth reason for an investments failure, namely;
(5) the unsuccessful attempts to diversify (branch out into 
new business) the firm's asset base by expanding into new
areas in the U.S.
In 1973, BAT acquired Gimbels Department Stores for 
$205 mn. in an effort to diversify from tobacco. BAT was 
committed to this strategy of expanding into retail, 
following up its original purchase with the acquisition of 
Marshal Field in 1982, Fredrick Nelson in 1982, and J.B.
Ivey & Co. in 1983. The purchase of Gimbels, however, never 
lived up to expectations despite an additional Investment of 
more than $100 mn. over the next twelve years. Finally in
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1986, Gimbels was sold to Allied Department Stores (now 
controlled by a Canadian investor, Robert Campeau, who also 
recently acquired Federated Department Stores) for 
approximately $200 mn. In the sale, BAT kept Saks Fifth Ave 
Co. (part of Gimbels), embarking on a $300 mn. five year 
expansion program in 1987.
Schlumberger acquired 100% of the fourth largest 
semiconductor company in the U.S., Fairchild Camera & 
Instrument Corporation, In 1979 for $425 mn. This marked an 
attempt to diversify (from oil industry machinery and 
instruments) into the semiconductor business. Eight years 
later, in 1987, Fairchild was sold to the National 
Semiconductor Corp. for $122 mn. While surely the retention 
of the original U.S. management may have led to inadequate 
links between the subsidiary and the parent, it seems more 
likely that Schlumberger1s lack of experience in the highly 
competitive semiconductor field was responsible for this 
disaster. Unlike BAT, Schlumberger seems to have decided to 
abandon the failed diversification. During the 1980s, 
Schlumberger made a series of acquisitions (highlighted by 
the $967 mn. spent for the off-shore drilling equipment 
manufacturer, Sedco. Inc., in 1984) that signalled a renewed 
commitment to its traditional business of oil service 
equipment, and scientific/measuring instruments and 
machinery.
These results emphasize an important conclusion of this
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research. Most of the sample firms who have reached the 
stage of establishing a significant U.S. presence, have used 
the strength of their experience in their traditional lines 
of production in their domestic economy. The firms like BAT 
and Schlumberger who have experimented with new activities 
in the U.S. remain the exception, and for good reason. In a 
competitive foreign environment it is tough enough to 
succeed in areas that the firm knows something about. 
Foreign firms may come to the U.S. to learn (see Chapter 
III), but these investments in new knowledge, or new fields 
of business tend to be small and often in the form of joint 
ventures. When, however, the strategy for penetration is 
hatched; the size of the commitment grows, a tendency to 
avoid joint ventures and assume 100% control develops, and 
the penetration itself is usually focused on the acquisition 
of U.S. firms (or the construction of new facilities by 
existing 100% controlled subsidiaries) which produce goods 
Included in, or compatible with, the parent firm's existing 
product lines.
Three B-firms provide further evidence of the 
difficulty in achieving successful diversification through 
U.S. investments. In 1979, the Imperial Group (tobacco) 
acquired the Howard Johnson Co. for $630 mn. Six years 
later the company was sold for $300 mn. While Imperial 
retained Howard Johnson's Ground Round Restaurants 
subsidiary, the transactions resulted in a $182 mn. writeoff
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by Imperial in 1985. In 1974, Inco (metal mining) attempted 
to diversify into the field of battery manufacturing with 
its 100% acquisition of ESB Corp. for $234 mn. After 
subsequent investment, ESB was divided into two companies, 
Exide Inc. and Rayovac Inc. in 1978. But, despite all 
efforts, the venture remained an albatross. Finally in 
1982, all battery operations were sold off or discontinued, 
resulting in a $292 m n . writeoff. In 1978, Northern 
Telecom, a telephone switching equipment subsidiary of Bell
Canada, attempted to diversify into the computer and data
processing fields with its acquisitions of Sycor Inc. and
Data 100 Corp. for a combined total investment of $249 mn.
The venture then proceeded to wrack-up $220 mn. in losses 
over the next two years. Then in 1981, Northern Telecom 
reorganized its entire U.S. operations, collapsing these 
ventures into Northern Telecom Inc. While its activity 
since then has been minimal, it appears that Northern
Telecom intends to stick to the telephone switching business 
for the present.
In addition to these three examples, other B-flrms have 
experienced troubles of a different nature. Having begun 
U.S. production in Pennsylvania in 1976, Volkswagon
purchased an unused Chrysler plant in Michigan in 1980.
But, production, which was scheduled to commence in 1982,
was indefinately postponed due to the sluggish demand for VW 
products. At this writing Volkswagon remains dead in the
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water, with its penetration strategy on hold. A company in 
a similar situation is Massey-Ferguson who has been present 
in the U.S. since its 1910 acquisition of the Johnson 
Harvestor Co. of Batavia, New York. After nearly a decade 
of large losses, credit extensions and equity dilutions, 
Massey's tractor and farm equipment business in the U.S. is 
on the verge of extinction (having closed or sold five 
plants from 1979 to 1982). Massey's acquisition of the 
Dayton Walther Corp. in 1986 corresponds with a corporate 
restructuring and name change to Varity Corp. in the same 
year. These events may signal a renewed commitment to U.S. 
production in the future, but, at this point, Massey is just 
struggling to survive.
Another B-firm that has failed in its attempt to 
penetrate the U.S. is the Flick Group which, as the result 
of a domestic political scandal in Germany, liquidated its 
industrial holdings (creating another sample firm, 
Feldmule-Dynamit Nobel). Included in the breakup of this 
industrial empire was the sale of Flick's 26% holding of W. 
R. Grace Co., to the latter company for $595 mn. in 1985. 
Moreover, Bowater, sold off most of its U.S. pulp and paper 
operations (first established in 1952) in 1984 and now 
appears to be launching a new assault with its $226 mn 
purchase of Rexham Corp. in 1987.
Two additional B-firms may have fallen victim to the 
problems of too rapid expansion and not enough capital to
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fend off the acquisition of the parent firm. This 
apparently holds true for J. Lyons who, after ten years of 
U.S. acquisitions of an A-firm status, was Itself acquired 
by Allied Breweries for $166 mn. in 1981. Meanwhile, 
Cadbury Schweppes, after acquiring Peter Paul Inc., 
Duffy-Mott Co., Canada Dry's U.S. operations, Sunkist Soft 
Drinks Inc. and the Dr. Pepper Co. (1978 to 1986), was 
itself acquired by the U.S. food producer, Hershey Inc., in 
1988.
In the C-firm category, two experienced general
financial hardship during the 1980s. AEG Telelunken was 
divided and sold. In 1983 it (consumer electonic products) 
was sold to Thomson and in 1985 AEG (machine tools) was 
acquired by Daimler Benz. During the same time, Dunlop, 
under the threat of bankruptcy and creditor demands for debt 
restructuring and corporate reorganization, sold its British 
and European tire operations to Sumitomo in 1984 and its 
U.S. subsidiary to BTR in 1985. While Dunlop's reduction to
C-firm status is reflected in the data presented, AEG
Telefunken has yet to be removed from the updated sample 
population (even though the value of its few U.S. operations 
were transferred to Thomson and Daimler Benz, respectfully).
Another company that undertook a substantial reduction 
in its U.S. position during the 1980s was Pechiney who sold 
Howmet Corp. (acquired 1962) and other parts of its U.S. 
aluminum business in 1983 for $200 mn. At the time of the
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divestiture the chairman o£ Pechiney blamed the high energy 
costs o£ the operations sold/ proclaiming: "Wherever
electrical current is too costly we will leave."I2 The 
proceeds from the sale were reinvested in a 50% stake of a 
new $1.2 bn. Aluminum Smelting Complex (25% Alumax and 25% 
the government of Quebec) built in Quebec, Canada in 1985.
The results for Creusot-Loire (C-L), the French steel 
subsidiary of Schneider, were more costly. C-L's inability 
to secure further financing of debts from the French 
government (a part owner of C-L) or its creditors, led to 
being broken up and sold off piecemeal. Its domestic 
financial difficulties were transferred to its U.S. 
operations as well. In 1977, Alan Wood Steel Inc. (acquired 
1974) was liquidated; in 1979, Yale Steel (acquired 1976) 
was sold; in 1983, Ag-Met Inc. (aquired 1976) was sold ; and 
in 1985 C-L received virtually nothing for its $100 mn. 56% 
interest in Phoenix Steel (acquired 1976) when the latter 
was reorganized under bankruptcy in 1985.
Two other C-firms were forced to withdraw from 
investments made after the Second World War. Saint Gobaln, 
one of the early post-World War II entrants, withdrew from
its 51% joint venture to produce plate glass in Tennessee,
after twelve years of losses, in 1970. Even though 
investing more than $100 mn. over that time, Saint Gobaln 
sold its share of American Saint Gobain Corp. for $2.3 mn.
And, finally, Saab-Scania withdrew from its joint venture
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(established 1980) with Fairchild Industries Inc. in 1985 
when the Federal Aviation Authority ordered the 
Saab-Fairchild 340 propeller planes removed from service due 
to engine failure under icing conditions. The retreat left 
Saab-Scania with an estimated writeoff in 1985 exceding $100 
m n .
CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to reveal the competitive 
nature and wave-like pattern of DFI in the United States. 
The results support the position taken by Ernest Mandel (see 
Chapter I ) who has stated that
As the forces of production out-grow the 
national state, they likewise gradually 
out-grow the State's role in controlling the 
industrial cycle and promoting economic 
upswing and growth. The more the monopolies 
think they have withdrawn from the law of 
value nationally, the more they become subject 
to it Internationally.
It is not "the monopolies" themselves that believe they have
withdrawn from the pressures of competition and the
operation of the law of value. It is only the monopoly
capital theorists who (in their recoil from the folly of the
neoclassical views of the firm, competition and value
formation) have created a theoretical structure divorced
from the real-world capitalist social structure of
accumulation in the late twentieth century. The results of
this misconception will be explored in Chapter VI.
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CHAPTER NOTES
1. Paul R. Sullivan, "Strategies for Playing the Global 
Game", New York Times. June 26, 1988, p. 3.
2. Lawrence Ingrassia and Mark M. Nelson, "Unilever-Despite 
Failed Bid for Vicks-Shows Signs That the Giant Is 
Awakening", The Wall Street Journal. October 10, 1985, p.37. 
The authors were certainly correct. Undaunted by this 
setback, Unilever successfully acquired cheesbrough Ponds 
for $3.1 bn. in 1986
3. Editors, "Why foreign companies are betting on the 
U.S.", Business Week. April 12, 1976, pp. 50-51.
4. L. G. Franko, The European Multinationals^ A Renewed
Challenge to American and__Brltlsh Big Business, Greylock,
Stamford, CT., 1976, p.182.
5. See Appendix C for oil companies excluded from analysis 
which otherwise meet the sample criteria.
6. 1985 was used instead of 1986 for two reasons: 1. This
corresponds with macroeconomic data presented in Chapter II;
2. It was the original intention of this researcher to 
conclude this study with 1985. However, data for 1986 (and 
some 1987) have been included for the sample population. 
Further updating for 1987 is planned.
7. The changes to the original sample firms (Appendix A) 
are listed below:
a. One German firm, Opel, was found to be a subsidiary of 
General Motors and was dropped from the sample.
b. Three Japanese firms (Sumitomo Chemicals, Sumitomo 
Electric and Sumitomo Metal) in the original sample are 
listed under the Sumitomo Group in the updated sample. The 
new effect was a loss of two entries from the sample list.
c. Two Japanese firms (Toray and Toshiba) in the original 
sample are listed under the Mitsui Group (not in original 
sample) in the updated sample. The net effect was a loss of 
one from the sample list.
d. Three Japanese firms (Mitsubishi Chemicals, 
Mltsuiblshi Electric and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries) in the 
original sample are listed under the Mitsubishi Group in the 
updated sample. The net effect was a loss of two from the 
sample list.
e. Two Italian firms (FINSIDER and ITALSIDER) in the 
original sample were found to be subsidiaries of another 
firm in the original sample, IRI. In the updated sample 
these two firms are incorporated under IRI resulting in a 
net loss of two from the original population.
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£. One British firm (George Weston) was found to be a 
subsidiary of Associated British Foods, another firm in the 
original sample. In the updated sample, George Weston was 
consolidated under Associated British Foods leading to the 
net loss of one firm from the sample group.
g. Four firms in the original sample were acquired by 
other firms in the sample during the period from 1966-1986. 
These were:
1. Associated Electrical Industries (acquired by 
GEC in 1967).
2. English Electric (acquired by GEC in 1968).
3. MacMillan-Bloedel (acquired by Noranda in 1981).
4. Brooke, Bond Liebig (acquired by Unilever in 
1984 ) .
In the updated sample these acquisitions were consolidated 
under the parent firm resulting in a net loss of four firms 
from the sample listing.
h. Three firms in the original sample merged with three 
other firms in the sample during the period from 1965-1986.
1. In 1978, Allied Breweries merged with J. Lyons 
creating Allied Lyons.
2. In 1979, EMI merged creating Thorn-EMI.
3. In 1986, USINOR merged with SACILOR creating 
USINOR/SACILOR.
In all three cases, the updated sample lists the merged 
companies under the new name resulting in a net loss of 
three from the original sample list.
1. In 1971, two Japanese firms (Fuji Iron & Steel and 
Yawata Iron & Steel) in the original sample were merged 
creating Nippon Steel, another company in the original 
sample. The activities of these two were consolidated under 
Nippon Steel resulting in a net loss of two from the 
original sample listing.
j. Two Japanese firms in the original sample changed 
their names during the period from 1965 to 1986. In both 
cases, the new and the old name were in the original sample. 
The activities of the two firms were consolidated under 
their new names creating a net loss of two from the original 
sample.
In addition to these ten changes which reduced the size of 
the sample, there were also four changes which altered the 
composition, but not the size, of the sample. These were:
1. Northern Telcom was found to be a subsidiary (52%) 
of Bell Canada Enterprises which was not in the 
original sample listing. In the updated 
sample, Northern Telecom is listed under Bell.
2. DeBeers, which is a subsidiary of Anglo-American 
(not in the original sample) is listed under
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Anglo-American/DeBeers in the updated sample.
3, In 1979, Dalgety PLC {not in original sample) 
acquired Spillars Ltd. In the updated sample, 
Splllers is consolidated under Dalgety.
4. In 1985, BTR PLC (in the original sample) acquired 
Dunlop Tire and Rubber Co. (U.S.), a subsidiary of 
Dunlop PLC. Since Dunlop (U.K.) still exists, 
both companies remained in the sample
8. The twelve firms excluded from the updated sample 
because of no U.S. presence are listed below:
a . Barlow Rand SA food products
b. British Leyland BR motor vehicles
c . Charbonnages de France FR mining-coal
d. CSR AA food products
e . Hibernia GR coal, chemicals
f . Hindustan Steel IA iron & steel
g- Kawasaki Steel JP met. ref., steel
h. Kobe Steel JP met. ref., steel
i. National Coal Board BR mining-coal
j . Peugot-Citroen FR motor vehicles
k . Ruhr Kole GR mining-coal
1. Snow Brand Milk Pdts. JP food & beverages
Should continuing research discover investments by any of 
these firms, they will be added to the sample later.
9. There are numerous sources of the information provided 
in this chapter. A partial listing would include:
a. Corporate Annual Reports of Sample Firms
b. The Wall Street Journal. 1958-87, various articles.
c. The New York Times. 1900-1987, various articles.
d. Book on non-U.S. multinationals, See Chapter III.
e. Articles on non-U.S. multinationals, See Chapter III.
f. Arpan and Ricks, Directory of Foreign Manufacturers 
in the U.S.. 1979 and 2nd Edition, 1985.
g. Moody's Industrial Manual, 1934-1979.
h. Dept, of Commerce, nine volume Study of Foreign 
Investment in the U.S. (1976).
i. Moody's International Manual, 1980-1987.
j. Various Business and Industry Journals and Magazines.
When I began thi3 project I had (naively) hoped to make use 
of Harvard's Multinational Enterprise Databank (see Chapter 
III) since they had begun to accumulate much of this 
information in the early 1970s under Raymond Vernon and H. 
G. Wells. Unfortunately, Harvard has chosen to view their 
information in a proprietary light, refusing to release any
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company specific information. As my initial investigtions 
commenced I began to realize the difficulty of the task due
to (1) the large size of the universe; (2) the time
limitations on the research efforts;and (3) the lack of 
reported data.
Reducing the sample size to 135 reduced the first problem 
significantly, but it also raises the distinct possibility 
that the sample is not a perfect representation of the 
universe, i.e., sample bias. It is hoped that post-doctoral 
research can reduce this possibility by expanding the sample 
size. As a starting point, a second data file has been
created which Includes the 26 firms listed in Appendix B and 
all companies from Fortune *s largest 200 list in any one 
year.
The second problem was alleviated by the extensions
graciously awarded by the Graduate School as well as the 
perseverence of my dissertation advisor in helping me
acquire them.
The last problem is the most difficult. The lack of 
reporting requirements by the Federal Government means that 
the researcher is dependent upon the private media and its 
own research efforts that get published. The difficulties 
this creates is evidenced by the publication of numerous 
conflicting reports in the sources consulted, as well as 
informational gaps in the reported activity. State-wide
studies have filled some of the gap, but it remains a fact 
that much of the DFI activity goes unreported. This is 
especially true if the foreign investing firm tries to
"hide" its presence through holding companies, dummy 
cororations, etc., as well as for smaller firms who operate 
further from the limelight. This lack of data also concerns 
some U.S. Senators who have debated (in committee during the 
summer of 1988) the need to establish reporting requirements 
for foreign investors in the U.S.
In order to provide the information included in thl3
Chapter, every effort was made (through public sources) to 
establish the timeframe of penetration, the size of the 
commitment, the location of the investments, the type of 
production undertaken, the form of the investment, the
percentage of parent ownership and the withdrawal from the
investment (where applicable). Where necesssary, careful 
estimates (primarily of the dollar size of the smaller 
investment) were made by comparing similar investments of
known value. Finally, while the researcher has attempted to 
accurately portray the commitment to U.S. production by the 
sample firms, it must be recognized that this is an ongoing 
research effort, and hence, the results should be viewed as 
preliminary.
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10. "How Foreigners Botch Their U.S. Investments", The Wa 11 
Street Journal. June 6 # 1984, p. 36.
11. The sample needs to be adjusted (as it will be) to 
reflect Flick's new non-investor status, yet this change 
(and some of the others discussed in this section) has not 
been made. This comment serves only to stress the 
evolutionary nature of this research project.
12. "Pechlney sells Howmet", The New York Times. March 19, 
1984, p. D8.
13. Ernest Mandel, Late Capital ism, 1978, Verso, London, p. 
560 .
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APPEIDIX A: THE ORIGINAL SAMPLE OF POREIGI FIRMS 









Asahi Chei. Industries JP 
ASEA SE
Assoc. British Foods BR















Brok. Hill Prop.(BHP) AA





Can. Pacific Invest. CA
CGE (Cie Gen.d'Elec) FR

































■tl. ref., steel 



























































gowny Im_ _ _ _ _ M i n _ _ _ IMjiain_ _ _ _ _ _ _ g-i»s r - » 7 6  B - m s
Degussa GR chealcals 13k 13S 131
Denaln Mord-Bst Longvy FR steel - 47 -
Distillers BR alco. bev./chealcals 73 232 408
DSH HE cheas., fertilizers 174 (1 57
Dunlop Pirelli Union B/I robber pdts, tables 53/3t 4( -
Electrolux SE electron/appliances - 132 108
EN! BR elect., appli., records 1(9 170 -
English Electric BR elec. equipaent (3 P -
Ericsson(LN) Teleph. SE electrncs., appliance 131 134 132
ESTEL HE aetal. ref., steel - (0 -
Feldauhle-Dynaart Nobel GR paper prdts/chealcals 119 . 155
Fiat IT aotor vehicles 12 3S 22
FIISIOER IT iron and steel 21 - -
Pi let Croup GR paper pdts/wood pdts. - 78 155
Foji Iron i Steel JP iron and steel 31 - -
Fujitsu JP office equip/coaputers - 242 (8
Furukava Electric JP aetal pdts. 1(1 201 196
General Electric BR electron/appliances 99 5( 64
George Veston Hldgs. BR food prdts. - 79 39
Grand Netropolitan BR beverages - - 76
Guest, Keen t Nttfolds BR aotor vehicle prts. 33 11 177
Gutehofinungshutte GR Indus, equip 29 13 113
Hanker Siddeley Group BR indos.equip 31 131 242
Henkel GR chealcals - 110 163
Hibernia GR coal, chealcals 94 - -
Hindustan Steel IA iron and steel 120 (229) 1178)
Hitachi JP electron/appliances IB 24 8
Hitachi Zosen JP shpbldg, Indus, equip. 1(5 190 255
Hoechst GR chealcals 15 9 21
Hoesch GR iron, steel t coal 34 - 191
Hoffaan-LaRouche SV pharaaceuticals (4 107 -
Honda Motors JP aotor vehicles 143 90 41
Hyundai SK sbpbldg., aotor veh's. - 271 25
Iaperial Chet. Ind (ICI) BR chealcals 5 21 27
Iaperial Group BR tobacco (7 (7 148
Inco CA alning-nickel, batteries 71 109 338
IEI IT iron, steel - - 3
Ishikauajlaa-Hariaa JP shpbldg, trans.equip 9( 104 129
Isuzu Motors JP aotor vehicles 136 154 109
Italsider IT atl, ref.-steel - 12 -
Kanebo JP textiles 121 131 231
Kawasaki Hvy Ind. JP shpbldg/transport - 111 149
Kawasaki Steel JP atl. ref., steel 100 (4 98
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Coioanv laie M M Indaotiy R-1966 B-1976 R-1915
KBD G! indos.Earn equip. 132 155
Kirin Brewery JP beverageses 187 191
Klockner-Verke GR ■tl. ref. steel 111 193
Kobe Steel JP ■tl. ref. steel 61 57
Koiatsu JP Indus, equip. - 169
KruppfFried.) GR ■tl. ref., steel 21 54
Kubota JP Indus tfara equip. 186 146
L 1 Air Ligaide FR chea. i gases 142 179
Lucas Industries BR ■otor vehicle parts 93 161
Lyons BR food products 170 164
MacMillan Bloedel CA paper t wood prdts. no ISO
Mannesaann GR ■etal infctg. 32 36
Massey Ferguson CA Indus. 1 fara equip 50 10
Matsushita Elec. Ind. JP electron/appliances 37 31
Mazda Motors JP ■otor vehicles - -
Hetallqesellschaft GR ■tl. ref. nonferrous 41 91
Michel Id FR tires, rubber 71 63
Mitsubishi Che>. Ind. JP chealcals/aluainna 149 51
Mitsubishi Electric JP elctron/appllances 85 97
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. JP indos. equip/itr. veh. 19 27
Montedison IT checaials 8 29
Mational Coal Board BR ■ining-coal 6 44
Eestle SV food pdts. 10 19
Rippon Electric [EEC] JP electron/appliances 145 116
Nippon Kokan JP ■tl. ref. steel 52 53
lippon Steel JP ■tl. ref. steel - 15
Missan Motor JP ■otor vehicles 42 26
Roranda Hines CA ■ng-cpr, atl/wood pdts. 167 183
Rorthern Telcoi CA electron/appliances 139 199
Olivetti IT office equlp(coaputers) 97 167
Opel (Adai) GR ■otor vehicles - *
Pechiney Ugine Kuhlian FR ■tl ref-alua.,cpr, steel 59/56 37
Peugeot-Citroen FR ■otor vehicles 46/39 22
Philips HE electron/appliances 7 5
Ranks Jovis HcDougal BR food podcts 54 130
Reed Int'l BR paper/wood products 74 91
Renault FR ■otor vehicles 16 8
Rheinsche Stahlverke GR iron/steel/aach.eng.coal 30 341
Rhone-Poulenc FR chealcals 26 39
Rio-Tinto-Iinc BR ■ng-alua, cpr, iron 125 72
Ruhr Kohle GR ■inlng-coal - 34
Saab-Scania SE ■otor vehicles 199/189 100
Saarbergverke GR ■ng.-coal/rbr prdts - 152












































Coapany laic latlQB Tndnatty l rl 9( ( _R - 19 7(  R-1915
Saint Gobaln FR bldg. atls. (2 28 54
Salzgitter GR atl. ref.-steel, shipbld. 44 85 1(8
Saasung SE elec. appliances - - 23
Sandoz SV phariaceuticals 157 137 144
Sanyo Electric JP electron/appliances 141 122 73
Schluaberger IA aeas. ( sclent, equip 141 123 75
Schneider FR Indus, equp, steel 47 71 -
Sieians GR electron/appliance J 18 14
Snov Brand Milk Prdts JP food products 175 195 151
Solvay BE cheaicls IE 9( 134
Sony JP electron/appliances - 153 80
Spillers BR food products 147 200 P
Statsforetag Group SE ang-lron, paper prdts. - 99 -
Steel Co. of Canada CA atl. ref.-steel 109 1(5 -
Sulzer Brothers SV Indus, equip. 1(3 1(0 267
Suiitoao Chen. JP cheaicals 1(4 lot 119
Suaitoao Elec. Inds. JP aetal products 191 197 179
Suiitoio Metal Ind. JP aetal ref.-steel 70 49 89
Talyo Fisheries JP food products (7 73 104
Tate t Lyle BR food products 95 (( 247
Thoason-Brandt BR electron/appliances 9( 59 (1
ThornEelectiical Inds. BR electron/appliances - 12( 124
Thyssen GR atl. ref-steel, aachinery 11 17 37
Tok.Sbib.Elec(Toshiba) JP electron/appliances 45 40 31
Toray Industries JP cheaicals/synth.fiber - 156 157
Toya Kagyo JP aotor vehicles 138 105 -
Toya-Eayon JP syn fibers/plastic 18 - -
Toyobo JP textiles 115 1(3 238
Toyota Motor JP aotor vehicles 40 18 4
Tube Invsts. BR aetal products 77 144 -
Ube Industries JP cheaicals, ceaent 1(8 182 207
Uoigate BR food products (7 140 200
Unilever M/B food pdts, detergents 2 1 (
US IBOR FR iron and steel 76 • -
VOEST-Alplne AU atl. ref.-steel 196 92 29
Volksvagenverk GR aotor vehicles 4 13 15
Volvo SE aotor vehicles 83 58 42
Tavata Iron f Steel JP iron and steel 24 - -





















SA - South Africa
SB - Sweden





ILC- No longer classified as an industrial coapany
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Appendli 8: Mufta. Cm . on F01BIS_il9li) IDG Largest Foreign 
Investors in U.S. lot la Sample
1. Seagram Co., Ltd. CA chea., energy, ale. bev. (23% Dupont, J.E. Seagraa ( Sons)
2. Tengelaan Croup GR supermarkets |AtP)
3. Hanson Trust PLC BR consuaer goods [Hanson Industries, SCR)
1. Generale Occidentals FR spnkts., tiaber, containers (Grand Union Crovn tellerbach)
5. Franz Haniel t Cle GR food distributors (Scribner Inc.)
(. Elf Aqultane Group FR cheas. drugs, bldg. materials (Elf Acquitane Inc.)
7. Delhalze 'Le Lion* SA BE supermarkets (Food Lion, Food Giant)
(. Vender International IE retailing (Dilliard Dept. Stores)
9. Ahold RV RE supermarkets (BI-LO, Giant Food Stores) 
business foras (Moore Business Foras)10. Hoore Corp. Ltd. RE
11. Genstai Corp. CA bldg. aatls., RE dev., finance services, (Genstar USA) 
constr., bldg. atls., apples. (R.B. Robertson Scovlll, Inc.)12. First City Financial Corp. CA
13. United Biscuit PLC BR bakery, food products (Reebler, Specialty Brands)
14. SRBCHA FR aviation (CFK International, Inc.)
15. Canadian Dev. Corp. CA office equipment, energy (Savin Corp.)
IS. TBG Holdings IV RE elec. f atl. pdts., containers, puaps, (Elc. Sciences Inc., InCon 
Packaging Inc., Info Tech. Group, Hetaiink, Sterling Fluid Pdts.)
17, Olyipia i Tork Dev. Ltd. CA recr., dev., bnkg., forest pdts, (Landaark Land, Rouse, 
libitibi-Price)
It. Otto Versand GR catalog retailing (Speigel Inc.)
19. Revs Corp. Ltd. All aedia (levs America)
20. tFI Intl., SA LUI auto prts, indus. comp, cement (Noog auto., Chicago Ravhide, Incoa, 
Intl., RC Cement)
21. lor them Foods PLC BR meat pdts., neat I poultry (Prestige Goods, leystone Foods)
22. J. Sainsburg PLC BR supermarkets (Shav's Supermarkets)
23. Sobey Parties CA food distributors (Hannaford Brothers]
24. Pilkington Brothers PLC BR glass, electro-optics (LOF Glass)
25. Johnson Ratthey PLC BR printing, refining (Johnson Ratthey Inc.)
25. Proaodes FR superaarkets (Red Food Stores, Houchens, Prairie)
Source: Ron-U.S. Multinational Enterprise Data Bank
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Aopendii C; _ O iI Firas Bicladed Froa Analysis
t i l l __________________ 1966 Bank____ 1976 Banfc____ 1985 Baafc
British Petroleua 3 3
CEPSA - 162 160
Daikyo Oil - 125 115
Elf-Aquitane * 20 10
Ell 27 6
EHPETROL - 101 89





Ideaitsu Kosan - 41 46
Iaperial Oil - 42 69
Narvzen Oil 176 77 77
Mitsubishi Oil - 108 116
leste - 168 82
Nippon Mining 130 114 94
OKV - 173 170
Petroflnia 69 41 44
Boyal Dutch Shell 1 I
Toa lemyo logyo - 95 102
Veba Cheaia - 66 65
PENII 66 70
Petrobras 90 23 18
(IDF) Taciaiento Petro 89 - 103
Chinese petro - 143 85
Indian oil - 103 51
Kuwait petro - - 28
Nippon oil - - 32
Pertaalna - - 35
Petro Canada - - 136
Petro Venezuela - 11 34
Shova Shell Sekiyu - - 60
Statoll - - 78
Ssangyong - - 137
Turktye Petrolleri - 180 63
ERAF 58 - -
Snnkyong - - 67
Sooice: loi-U.S. Multinational Enterprise Data Bank
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY: ACCUMULATION, COMPETITION AND DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES
THE WORLD SYSTEM PERSPECTIVE 
It has been argued that the current wave of direct 
foreign investment (DFI) in the United States can be viewed 
as the logical outcome of the competitive drive of 
capitalist accumulation and reproduction on a world scale. 
At this particular historical juncture (the period since the 
Second World War), the imperative of expanded reproduction 
has established the internationalization of productive 
capital (DFI) as the dominant moment in capital's movement 
through its three circuits of accumulation. This view was 
seen, in Chapter II, to be Marxist in its origin, drawing on 
the works of such modern authors as Christian Palloix, Ben 
Fine, Lawrence Harris, Ernest Mandel, Gregory Adams and Marc 
Herold.1 As Mandel has pointed out, the imperative of 
expanded accumulation has turned the multinational 
enterprise into the determinant organizational form in 
capital's reproduction. Thus, he was quoted in Chapter IV 
that,
In the past there was only marginal 
internationalization of the production of 
surplus-value in actual manufacturing 
industry, outside the domain of raw materials.
Today it constitutes the really new and 
specific aspect of the internationalization of 
capital in the late capitalist epoch.... This
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development started immediately after the 
Second World War, especially in the U.S. oil, 
automobile and electrical apparatus
industries, and has today become a world-wide 
phenomenon which for the first time actually 
provides an immediately international 
framework for the competition of c a p i t a l . ^
This conception stands in distinction from and is 
opposed to the perspective that DFI in the U.S. (and in 
general) can be explained through either a market 
imperfections model or a generalized monopoly framework.'3 
The current wave of DFI in the U.S. cannot be explained by 
the mainstream position that seeks to expose the cause
through a listing of either firm-specific monopoly 
advantages or macroeconomic market imperfections fostered 
within specific countries or industries. These theories 
have consistently confused the enabling and motivating 
factors with the underlying cause of the international flows 
of productive capital. As argued in Chapter III, these 
theories have evolved from a misplaced retention of the 
neo-classical paradigm which holds that any firm would
choose to service foreign markets through exports unless it 
was able, or required, to overcome the inherent 
disadvantages (which, though stated are never proven) of 
foreign production. This neo-classical foundation 
invariably prevents the mainstream researchers from
recognizing the basic advantages bestowed on the firm that 
adopts international production, chief among which is the 
increased flexability afforded to the process of a firm's
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accumulation.
Firm-specific monopoly advantages, such as superior 
technology, internal organization, financing or size, do not 
cause the DFI decision to be made. Instead, they serve as 
the means or methods which allow the firm to achieve an 
internationalization of its productive capital in particular 
instances. Industry or country specific market 
imperfections (such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
currency premiums, availibility of raw materials, 
undervaluations of the U.S. stock market, etc.) likewise do 
not cause the decision to undertake DFI in the United 
States. While all of these specific factors can be seen as 
motivating ones, in particular cases at particular times, 
the explanation of the DFI decision resides in the process 
of competitive accumulation and reproduction o£ capital 
itself.
The competitive world system perspective is also denied 
by the neo-Marxist theory of monopoly capital. The latter 
sees the cause of the export of capital (both portfolio and 
direct) in the development of generalized monopoly not 
competition between capitals. Here the export of capital 
(in general) is regarded as an attempt to vent the 
domestically-produced unlnvestable surplus. The inability 
to absorb this ever-growing surplus, which results, it is 
argued from the development of permanent monopolies, creates 
permanent stagnation and a growing irrationality of the
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capitalist system as a whole. As seen in Chapters I and II,
this thesis claims that the monopoly capital theory stands
the world on its head, with the DFI decision arising from
permanent monopoly and perpetual stagnation, instead of from
the process of competitive capitalist accumulation itself.
The fundamental cause of the error is the lack of a
dialectical view of accumulation which allows for the
contradictory nature of competition and monopoly, while
resolving this contradiction through the synthesis of
capital's movement.^ Marx noted at the dawn of the age of
joint-stock companies,
In practical life we find not only 
competition, monopoly, and the antagonism 
between them, but also the synthesis of the 
two, which is not a new formula, but a
movement. Monopoly produces competition, 
competitors become monopolists....and the more 
the mass of the proletarians grows as against 
the monopolists of one nation, the more 
desperate competition becomes between 
monopolists of different nations. The 
synthesis is such that monopoly can only 
maintain itself by continually entering into 
the struggle of competition.'’
This thesis contends in Chapters I and II that the 
neo-Marxist rejection of the Marxian laws of motion (the 
increasing concentration and centralization of capital, the 
tendency for the rate of profit to fall, and the labor 
theory of value) results both from a failure to understand 
the dialectical nature of competition and monopoly in the 
process of accumulation, as well as from an inappropriate 
focus in the level of abstraction whhich is applied. While 
Marx cannot be criticized for concentrating his analysis on
3 2 7
a single nation-state (Great Britain), the neo-Marxist 
analysis o£ modern capitalism based on only one nation-state 
(usually the United States) is both indefensible and the 
cause of many subsequent errors. Chief among these errors 
is the claim that the internal logic of the capitalist 
system has broken down, producing a system that is 
increasingly illogical and, hence, unintelligible. 
Inevitably, this leads the monopoly capital theorists to 
predict that it is only a question of time before the 
capitalist system collapses under its own weight. What they 
fail to perceive, however, is that it is not capitalism 
which is increasingly irrational and crumbling, but the 
static theory of monopoly capitalism itself.
THE DATA ON DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
The Macroeconomic Data
In Chapter II, macroeconomic time-series data, gathered
from The Survey of Current Business. were presented for
direct foreign investment in the United States since 1900. 
These data illustrated that most of such investment has 
occurred since the end of the Second World War. The pace of 
this activity averaged an annual growth rate of 7.06% from 
1950 to 1970. From 1970 to 1985 the pace of this movement 
of capital accelerated significantly, averaging an annual 
growth rate of 19.06%. Additionally, these time-series 
showed that the source of DFI was almost exclusively other 
developed capitalist countries. Throughout the post-World
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War II period, 65-70% o£ this investment has originated in
Europe (led by Great Britain and the Netherlands).
Meanwhile, Canada has seen its share of DFI in the U.S. 
decline from a high of 30,4% in 1955 to a level of 9.1% in 
1985. The declining share for Canada has been matched by a 
growing share for Japan from 1.3% in 1960 to 10.4% in 1985. 
Finally, it was noted that the increasing share of Latin 
America's DFI in the U.S. (from 1.8% in 1965 to 9.3% in 
1985) was, at least partly, a statistical abberation owing 
to a change in the Commerce Department's definition of
ownership in its 1974 benchmark survey.®
Even though direct Investment abroad by U.S. 
corporations has grown throughout the post-World War II 
period, Chapter II presented penetration indices in Tables 
2-10 and 2-11 which illustrated that the two-way flow of 
investment has not been proportional. From 1950 until 1970 
U.S. direct investment abroad grew at a more rapid pace than 
DFI in the U.S. Between 1970 and 1975 a trend reversal 
occurred as the inward flow of direct investment began to 
outstrip the outward flow. During the late 1970s this 
reversal of trend gained strength, culminating (from 1980 to 
1985) in the development of penetration supremacy for many 
of the foreign countries (i.e. Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Japan).^
The Microeconomic Data 
Chapter V presented the results of an analysis of a
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sample of 135 foreign manufacturing firms with direct 
investments in the U.S. This research indicated that the 
largest manufacturing investments have occurred in the 
following Industries: Chemicals and Drugs; Transportation 
Equipment; Electrical Machinery; Non-electrical Machinery 
and Computers; and Food and Kindred Products. These results 
conformed to the macroeconomic data obtained from the The 
Survey of.Current Business and presented in Chapter II, 
Table 2-9. An exception to the aggregate data was noted by 
the existence of a disproportionately large number of firms 
(in the sample) in the Primary Metals Industries. This 
anomoly was explained by the fact that most of these sample 
firms possessed relatively small investment stakes in the 
United States.
The sample data also revealed a country breakdown 
similar to aggregate data with a few exceptions. While the 
firms showing the greatest representation were primarily 
European (led, of course by Great Britain), the sample 
contained a disproportionately large number of Japanese 
firms and a disproportionately small number of firms from 
the Netherlands when compared to the aggregate data 
presented in Chapter II. These incongruencies were 
explained by the fact that most of the Japanese firms were 
relatively small (designated as C-firms) investors in the 
U.S. who had only recently (post-1975) made their initial 
investment there. Thus, these Japanese firms were seen as
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being in only the first stage of their penetration strategy 
and it was predicted that further investment was quite 
likely. Additionally, the relatively small number of Dutch 
firms in the sample was explained by the fact that three of 
them (AKZO, Phillips, and Unilever) were among the very 
largest investors in the U.S. (designated as A-firms). All 
three had a massive presence in the United States which had 
been built up over many years, with initial penetration 
pre-dating the Second World War.
The timeframe of the sample population's post-World War 
II direct investment penetration of the U.S. market 
corresponded with that of the aggregate data presented in 
Chapter II. The sample results indicated that most firms 
follow a preconceived strategy of penetration. This is
often marked by an initial stage of experimental investment 
during which small investments and/or joint ventures
predominate. Once, the firm decides to fully commit itself 
to production in the U.S., however, the size of the 
investment tends to dramatically increase while the use of 
joint ventures tends to diminish. An attempt was made to
identify the timeframe of each sample firm's strategy of 
penetration since the end of the Second World War. This 
analysis revealed that the largest investors (A-firms) 
embarked on their strategy between 1965 and 1975, even if
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the firm was found to have investments in the U.S. 
pre-dating the Second World War, Also, most of the A-flrms 
were shown to have undertaken an expanded (third round) 
commitment to U.S. production in the 1980s. The 
middle-sized investors (B-flrms) tended to begin their 
penetration strategy somewhat later, between 1970 and 1980, 
while the smallest investors (C-firms) illustrated a 
tendency to embark on their penetration in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. Thus, the aggregate data, which showed a 
marked increase in DFI in the U.S. after the mid-1960s, was 
revealed to contain three waves of investment as A-firms 
were followed by B-firms and then by the C-firms.
The results of the analysis of the sample firms also 
indicated a strong proclivity for acquisitions of existing 
U.S. companies (as opposed to new constructions or 
joint-ventures) predominating as the method employed to 
achieve penetration. This was particularly true for the 
largest investors. Thirty six percent of the 28 A-firms 
used acquisitions only in their penetration, while 21% used 
both acquisitions and new construction and the remainder 
used acquistions supplemented by both new construction and 
joint-venture arrangements. On the other hand the smallest 
investors (C-firms) in the sample population exhibited a 
much greater propensity to employ joint-venture arrangements 
with U.S. firms in their attempts to penetrate U.S. 
production.
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Finally, the inherently competitive nature of this 
movement of capital was further illustrated through an 
exploration of the firms who had failed in their penetration 
efforts. It was seen that failure was primarily due to: (1) 
unsuccessful efforts to use the U.S. market to diversify the 
investing firm's production base; (2) the lack of adequate 
financing for the U.S. projects by the foreign parent; or 
(3) a poorly conceived investment strategy tied to an 
outdated or improper technology. The existence of these 
failures was seen as further evidence of the bankruptcy of 
the theory of monopoly capital.
CRISIS IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ACCUMULATION. GROWING 
STAGNATION, INCREASING COMPETITION AMD THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PRODUCTION
In distinction to the neo-Marxist static model of 
monopoly capital which forecasts perpetual stagnation and 
increasing irrationality of the capitalist system, this 
thesis has advanced the dynamic theory of long waves of 
capitalist accumulation and reproduction. Conceptually this 
means that capitalism is seen as a rational system (within 
its own limits) that develops in an uneven and 
disproportionate fashion. Most clearly elucidated in the 
works of David Gordon and Ernest Mandel, the claim is that 
capitalism, as a world system, is inherently subject to 
periods of prolonged expansion, followed by peroids of
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prolonged stagnation. Bach long wave o£ expansion is based 
on a unified system of social structures that allow 
profitable capitalist accumulation to proceed. The very 
process of accumulation, however, creates growing 
contradictions and conflicts within the system which begin 
to suppress profitability and increasingly act to undermine 
the legitimacy of this unified system of social structures. 
The tendency for the rate of profit to fall (Mandel believes 
this to be more appropriately related to long waves than the 
normal industrial cycles), which proceeds from the Marxian 
notion of a rising organic composition of capital centered 
around a set of inter-related technologies, produces a 
period of increasing competition and extended stagnation.
Gordon, who identifies this period of stagnation as one
of crisis in the social structure of accumulation, claims
that the long wave of stagnation can only be overcome by a
restructuring of the social relationships governing
accumulation.
While the capitalist economy tends 
endogenously to generate both business cycles 
and economic crises, normal economic activity, 
within the context of prevailing social 
relationships, is sufficient to restore 
prosperity during a business cycle recession.
Normal economic activity is not sufficient, on 
the other hand, to generate a resolution of an 
economic crisis and a restoration of a rapid 
rate of accumulation: changes in the
prevailing social relationships with the 
ultimate effect of reconstituting the 
environmental stability necessary for rapid 
and sustained accumulation, are necessary for 
crisis to come to an end.
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In Gordon's judgment, the only way to resolve this growing 
crisis in the social structure of accumulation is to replace 
the current structure with a new one. He further stated 
that the forces which operate to determine the form of the 
restructuring are endogenous to the capitalist system. 
Thus, such factors as the trajectory of class struggle, the 
organization of corporate structures, the altered forms of 
competition, the nature of state intervention and control, 
the social and technological mechanisms of reproduction and 
other factors (see Chapter IV, Table 4-9) interact in this 
period of stagnation and crisis to define the path of the 
restructuring.
The concrete historical conditions existing after the 
Second World War produced a social structure of accumulation 
which was based on the hegemony of the United States, 
allowing it to create the institutional framework (both 
domestically and internationally) necessary for prolonged 
expansion. As accumulation proceeded, however, the logic: of 
this social structure began to disintegrate. The long wave 
of expansion gave way to a phase of prolonged stagnation as 
the ability of the system to sustain itself weakened. The 
spreading stagnation produced a heightening of conflict 
between capital and labor (intensified class struggle), an 
expansion of capitalist rivalry (especially international 
imperialist rivalry), and a growing crisis in the social 
structure of accumulation.
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From such a world-system viewpoint this thesis has
attempted to provide an explanation of DFI in the United
States which focused on the declining hegemony of U.S.
imperialism, the development of a generalized crisis of
overproduction, a falling rate of profit, increasing
international competition and a spreading threat of
structural breakdown. At this particular historical
juncture, the growth of International competition achieves
its most poignant expression in the progressive
internationalization of productive capital as corporations
of all sizes seek to overcome the limits to their continued
accumulation. What has been expressed corresponds with the
stance of olle and schoeller who have argued that,
the stage which the world capitalist system 
has now reached contains a tendency which is 
forcing companies, regardless of their size, 
to undertake a global reorganization of their 
manufacturing processes on pain of 
extinction....It is the historically unique 
combination of innovations in site, products 
and processes in a phase of world economic 
stagnation which constitutes the substance of 
the reorganization of the world economy. ®
While this thesis has exposed the extent of the 
internationalization of productive capital as it relates to 
the growth of manufacturing DFI in the United States, no
attempt has been made to analyze its impact on the social
structure of accumulation in the United States or in the
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capitalist world as a whole. Such an investigation will 
serve as a starting point for further (post-doctoral) 
research already underway through an expansion of the sample 
population (both for manufacturing and non-mnufacturing 
firms) in the non-U.S. multinational enterprise data bank. 
The goal will be to analyze the impact of the growing DFI in 
the U.S. on the changing forms of competition between 
separate fractions of capital as well as the effect of these 
changes on class struggle, the social and technological 
mechanisms of reproduction and the role of the state in 
reconstituting a social structure of accumulation that will 
create the conditions for expanded capitalist production and 
accumulation. In thl3 regard, what has been elaborated 
above must be considered a preliminary Investigation which 




1. For a further discussion of this perspective see Chapter 
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16, Spring 1982, pp. 56-57.
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